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In Shelley’s Wake: Tracing Two Centuries of Impact builds upon the strong 
biographical scholarship on Mary Shelley to consider the conditions and 
circumstances that allowed her to write what Brian Aldiss labels “the first real novel 
of science fiction” (30), Frankenstein. While this generic categorisation remains 
contentious, my work draws upon Michel Foucault’s concept of discourse and the 
language of archaeology and geology that he uses throughout An Archaeology of 
Knowledge and The Order of Things to build an understanding of culture as a fluid 
phenomenon and hence one in which we can trace the ripples of impact caused by 
the publication of Shelley’s novel. My close reading of Frankenstein explores the 
major themes of curiosity, education, family, and responsibility to reveal Shelley’s 
position, concluding that she offered fractured mirrorings of each in the three-part 
narrative of the novel. These ambiguous representations, where none are given clear 
primacy over the others, are the hallmark of the novel and ultimately establish the 
moral space for readers to make their own decisions about the potentials of new 
science. 
Moving forward, I explore the utility of emerging research tools in tracing, 
measuring and quantifying the impact of Shelley’s works and the moral space she 
established in her ambiguous representations of science and its potential outcomes. 
Ultimately, I conclude with a return to Foucault, arguing that Shelley is, in fact, a 
founder of discourse, having “ produced something else: the possibilities and the 
rules for the formation of other texts” (“Author”113). Having surveyed the impact of 
Shelley’s work, I argue that what is revealed is not only the very early elements of 
the science fiction genre but in Frankenstein Shelley also opened a new discursive 
space for science and morality to interact through fiction. It is this same discursive 
space that the genre of SF, with all its sub-genres and permutations, has come to 
occupy today, and so we can see Shelley as not only the founder of genre, but the 
founder of a new way for culture and society to respond to scientific advancement.  
This work offers a new perspective on Shelley and on science fiction, as I 
argue that Shelley both established a new discursive space and laid the groundwork 
for the genre (SF) which most often occupies this space. There is an abundance of 
scholarship on Shelley, with a great deal of new material emerging as it is the 
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bicentennial year of the first edition of Frankenstein, so it is a relevant and current 
topic of interest to a wide range of scholars. I offer something new to this discussion: 
in my close reading of the novel, my framing of Foucault’s concept of discourse, and 
to the significance ascribed to Shelley, not only as a founder of genre, but more 
importantly as opening out the space in which our culture can negotiate the moral 
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The bicentenary of the publication of Frankenstein has sparked a great deal of 
reflection upon and re-evaluation of academia’s understandings of Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley and her works. The intense interest shown in the 
Frankenstein bicentennial by scholars of many different persuasions, across such 
subject areas and sub-disciplines as varied as Romanticism, science fiction, Christian 
studies, the Gothic, technology, and psychology, is testament to the enduring hold 
that  Shelley’s novel has on both the academy and the wider reading public. No 
fewer than ten calls for papers for conferences marking the milestone appeared 
during 2017, and it is to be anticipated that most of these will generate publications, 
along with the numerous special issues of journals and, of course, theses on the 
novel. Perhaps most significant is the establishment by Arizona State University’s 
Center for Science and the Imagination of the Frankenstein Bicentennial Project, 
which has been designed to marry STEM-based research to literary criticism of the 
novel to encourage ongoing conversation about the moral consequences of scientific 
research and innovation. Such a flurry of activity at the moment of the bicentennial 
makes it easy to imagine that the last two hundred years has been replete with 
continuous scholarly interest in Shelley and her novel. Yet in many ways the 
academic recovery of Shelley’s literary stature has been rather like the work of her 
titular character, Victor Frankenstein: the recovery has come late and has been 
something of a hybrid activity, stitching together limited points of interest from 
small subsets of the broader field of literary criticism. In Shelley’s Wake takes part in 
this conversation and offers a re-evaluation of Shelley’s significance as an early 
science fiction author to argue that she can be seen as a Foucauldian founder of 
discourse and that this discourse still operates in our culture today. 
Just as Victor’s creature was the result of years of unrecognised toil, Shelley 
criticism had languished for almost a century after her death, with the majority of 
scholars focussing their attention on her famous husband. Just as Victor experienced 
“an anxiety that amounted to agony” (M. Shelley Frankenstein [1818] 35) at the 
moment of creation, a review of the biographical scholarship reveals Shelley was 
beset by a similar anxiety as she strove to be both a woman and author in the 1800s. 
Feminist scholars such as Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, Anne Mellor, and Mary 
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Poovey gave new life to studies of Shelley and her work when they recognised 
Shelley not only as a woman, but as an author worthy of critical attention, rather than 
as a footnote in her husband’s works. Shelley was one of many of the female authors 
who had published anonymously (Jane Austen) or under a male pseudonym (George 
Eliot) during their lifetime whose life and works were investigated in more detail by 
this wave of feminist scholarship.  The late 1980s saw a surge in the academic 
interest in Shelley with the publication of new editions of Shelley’s letters and 
journals and Muriel Spark’s Mary Shelley—Shelley’s once lifeless body of work was 
now a living thing. While the emphasis and scope changed, biographical approaches 
to reading Shelley have dominated scholarly responses to her works. Since the late 
1990s, a much wider range of approaches have been adopted in the study of Shelley 
and her works: just as Victor’s creature strikes out on his own, so too academic 
responses to Shelley have taken diverse and varied paths. Many of these retain a 
biographical bent, particularly psychoanalyses of Shelley, which seek to find hidden 
meaning in her works. The potential for Shelley’s work to be read through the lens of 
psychoanalysis was picked up by a number of critics at the turn of this century; 
however, I will argue that these are a continuation of the biographical tradition, in 
that they contribute more to our understanding of Shelley as a person rather than to 
an understanding of how the texts which she authored participated in broader cultural 
and literary contexts. In examining the major trends in the history of Shelley 
scholarship, then, I will establish that the scholarship surrounding her work 
ultimately drifts toward painting a diverse and multifaceted portrait of a life against 
which her literary achievement can be measured. To cut against the grain of these 
trends, I will focus on both Shelley’s own perception of herself as an author and the 
responses of others to this sense of her stature as an author.  
Chapter Two will build upon the strong biographical foundations of previous 
scholarship to construct a new contextual biography of Shelley. It is important to 
note that this thesis is not intended as a biography of Shelley, rather, it draws upon 
the particular perspective offered by the methodology of contextual biography to 
position Shelley within her place and time. In so doing, it becomes possible to trace 
the ideas and individuals that influenced Shelley and her writing, while also seeing 
her as an active agent within this landscape, one who took these influences and 
synthesised them into something new. Contextual biography serves as a way to 
merge our understandings of the many aspects of Shelley into a whole; to step back 
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and look at the larger picture. This perspective offers new opportunities for 
understanding and analysis. By considering Shelley’s place within her discursive 
context, this chapter will also articulate the key features of contextual biography, 
which remains a general practice rather than a well-defined methodology. Contextual 
biography goes beyond classic biography in that it considers the broader social and 
cultural forces that may have influenced the subject. One of the key features of 
contextual biography is that it is evidence-based. Arguments for any correlation 
between socio-cultural factors and the life or work of the author must be supported 
by evidence. This stands in contrast to pathography or psychobiography, such as 
Anthony Badalamenti and Ronald Britton’s analyses, in which the critic infers 
relationships between events and works, often arguing that the author may not have 
even been consciously aware of these parallels. When the vast amount of work and 
the wide range of conclusions about the incompatibility of Shelley’s dual nature as 
woman and writer is taken as a whole, it becomes clear that Shelley’s sense of self is 
played out through her fiction. This makes a study of her personality, place, and time 
significant in an evaluation of her work.  
Michel Foucault views the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth centuries as a period of significant change, “certainly one of the most 
radical that ever occurred in Western culture” (Order 220), during which, “a 
modification and shifting of cultural interests, a redistribution of opinions and 
judgements, the appearance of new forms in scientific discourse, wrinkles traced for 
the first time upon the enlightened face of knowledge” (Foucault, Order 238) 
appeared. Yet Foucault is no absolute determinist, as the concept of the founder of 
discursivity allows for creative agency, albeit under conditions open to epochal 
change. This study reveals Shelley was at the right place(s) at the right time 
(nineteenth century Europe, under Foucault’s definition) to be the founder of this 
new discourse. To successfully show that Shelley is a founder of discourse, the 
method of contextual biography can be applied to demonstrate both how Shelley 
drew upon her context and how her work in turn changed the discursive contexts of 
her culture. Coupled with the additional complexity of her personal life and her close 
relationship to two of the greatest minds of the era (namely, her father William 
Godwin, and her mother, Mary Wollstonecraft), Shelley was well-equipped to bring 
to life something new, as she stood at the intersection of traditional beliefs, radical 
thought, religion, and secular science: the old world and the new.  
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 Chapter Three will posit that Shelley can be viewed as a Foucauldian founder 
of discourse, not merely the progenitor of a genre. Foucault’s conception of society 
and culture through the language of archaeology and geology seems to support the 
evolutionary view of culture and change suggested by the cultural turn, as slow and 
sedimentary. Yet Foucault also acknowledges the ability of individuals to disrupt the 
slow evolution of culture with his theorisation of the role of the “founder of 
discourse”, a figure who not only creates their own works but “the possibilities and 
the rules for the formation of other texts” (Foucault, “Author” 113-114). I argue that 
Shelley is a Foucauldian founder of discourse—she renegotiated the values 
framework for the new science of her era. I argue Frankenstein’s creation is 
Shelley’s reflection upon the potential of the new science of galvanism: she founds a 
new way to reflect upon the potential impacts of scientific developments by using 
fiction to pose a moral “what if…?”. Most significantly, she leaves the act of 
negotiation to the reader with the ambiguity of the ending, which condemns neither 
Victor nor the Creature. As Susan Tyler Hitchcock describes, “the monster … 
remains a player on the greatest stage of human history because his story continues 
to raise, not answer, questions” (6). Shelley’s choice to leave the ending open to 
reader interpretation is a key component of her establishment of a new discursive 
space. In this way we can see the role of the individual biographical subject within 
their broader cultural context as a potential agent of cultural change, or founder of 
discourse.  
To support this argument and explore the ideas that Shelley was concerned 
with, Chapter Four offers a close reading of the 1818 edition of the Frankenstein. 
Shelley took the core ideas and concerns of her time and her milieu and synthesised 
them into something new. Curiosity, education, family and community, and 
responsibility are all significant themes explored in the novel. Just as lightning both 
fuses and fractures, so too Shelley’s novel synthesises or fuses the concerns of her 
times in her narrative, yet the ambiguous ending leaves a multiplicity of possible 
meanings. Charles Schug describes this as a “moral experience [which] goes on after 
Frankenstein’s death, it continues after the novel stops” (611). I see the three 
narrators as distorted and fragmented reflections of one another, and so the readings 
of these themes is also fragmented—different meanings can be made depending on 
which fragment catches the reader’s eye. Schug observes, “each narrator interprets 
his experience in moral terms yet each takes a strong moral position that is 
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inadequate to encompass the experience of the other two” (612). I argue that it is this 
diffusion or fracturing of meaning that gives the novel its power and longevity over 
the past two centuries.  
Of course, Frankenstein and The Last Man were not Shelley’s only novels. 
Valperga and Perkin Warbeck are other notable works, however they err more to 
historical fiction rather than something that could be labelled science fiction or 
speculative fiction. Brooks Landon describes science fiction as “a literature of the 
possible - or the not yet possible, as opposed to fantasy, where the impossible holds 
sway” (17). Shelley’s other novels take real people and events as their premise, 
rather than that which may be possible (even if “not yet possible”) through science 
and technology. Shelley’s other novels do not operate in the same discursive space, 
that intersection between science and fiction which was only just emerging. As 
outlined in Figure 3 in Chapter 1, discursive ripples can interact and overlap. In both 
Valperga and Perkin Warbeck, we can see the commonality of the political discourse 
that operates in The Last Man, yet Shelley does not use the science fiction “what 
if…?” hinge that is so key to the narrative of Frankenstein and is also the trigger for 
the political and social changes in The Last Man. The other factor in deciding to 
restrict this study to only two of Shelley’s works was that as a study of impact it 
made most sense to focus upon the text that has had the most significant impact. The 
discussion of The Last Man only reinforces the slowly emerging tropes of the genre 
and serves as evidence of texts operating in the discursive space which opened upon 
the publication of Frankenstein.  
 Many scholars have noted the intertextuality of Shelley’s, Percy Bysshe 
Shelley’s, and Godwin’s work—Chapter Five will explore these intersections, and 
assert that Shelley can be seen as an early contributor to the formation of science 
fiction as a genre. It is not the aim of this thesis to definitively assign a genre 
classification to Shelley’s novel; it is in many ways a generic hybrid, with a strong 
Gothic foundation. However, I argue that Shelley’s work, while drawing on 
conventions of other genres and with strong links to other works, does do something 
innovative that can be viewed as a forerunner of the science fiction genre. Then, in 
the final chapter, I will trace the afterlives of Shelley’s work, as it continues to create 
ripples of influence in our own culture. I will offer some reflection upon tools that 
may make it possible for academics to better navigate the tsunami of scholarship that 
has arisen since the 1980s and the proliferation of digital publishing. This is not a 
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comprehensive survey, rather a starting point for a conversation about how data 
mining and analytic tools may assist scholars to identify trends which they can then 
research more deeply. I will argue that the discourse Shelley founded can be seen 
both in responses from her contemporaries and in our culture today. This discursive 
space, where readers are left to their own moralising, is most often manifested in 
books labelled as one of the many sub-genres of science fiction. For reasons that will 
become apparent throughout this thesis, I opt not to try to pin this discourse down 
with a name that might give pre-eminence to one or another aspect of the 
possibilities that it creates in society. This discourse needs to be understood in 
relation to the social function of science fiction, more broadly, but it is not altogether 
reducible to the category of science fiction. It draws on prior discourses—for such is 
the way new discourses are formed, as I shall explain—but it is also not to be aligned 
principally with one or another of these. It is, in effect, a field of open possibility that 
resists being fixed by a specific name. 
Along these lines, I will conclude my argument by positing that science 
fiction is both a genre and a function of this unnameable discourse—the genre is the 
literary form that the broader social discourse takes. There is no doubt that science 
fiction writers fulfil the role that Percy Bysshe Shelley once attributed to poets: “the 
unacknowledged legislators of the world” (80). It is unlikely that at the time of his 
death, he could have comprehended the impact that his wife would have in bringing 
this change to the world. A clear sign of the enduring impact of Shelley’s novel is in 
the extent to which science fiction regularly defines how scientists and publics think 
about the role of science in society. Ultimately, through a study of the conditions that 
facilitated the writing of Frankenstein and of its ongoing impact, I will argue that in 
Shelley’s wake we have been left with a new space for our society to articulate and 
explore our fears and hopes for the future, and where we can decide where our moral 
boundaries lie. To begin our exploration of this space, we must first turn to the 






Reading Shelley: A Review and a Response 
 
Scholarly interest in Shelley was slow to emerge in the century following her death 
in 1851. She was regarded as a “personality” rather than as an author in her own 
right, often appearing in criticism only as a biographical note in relation to Percy 
Bysshe Shelley. Shelley did receive some attention from a handful of critics, but they 
still tended to attribute her writing ability to her associates, such as Percy1, her father 
William Godwin, and Lord Byron. She slowly garnered some critical interest but in 
this period her work is rarely judged on its own merits; rather, critics hunt for 
evidence of Percy’s (or others’) influence. So while she was recognised as worthy of 
study, it was only as a dull reflection of her husband’s brilliance. This is clear in one 
of the earliest evaluations of Shelley’s works, Walter Edwin Peck’s 1923 
contribution to the PMLA journal. Peck’s title, “The Biographical Elements in the 
Novels of Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley,” suggests he will link events in Shelley’s 
novels to events in her life, which also became a common practice in later Shelley 
scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s. However, Peck does not trace Shelley’s 
autobiographical leavings. Instead, he reads her works as a biography or character 
studies of Percy and his circle. Peck states, “on five occasions Mary Shelley drew 
full-length portraits in prose of her husband, and his intimate friends…. these not 
only serve to verify known data but afford new information of real value concerning 
Shelley and his circle” (197). This approach of seeing Shelley as an appendage of 
Percy (wife, mother of his children, and occasional praise for her work as his 
posthumous editor) would be common into the 1950s.  
It was not only Percy’s influence critics sought to identify in Shelley’s works 
during this period of criticism. Ernest J. Lovell wrote “Byron and the Byronic Hero 
in the Novels of Mary Shelley” (1951) in response to the publication of Shelley’s 
Letters (1944) and Journals (1947). Lovell asserts that Peck’s reading of Shelley’s 
characters as representations of Percy is flawed. He argues that many of the 
                                                          
1 Rather than write Mary Shelley and Percy Shelley throughout this thesis to differentiate between 
the two, I have adopted the common practice of referring to the primary author by surname (i.e. 
Shelley), and using the spouse’s first name (Percy) in most instances. The choice to use the surname 
Shelley also avoids the pitfalls of overfamiliarity with the biographical subject or the adoption of an 
informal tone.  wit7 
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characters Peck identifies are in fact representations of Byron. Shelley herself admits 
that “in Lord Raymond and Count Adrian faint portraits … of B. [Byron] and S ---- 
but this is a secret” (M. Shelley, Letters Vol. I 564). Both Peck and Lovell 
demonstrate the trend of reading Shelley’s works biographically that was the norm 
during this period of criticism. These readings place Shelley in her role of woman 
and observer, rather than full participant, in her circle and do not regard her as an 
author of note. These early biographies also serve as evidence of the trend towards 
the conflation of Shelley’s life and works, with many assertions based on assumption 
and extrapolation, rather than documentary evidence.  
Peck foreshadows another key feature of later criticism in his closing 
remarks: the emphasis on Shelley’s role as a mother. Peck quotes from Shelley’s 
Faulkner: “To the last she was all mother; her heart filled with that deep yearning, 
which young mother feels to be the very essence of her life, for the presence of her 
child” (293). Peck’s use of this quote reflects the common practice of reading 
Shelley’s work through the lens of her personal life; tracing events and actions in 
Shelley’s fiction back to her grief at the loss of three of her children and her 
luminary husband, or to the influence of significant male figures had upon her 
writing.  
This dichotomy between Shelley’s personal experiences and her work as an 
author was again highlighted in 1938 in one of the first full-length biographies. 
Perhaps one of the most influential insights R. Glynn Grylls offers is that, “Mary 
(suffered) for the conflict there was in her nature between the feminine and the 
artist” (xiii). This conflict in her nature has become a key idea in the study of 
Shelley—the way she sought (and largely failed) to reconcile her sense of self as a 
woman and mother with her creative ability and role as author. While Grylls’s 
biography is largely narrative in style she does draw heavily from letters and diaries 
to which she was given exclusive access by Lord Abinger, who had inherited much 
of Godwin and the Shelleys’ papers. This meant that Grylls’s biography was the best 
supported representation of Shelley available at the time.  
Elizabeth Nitchie was reliant on Grylls’s account of the Abinger papers when 
writing her 1943 article, “Mary Shelley’s Mathilda”. While Nitchie’s research did 
uncover previously unpublished material, this highlights the problematic nature of 
early Shelley scholarship, as much of her personal writings and novels were held in 
private family collections. It also goes some way to explaining why scholars had to 
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resort to inference and extrapolation when linking Shelley’s life and works, as they 
did not have access to Shelley’s own account of events. This article also foreshadows 
the establishment of what has come to be recognised as one of the most significant 
collections of Shelley’s works: the Abinger Collection held at the Bodleian Library. 
Nitchie explains that at this time (1943), only one person had been given access to 
texts still in Lord Abinger’s possession: “These have been made available only to 
Miss R. Glynn Grylls”, who gave, “a description of the two notebooks, a brief 
summary of the story and a few quotations from the final draft” (448). Abinger 
ultimately donated this collection, which gave unprecedented access to previously 
unseen writings by Shelley and her circle. The copying of Lord Abinger’s collection 
to microfilm was only completed in 1952 and the full collection was not stored at the 
Bodleian until 1993 (Abinger Collection). Lord Abinger gave access to the full 
journals of Shelley to Diana Scott-Kilvert and Paula R. Feldman during the 1970s 
which resulted in a much more comprehensive and complete text than the 1947 
Journals that had previously been available.  
Nitchie’s article is not only significant for highlighting the importance of the 
papers that would become the Abinger Collection. Nitchie is one of the first scholars 
to recognise Shelley’s wider body of work and to look to these works for Shelley’s 
personal motivations and influences. Unlike Peck and Lovell, Nitchie reads Mathilda 
for clues about Shelley’s own motivations, rather than for fictionalised portraits of 
her circle. Nitchie wrote in response to Newman Ivey White’s biography of Percy, 
which offered “an analysis of the estrangement between Mary and [Percy] Shelley 
after the death of Clara” (Nitchie 447). Nitchie refutes this using evidence from the 
then-unpublished Mathilda: 
 
But if Shelley’s poems are the obverse of this coin, it also has a reverse 
which Mr. White has not seen. This reverse is an unpublished story by Mary 
Shelley entitled Mathilda, written in 1819 after the death of William, which 
renewed Mary’s grief but not her antagonism to Shelley, and before the birth 
of Percy Florence. (447) 
 
Drawing upon the available fragments of Mathilda and letters and works from within 
the Shelleys’ circle as evidence that they were not estranged, Nitchie argues that the 
novel’s incestuous theme was Shelley’s way of addressing her conflict with Godwin, 
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not Percy. This is well supported: Shelley was torn between reverence for her father 
and the reality of his lack of sympathy on the death of her children and his unceasing 
demands for financial support (Nitchie 457-459). Nitchie’s engagement with 
Shelley’s texts, beyond Frankenstein and her personal correspondence, mark a 
watershed moment in Shelley criticism, as it serves as evidence of the gradual move 
away from simple biography, often more about Percy, towards analysis of Shelley as 
an author and significant figure in her own right. 
By the end of the 1950s, interest in Shelley had waned, but the strong 
biographical focus of criticism had contributed to the recovery and publication of a 
body of works that included her letters, diaries, and several previously unpublished 
novels. Few critics acknowledged the full value of these works, however, as most 
still read Shelley for traces of Percy. This is not to say that I would disregard the 
impact of Shelley’s circle on her writing and, in particular, on the conception of 
Frankenstein. The impact of Shelley’s circle on her writing is considered in this 
thesis in Chapter Five: Influence, Inspiration and Innovation, but this needs to follow 
more careful groundwork that situates Shelley as the central agent of the book’s 
creation rather than distributing her agency among her coevals. Her agency is 
enacted, of course, through the social and familial roles she filled, although it must 
be remembered at all times that one of these roles, “author,” was always very much 
in play throughout her life, even as she filled other roles. The biographical focus of 
the scholarship to this point contributes to the recognition of the problematic nature 
of being a woman, mother, and author during the late Romantic and early Victorian 
eras. This is something that would be explored by future critics, particularly in 
feminist readings, right up until today. 
 
1.1 SAVED BY THE SECOND-WAVE SISTERHOOD 
 
Following on from the biographical readings of Shelley in the first half of the 
twentieth century, 1970s feminist scholars placed new emphasis on the value of 
Shelley’s works while also continuing to acknowledge the important role her 
womanhood had in shaping her work as an author. Gilbert and Gubar’s ground-
breaking feminist reader, The Madwoman in the Attic, included Shelley as one of the 
important women authors that had previously been neglected by first-wave 
feminism. The authors’ stated aim is “to show new ways in which all nineteenth-
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century works by women can be interpreted…. in the process of researching our 
book we realized that, like many other feminists, we were trying to recover not only 
a major (and neglected) female literature but a whole (neglected) female history” 
(xii). The book includes analysis of two of Shelley’s works, Frankenstein and The 
Last Man. Gilbert and Gubar read Frankenstein as a feminist response to Milton’s 
Paradise Lost; a reinterpretation of the role of masculinity and a reaction against it. 
The feminist approach places great emphasis on Shelley’s femaleness—her role as a 
mother, wife and daughter are integral to their reading of the texts. She is the only 
author to have two works considered and in this way she is foregrounded as one of 
the key authors of the period, and her work then read as a critical commentary on the 
social norms of the day. It is in this work that Shelley begins to emerge as an 
important literary figure, rather than just as a historical person. Her texts, not just her 
life, are explored.  
Gilbert and Gubar’s reading of the fictional author’s “Introduction” to The 
Last Man poses that the process Shelley outlines in fact represents her discovery of 
the authorial power of women: 
  
This last parable is the story of the woman artist who enters the cavern of her 
own mind and finds there the scattered leaves not only of her own power but 
of the tradition which might have generated that power. The body of her 
precursor’s art, and thus the body of her own art, lies in pieces around her, 
dismembered, dis-remembered, disintegrated. How can she remember it and 
become a member of it, join it and rejoin it, integrate it and in doing so 
achieve her own integrity, her own selfhood? (98) 
 
It is this struggle for self-integration that would plague Shelley throughout her life. It 
is an interesting coincidence that this example also deploys imagery of 
dismemberment—just as Victor had to create his creature form many parts, Shelley 
must construct her sense of self from the many roles into which she is placed (and in 
which she places herself).  
Gilbert and Gubar’s insights about Shelley’s sense of self acknowledge the 
dichotomy that was explicitly identified in Grylls’s 1938 biography. This conflict 
between her dual role of woman (mother, daughter, wife) and author, and Shelley’s 
response to this conflict, further highlight the importance of Shelley’s biography in 
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understanding her work as an author since her authorship is so inextricably linked to 
her identity (or, plural, identities). Gilbert and Gubar express this point: 
  
For her developing sense of herself as a literary creature and/or creator seems 
to have been inseparable from her emerging self-definition as daughter, 
mistress, wife, and mother. Thus she cast her birth myth— her myth of 
origins—in precisely those cosmogenic terms to which her parents, her 
husband, and indeed her whole literary culture continually alluded. (224) 
 
The tension Shelley seems to have felt between her various roles is usefully labelled 
an “anxiety of authorship”. Gilbert and Gubar explain that for women writers, their 
male precursors “symbolize authority” yet this cannot define the woman writers’ 
experience as their gendered experiences are so different. Gilbert and Gubar 
continue: “Thus the ‘anxiety of influence’ that a male poet experiences is felt by a 
female poet as an even more primary ‘anxiety of authorship’—a radical fear that she 
cannot create, that because she can never become a ‘precursor’ the act of writing will 
isolate or destroy her” (48-49). It is true that Shelley’s literary precursors are almost 
exclusively male, however, the shade of her famed mother, Mary Wollstonecraft, 
served as a ‘literary fore-mother’ in a way that few women writers of the period 
would have experienced. During Shelley’s life, her literary circle is almost 
exclusively male—the women she has lasting relationships with (for example, Claire 
Clairmont, who used her womanhood rather than her intellect to gain a link to 
Byron, and the frequently pregnant wives of the Shelley circle, including Maria 
Gisbourne and Jane Edwards) were not authors but mothers, wives and daughters, as 
expected by society. Shelley also no doubt felt that “the act of writing will isolate or 
destroy her” (Gilbert and Gubar 49). Her life on return to England after Percy’s 
death was a delicate balancing act between writing to survive, but not stepping 
beyond the bounds set by her father-in-law and so jeopardising her role as mother to 
her one surviving child, which will be explored here in Chapter Two. 
Mary Poovey also contributed to the growing analysis of Shelley as an 
author, as well as recognising the importance of her biography, in the chapter “My 
Hideous Progeny: The Lady and the Monster” in her book The Proper Lady and the 
Woman Writer (1984), which evaluated the works of Shelley, her mother Mary 
Wollstonecraft, and Jane Austen. Poovey asserts that the triple-narrative of 
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Frankenstein, and particularly the revisions to the 1831 edition, reflect Shelley’s 
beliefs about creativity, imagination, and the work of the author. Poovey posits that 
Shelley felt trapped between the irresistible influence of imagination and her creative 
ability, fostered and fuelled by the most important (predominantly male) figures in 
her life and the role expected of women in her increasing conservative, proto-
Victorian society: “Taken together, the two editions of Frankenstein provide a case 
study of the tensions inherent in the confrontation between the expectations Shelley 
associated, on the one hand, with her mother and Romantic originality and, on the 
other, with a textbook Proper Lady” (Poovey 121). Poovey attributes the increasing 
emphasis on characterising domesticity as good and imagination (the creative drive) 
as an unstoppable force, akin to fate, in the later edition of Frankenstein as a 
reflection of Shelley’s own self-perception at this time. She concludes:  
 
as a young girl she discovered both the monstrosity and the price of her own 
ambitions; as a grown woman she experienced a persistent desire to disguise 
that aggression beneath the manners of the proper lady her society promised 
that every girl could grow up to be. (142) 
 
This would align with elements in Shelley’s life, particularly her father-in-law’s 
demand that she keep her and his son’s names from the public eye (Williams 178), 
hence the pressure to retire to an entirely domestic circle competed fiercely with both 
her own creative drive and the economic reality of needing to supplement the meagre 
stipend she was awarded from Percy’s estate. Poovey’s reading is less overtly 
feminist, considering Shelley as an author, who as a woman was under different 
social pressures to her male counterparts. Her gender is not the focus of Poovey’s 
work and so marks the transition from criticism based on her femaleness to criticism 
focused on her work as author, albeit a female one. 
Second-wave feminist readings of Shelley’s work built upon the earlier 
biographical readings by not only recognising the influence of the significant men 
that made up her circle, but considering her response to the positions these 
relationships put her in throughout her life. Feminist readings also emphasise the 
anxiety or tension that Shelley experienced in navigating between being both a 
woman and an author. This deepens the criticism of Shelley and her works beyond 
simple biographical readings to a more complete understanding of both how 
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significant Shelley’s experiences are in shaping her works and how significant her 
identification as an author is. Shelley’s sense of self as an author is fundamentally 
linked to her place, time and personality, which will be explored more fully in 
Chapter Two. The feminist scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s begins to reveal how 
Shelley’s works address the tensions that were prevalent in the Romantic era as the 
role of women began to shift and it became possible to be both a woman and a 
writer.  
 
1.2 SPARK LIGHTS A FIRE 
 
The shift from biographical reading per se to a deeper critical understanding to 
which Shelley’s biography contributed key elements was cemented in 1987 to 1988. 
Three major publications worked in concert to reinvigorate the study of Shelley’s life 
and works. Muriel Spark’s biography and two new, much more complete and 
comprehensive editions (thanks to full access to the Abinger Collection) of Shelley’s 
letters and diaries provided new material for critics. These publications also 
reaffirmed Shelley as worthy of study, not merely within the context of what could 
be gleaned about Percy, Godwin, or Byron, but as both woman (as had been 
highlighted by the feminist readings in the early 1980s) and author in her own right. 
Spark had already recognised Shelley’s significance as an author in 1951, when she 
conceived the idea of a critical biography to commemorate the 100th anniversary of 
Shelley’s death. The work did not stir a great response initially, but its republication 
with revisions in 1987 turned the feminist criticism fire into a scholarly inferno. 
Shelley was finally free from the shadow of her husband and her whole body of 
work was being critically evaluated, in many cases, for the first time since their 
original publication. Spark’s book is one of the most extensive full length 
publications dedicated solely to Shelley and marks the shift in academic responses 
from footnotes commenting on her as merely Percy’s wife to wider recognition of 
her as an author of merit, worthy of critical attention. Spark’s work provides a 
comprehensive discussion of Shelley’s life and a rigorous analysis of her work, most 
notably Frankenstein, in which she concludes that the monster is ultimately 
Shelley’s social consciousness made manifest.  
Spark closely recounts events from Shelley’s life, continuing the strong 
tradition of biographical Shelley scholarship. She too, like Grylls and Gilbert and 
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Gubar, recognises the anxiety created by being both woman and author: “It was, 
however, a decided conviction that she was being denied admittance to ‘society’ that 
she began to concede more and more, and too much, to public opinion” (Spark 126). 
Spark is referring here primarily to the changes made to the 1831 edition of 
Frankenstein. Importantly, she also goes beyond a reading of Shelley’s circle of 
significant personalities to acknowledge the significance of the time in which 
Shelley lived: “As Frankenstein clashed with his Monster, so did fixed religious 
beliefs with science: so did imaginative and emotional substitutes for religion with 
scientific rationalism; so did the intuitive and lush passions for a new era with the 
dialectical, material and succinct passions of the eighteenth century” (Spark 166). 
What Spark foregrounds here is the point that Foucault makes in The Order of 
Things, albeit without explicitly aligning her work with that of the French social 
philosopher—this point being that the nineteenth century was a time of rapid 
discursive change as entirely new fields of study emerged. I argue that Shelley was 
both witness to and participant in this momentous change.  
The significance of the Abinger Collection cannot be overstated in enabling 
the republication and then evaluation of Shelley’s diaries and letters. Unlike Nitchie, 
who in 1943 was reliant on Grylls’s account of what she had seen when accessing 
Lord Abinger’s personal collection, the subsequent donation (and in 2004, 
permanent purchase) of the works to the Bodleian Library gave academics 
unprecedented access to works that had not been seen by more than a select few in 
over a century. While these two texts renewed the emphasis on biographical reading 
of Shelley, they were also influenced by the subsequent shift in criticism and so the 
editors’ comments are focused on Shelley and her work as author, not merely tracing 
the influence of others upon her.  
One of the most significant contributions to Shelley scholarship at this time 
was Betty T. Bennett’s comprehensive editorial effort in compiling and analysing 
Shelley’s letters, with the second volume being published in 1988. This work 
includes discussion of how various passages that are difficult to see may be read and 
also provides context for the modern reader. Bennett is also responsible for a number 
of other Shelley publications, with a volume entirely devoted to Shelley marking in 
particular the recognition of her literary worth. The 1988 volume of Letters also 
added fuel to the fire as Bennett’s extensively researched and annotated publication 
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brought to light previously unpublished text and so provided new material that 
reshaped scholars’ understanding of Shelley.  
1987 saw the publication of Shelley’s Journals, edited by Paula R. Feldman 
and Diana Scott-Kilvert. As with Bennett, the extensive research of the editors is 
evident, with many previously unpublished letters and fragments included. Their 
contextual notes enrich the documents, which are occasionally fragmented or 
incomplete. For all the remarkable efforts of the editors, though, the most notable 
(and regrettable) absence in all such editions remains the missing diaries, one of 
which covers the period of Frankenstein’s inception. The addition of Shelley’s 
diaries to the letters that Bennett had edited gave rise to many close readings of 
Shelley’s works through a biographical frame—conflating her life with her work. 
This trend had dominated the early part of the 1980s and would persist in Shelley 
scholarship for the next decade. Like many critics, Feldman and Scott-Kilvert note 
the conflict in Shelley’s nature, stating that “the journal is thus in many ways a 
reflection of the conflict in her own character between her outward reserve and the 
intense emotionalism she concealed beneath it” (Shelley, Journals 1987, xvi). This 
highlights the conflict between roles that had already been noted, but also explains a 
conflict between Shelley’s outward demeanour and inward thoughts. Sometimes 
perceived as cold by those closest to her, the diary reveals that this is not the case at 
all. Both these letters and diaries remain the most comprehensive and well-regarded 
editions of Shelley’s personal writings.  
The combination of Spark’s new reading of Shelley’s life and a rich new 
trove of original material reinvigorated studies into Shelley. Emily Sunstein’s 1989 
Mary Shelley: Romance and Reality built on and responded to Spark’s work with a 
full length academic biography. Her readings of various texts and events function as 
a summation of the current academic view of Shelley: “Perhaps she will be best 
remembered for her perception in Frankenstein and The Last Man, that the 
Promethean drive is at the heart of human ends; and even so, if Nature shrugs we 
perish. In that ambiguity she may be said to have heralded the consciousness that 
distinguishes the Post-Modern for the Modern Age” (Sunstein 403). It will be argued 
that this growing consciousness is in fact the establishment of a discourse, and this 
argument can only be made with a strong contextual biography as its foundation.  
Anne K. Mellor turned her full attention to Shelley in her 1989 work Mary 
Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters. Mellor lays down the new critical 
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contexts on which her study scaffolds its reading of the relationship between life and 
writing: “Relation psychology …, feminist critical theory, cultural anthropology, 
Marxism, and the new historicism” (xii). She also decries those critics who “persist 
in reading Mary Shelley primarily in relation to her husband’s personality and ideas” 
(xi), marking a final and distinct shift away from the biographical approach and its 
emphasis on Percy. Her work is a strongly feminist reading, focusing on a female 
critique of science, discussion of family, and gendered readings of the text, and is 
still regarded as one of the key feminist readings of Shelley. Mellor states, “I hope to 
clarify the subtle ways in which Mary Shelley’s fictions criticise the dominant 
romantic and patriarchal ideologies of her day” (xii) and, in so doing, reads Shelley’s 
works as social commentary in a way that had not been done before.  
Mellor went on to pose the concept of feminine Romanticism in her 1993 
Romanticism and Gender; widening the scope of our understanding of the Romantic 
era to acknowledge the prolific female authors and their differing interests to that of 
the six male authors who until this time had been considered the canonical Romantic 
writers. Susan Tyler Hitchcock affirms this shift beyond the previous Romantic 
canon, citing research which found “the slow infiltration of women writers into our 
standard teaching canon”:  
 
Fully half of the courses surveyed, from undergraduate overviews to graduate 
seminars, included Frankenstein on the syllabus. The researcher concluded 
that “the canon in British Romanticism now includes seven writers rather 
than the former standard six”. Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin Shelley had 
made it into the ivory tower. (285) 
  
Mellor supports this, continuing with her assertion that a number of the female 
authors of the period “employed the novel as a site of ideological contestation and 
subversion, exploiting its generic capacity for heteroglossia and dialogism, for 
disruptive laughter and a sustained interrogation of existing social codes, to invoke 
Bakhtin’s terms” (Romanticism and Gender, 9). This served to emphasise the less 
stable role(s) of women during a period of dynamic social change. Mellor does cite 
Shelley but does not do an in-depth reading of her works, which is hardly necessary 
considering her earlier study. However, this important redefining of Romanticism 
further opened the door for others to consider women authors of the period, 
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including Shelley. These two works by Mellor offer a glimpse of the potential scope 
and benefits of contextual biography, as Mellor seeks to develop an understanding of 
how Shelley and other female authors were positioned in their society and how they 
responded to this, both personally and in their works, although her study stops short 
of pursuing the broader cultural context that I aim to capture here in my own study of 
Shelley’s life, in which I hope to identify the wider forces at play in creating the 
conditions that facilitated the writing of Frankenstein. 
This period of criticism that was ignited by Spark’s biography and new 
editions of Shelley’s Letters and Journals marks another shift in the focus for critics. 
While the feminist emphasis on female roles is still present, new readings begin to 
emerge that consider both how Shelley’s texts functioned within their context and 
how they continue to function in the present time. The significance of the time and 
place in which Shelley wrote is foregrounded, as critics consider how this influenced 
her work and her sense of self, and how her work also actively responded to and 
challenged the norms of the period. This approach, less centred on biography and 
gender, would continue into the 1990s and the new millennium, although the pace of 
criticism slowed for a time.  
 
1.3 IT’S ALIVE! 
 
Academic interest in Shelley waned in the early 1990s, with fewer full-length 
publications. The journal Romanticism devoted a full edition to Shelley in 1993 and 
this shows that while interest had declined, it had not ceased. Following a number of 
conferences held in 1997 to commemorate the bicentenary of Shelley’s birth, a 
millennial wave of publications appeared. The most provocative of these was 
Miranda Seymour’s Mary Shelley. Seymour’s offering gives a more sexualised 
account of Shelley’s motivations, asserting that Percy and Claire were more than 
likely having an affair (Seymour 132) and that Shelley’s interest in Jane Edwards 
after Percy’s death was romantic. Shelley’s letters and diary can be read in such a 
way as to support this argument, yet there is no definite proof to support Seymour’s 
interpretation in any of these documents. Read against Sunstein’s 1989 text, 
Seymour provides some interesting counterpoints, yet Sunstein’s (admittedly more 
conservative) interpretation of events seems better supported by the evidence 
available in the letters and diaries. Seymour’s work highlights the importance of 
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having a standard of evidence in biography, as she herself acknowledges there is no 
direct evidence to support her assertions; it is only her interpretation. This is a 
particular pitfall for biography, as the researcher is creating their own images of the 
subject, rather than analysing the evidence itself. They are adding to the scholarly 
understanding of their subject, and may perhaps add misrepresentations that distort 
the impression of the subject as a whole.  
Fred Botting’s 1991 Making Monstrous: Frankenstein, Criticism, Theory 
offers many insights that are still relevant a half-century on. Botting discusses the 
complexity of the narrative structure and Shelley’s authorial voice—his conception 
of a “doubling” or mirroring in the characters will be explored in Chapter Four. 
Botting also reaffirms the strong biographical readings of Shelley’s work: “It 
becomes difficult in many cases to define where the novel ends and biography 
begins, and whether a distinction is at all possible: the strands of influence are so 
entangled” (75). Yet Botting does not delve deeply into this entanglement, noting 
instead that these readings “provide fewer reasons for critical certainty” (78). Botting 
also clearly identifies the impact of Shelley’s ambiguous ending:  
 
The reader is left suspended uneasily between two poles, without resolution 
or closure, a position on the margins, neither inside nor outside the text, like 
the absent reader of the epistolary novel. In this uncertain, suspended space 
that is neither one nor the other, many meanings may be produced, and many 
differences may be unleashed. (154) 
 
This ambiguity is essential to the longevity and power of Shelley’s novel, a point 
that will be explored in this thesis in Chapter Six.  
The journal Women’s Writing devoted an issue to Shelley in 1999. This 
surveys Shelley’s relationships with many key figures in her life and considers a 
wide range of her works. Most interestingly, Claire Clairmont and her step-mother 
are given consideration, widening the scope of study, which usually focuses 
primarily upon the males in her life. A number of Shelley’s less prominent works are 
also included, such as Lodore. This collation of essays rather than full length books 
would be the trend in Shelley scholarship as the call for full-length works 
diminished. Betty T. Bennett also made another watershed contribution to Shelley 
studies with co-editor Stuart Curran in their anthology of essays Mary Shelley in Her 
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Times. Containing fifteen essays that address the full range of Shelley’s writing, this 
collection again demonstrated the wide array of approaches to reading her work. The 
most successful of these chapters—William St Clair’s “The Impact of Frankenstein” 
and Samantha Webb’s “Reading at the End of the World: The Last Man, History and 
the Agency of Romantic Authorship”—consider both the life of the text of 
Frankenstein and a reading of The Last Man as a critical reflection on authorship.  
St Clair’s chapter gives a detailed account of the publication history of 
Frankenstein, highlighting how the rapidly emerging copyright laws of the modern 
print publication era in fact stymied the novel’s readership until late in the nineteenth 
century. By this point, however, Frankenstein and his creature had already taken on a 
life of their own: “Refused life in the reasonably stable culture of print and reading, 
Frankenstein survived in a free-floating popular oral and visual culture, with only 
the central episode of the scientist making the Creature holding tenuously to its 
original” (St Clair “Impact” 54). This is a key point to note in any study of this text, 
and St Clair’s thorough account of how the text’s publication history facilitated the 
disconnection between text and narrative is valuable background. The fact that 
Shelley’s exploration of science gone wrong triggered such interest, even with her 
original text unavailable for much of the time, speaks to how the work resonated.  
Webb’s contribution to Mary Shelley and her Times argues that the narrative 
frame used in the novel provides a critique of the role of the author—particularly, the 
Romantic author—in relation to effecting real social change. She observes:  
 
While Mary Shelley certainly believes in the agency of authorship and in the 
power of writing to change the world, she also believes in the equal agency 
of readership and is suspicious of the ways texts can be made to function in 
society. Her critique is certainly located in contemporary debates about the 
social function of writing; it also proceeds from a sense of alienation from 
her own audience, surely a uniquely contemporary dilemma for Romantic 
period authors. (Webb 133) 
 
This text contributes to consideration of Shelley’s self-conceptualisation as an author 
and also the perception of others over time of her as an author.  
Another example of the quiet persistence of Shelley scholarship is Paula R. 
Feldman and Theresa M. Kelly’s 1995 anthology of essays, Romantic Women 
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Writers: Voices and Countervoices, containing two readings with a particular focus 
on Shelley. Drawing on the first wave of feminist responses to Romanticism and also 
responding to newer ideas, the reader has a wide scope, and the two papers on 
Shelley are stark contrasts. Stephen Behrant’s offering (1995) harks back to the most 
feminist readings while Judith Pike’s (1995) application of Freud and Lacan herald a 
trend in subsequent publications of applying psychoanalytical readings. These 
starkly different chapters serve to highlight the way in which the field of Shelley 
studies has broadened in the space of only two decades. All facets of Shelley’s life 
and works were under consideration and many competing perspectives and readings 
emerge in the scholarship during this period.  
Behrant’s work serves as a synthesis of the biographical and feminist work 
that emphasises Shelley’s dichotomous roles of woman and author. Behrant utilises 
Foucauldian language to describe the shift that takes place when the critic applies a 
biographical lens to read the life through the work: 
 
The woman writer (who becomes herself an originator of discourse by 
publishing) is “represented” within public culture as an object of discourse 
when her work is reviewed by the (generally male) critic. But she is also 
translated into the subject of discourse when her literary efforts are 
indiscriminately interchanged with, or substituted for, her self—her 
individual person—within the public discourse of criticism. (Behrant 71-72) 
 
As will become clear from this thesis, Behrant’s claim that publishing is sufficient to 
become an originator of discourse is overblown—a fuller discussion of Foucauldian 
discursive formations and Shelley’s role in this landscape is undertaken in Chapter 
Three. More useful is Behrant’s observation of the double nature of criticism that 
makes women writers both object of subject of critical discourse. This tension 
between being both a writer and a figure who can be “read” is neatly summarised by 
Behrant:  
 
The author constantly runs the risk of being made into a fiction by the reader 
who formulates or extrapolates the author from the text. The woman author is 
“read” within a system of culturally encoded patriarchal authority over which 
she has virtually no control but within which she is expected to express 
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herself. She is thus deprived at once of subjectivity, creativity, and autonomy. 
(85)  
 
Behrant’s strongly feminist reading reiterates one of the key beliefs of Feldman, 
Mellor, and Poovey; that is, it is not possible to separate the author and the 
individual, but conflating them and reading biographically is also fraught. Behrant 
also acknowledges what has been recognised in almost all Shelley scholarship: she 
felt torn between her roles as woman and author. This is most clear in his summation 
that it is “entirely valid to read in Frankenstein, as in much of Romantic women’s 
writing, the enigmatic warning … that creativity may be hazardous to one’s health—
indeed to one’s entire existence” (Behrant 85). Shelley would have felt this danger in 
a way few of her time could have. Her gifted husband died young, and the remainder 
of her life was spent living from her creative works, while being closely censored by 
her father-in-law. 
In stark contrast, Pike’s psychoanalytical reading also marks a shift in 
criticism to centre on issues of the body and the Creature. Criticism of the texts, 
rather than close study of the author, would be a trend that would grow as the 
twentieth century moved to a close, as academia explored avenues other than 
biography. Pike observes, “the reanimated corpse awakens a powerful dread that 
brandishes itself in our psyches. Mary Shelley captures this dread when she 
resurrects her Monster and transforms the exquisite corpse of the eighteenth century 
into a menacing sublime corpse that resists fetishization” (153). Reading 
Frankenstein and the Creature in terms of identities, the body, and the sense of self 
draws on a wide array of theoretical approaches and so Pike’s contribution marks a 
new way of reading Shelley’s work that would only become more prevalent in the 
twenty-first century.  
 
1.4 READING A MIND: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SHELLEY 
 
Pike’s chapter was a forerunner for the many psychoanalytic readings of Shelley that 
would proliferate in the 2000s. These psychoanalytic readings demonstrate the 
complexities and challenges of reading and critiquing literature that has clear 
references to the author’s own life. Some of these readings highlight the risks of 
applying psychoanalysis to literary criticism, while some suggest Shelley is “proto-
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Freudian” as her works show an early application of Freud’s talking cure. Shelley 
famously attributes the inception of her most well-known novel, Frankenstein, to a 
dream, which could then be seen as a dream wish in Freudian terms. What is clear in 
Shelley’s work are the complex narrative structures she uses to distance herself from 
being identified as the authorial voice, which are explored more fully in Chapter 
Three. I argue that rather than reading Shelley’s work, and particularly the inception 
dream, to support psychoanalyses, it is more fruitful to see the inception dream as 
evidence of Shelley’s exploration and critique of the authorial process.  
The psychoanalytic approach to literature adopts “Freud’s belief that writers 
betray who they are, their core conflicts and well-guarded secrets revealed as they 
emerge in dreams and literary works” (D’Amato 119). This approach aims to close 
the gap between the “real” and the implied author by finding parallels between the 
author’s life and their works, allowing for assumptions about their beliefs or mental 
state to be made. How does having this psychoanalytic understanding of the author 
enrich our understanding of the text and its importance? The rich promise of 
psychoanalysis is that it can deliver what structural theory aspires to identify when, 
for example, Foucault explains that texts are ascribed value based on the responses to 
these questions: “From where does it come, who wrote it, when, under what 
circumstances, or beginning with what design?” (“Author”, 108). Some of these 
questions can be answered empirically through contextual biography, through which 
method we can see evidence for the influences of place and time upon the author and 
their work. The one thing that can rarely be answered with any degree of certainty is 
the question of “design”—even if the author has left a written record of their intent, 
we have little way of knowing if they feel they fulfilled this goal, or if the stated 
intent was in fact their true purpose in the first place. It is this question of “design” or 
motivation that psychoanalysis attempts to answer and it is clear that it is an almost-
impossible task, especially if Foucault is right when he claims that through “the 
contrivances that [the author] sets up between himself and what he writes the writing 
subject cancels out the signs of his particular individuality” (“Author” 102). 
It is certainly possible to see the shadows of an author’s lived experience 
behind their works and authors often acknowledge this themselves, as Shelley did. 
However, some psychoanalytic readings purport to be able to divine the unconscious 
motivations of authors, which is difficult to support with evidence, since 
unconscious content is by its very nature concealed by the text and can only be 
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brought to light through the mode of interpretation of the psychoanalyst. This is the 
case in many of the psychoanalytic readings of Shelley’s Frankenstein and, 
particularly, her account of the dream that inspired the writing of the story. Most of 
these readings suggest that in writing Frankenstein, Shelley was subconsciously 
exorcising her personal demons, or practicing an early form of Freudian therapy 
through literature. These readings are a study of the person rather than a study of the 
text and so may more accurately be considered pathographies (biography through 
psychoanalysis) rather than literary criticism. This is an important distinction for this 
thesis, as I view psychoanalysis of Shelley as pathography, and so part of the long 
tradition of biographical approaches to reading and understanding Shelley’s works. 
Those who apply psychoanalysis to the characters within a text I argue are engaging 
more in literary psychoanalysis than biographical analysis. The aim of this thesis is 
not to uncover the “real” Shelley but, rather, through the method of contextual 
biography, to establish the contextual conditions which enabled her to write 
Frankenstein and establish a new discursive space.  
The clear and intentional links between life and works that many literary 
psychoanalyses draw are more suited to pursuits in the field of psychobiography 
whose significance “lies within personality and creativity research” (Kőváry 741) (or 
studies of persons) rather than literary criticism (studies of texts). Some of the 
examples in this section are in fact more pathographies, which Schioldann defines 
as:  
 
historical biography from a medical, psychological and psychiatric 
viewpoint. It analyses a single individual’s biological heredity, development, 
personality, life history and mental and physical pathology, within the socio-
cultural context of his/her time, in order to evaluate the impact of these 
factors upon his/her decision-making, performance and achievements. 
(Schioldann in Kőváry 742)  
 
It is in these biographical genres that psychoanalysis finds a place, as psychoanalysis 
is ultimately a study of persons rather than a study of works. A study of the works 
may contribute to a study of the person in the form of psychobiography or 
pathography, but the inverse is not necessarily true. While an understanding of the 
discursive origins of texts assists in understanding how the text functions within its 
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discourse, suppositions about the author’s internal life or motivations are not always 
well-founded.  
Frankenstein was published in 1816 with no author given, establishing 
Walton as the authorial voice within the narrative. By 1831, Shelley had been 
recognised as the author and, propelled by the wave of stage adaptations that 
followed its initial publication, particularly the 1823 production Presumption, her 
novel had entered the zeitgeist as a warning against playing God and the dangers of 
modern science. The widespread cultural impact of Shelley’s novel will be addressed 
in Chapter Six. Prior to the republication, Shelley was asked to write a new 
“Introduction” to the novel (M. Shelley, Letters Vol. II 129). It is here that she 
recounts the dream that became Frankenstein and that has provided rich fodder for 
psychoanalysis. However, her account of the inception dream allows Shelley to 
again distance herself from the act of authorship, instead crediting the narrative to an 
inspired dream. As Fred Botting notes, “From the outset Frankenstein’s author is 
displaced” (2).  
 
1.5 FREUDIAN DREAMING 
 
Shelley recounts her inception dream in the “Introduction” to the 1831 edition of 
Frankenstein, some fifteen years after it occurred. This provides rich material for 
analysis, yet is also problematised by the significant gap in time and the resultant 
questionable veracity of the account of the inception dream. While the veracity of the 
1831 “Introduction” is questionable, particularly the claim that the story came in a 
waking dream and associated denial of ownership, the basic outline of the story 
competition is given in the 1818 “Preface”: “The circumstance on which my story 
rests was suggested in casual conversations. It was commenced, partly as a source of 
amusement, and partly as an expedient for exercising any untried resources of mind” 
(M. Shelley 1818, 5). This hints at the conversation about the principles of life 
outlined in the 1831 “Introduction” and also at Percy’s encouragement for Shelley to 
extend her initial effort into a more complete novel. The ghost story challenge is also 
established: 
 
in the evenings we crowded around a blazing wood fire, and occasionally 
amused ourselves with some German stories of ghosts, which happened to 
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fall into our hands. These tales excited in us a playful desire of imitation. 
Two other friends (a tale from the pen of one of whom would be far more 
acceptable to the public than any thing I can ever hope to produce) and 
myself agreed to write each a story, founded on some supernatural 
occurrence. (M. Shelley 1818, 6) 
 
It seems the events of the “Introduction” do have a basis in fact but the addition of 
the “waking dream” problematizes Shelley’s simultaneous acknowledgement of and 
distancing herself from the act of authorship.  
In the “Introduction” Shelley portrays herself as a dreamer from childhood: 
“Still I had a dearer pleasure than this, which was the formation of castles in the 
air—the indulging in waking dreams—the following up trains of thought, which had 
for their subject the formation of a succession of imaginary incidents“ (M. Shelley, 
“Introduction” [1831] 165). These flights of imagination were her “refuge when 
annoyed—my dearest pleasure when free” (M. Shelley, “Introduction” [1831] 165). 
She goes on to recount the dream that offered the tale of Frankenstein, which came 
to her fully formed: “When I placed my head on my pillow, I did not sleep, nor could 
I be said to think. My imagination, unbidden, possessed and guided me, gifting the 
successive images that arose in my mind with a vividness far beyond the usual 
bounds of reverie” (M. Shelley, “Introduction” [1831] 168). It is important to note 
her denial of authorial agency in the formation of the novel; she attributes the 
narrative to her “independent” imagination, which, “unbidden, possessed and guided 
me, gifting the successive images” (M. Shelley, “Introduction” [1831] 168; emphasis 
added). Here, Shelley evokes the Romantic idea of imagination, which bestows 
visions upon the author to inspire their works, rather than taking direct responsibility 
for authorship.  
Shelley concludes her dream account by describing the dream’s lingering 
residues: 
  
I opened mine in terror. The idea so possessed my mind, that a thrill of fear 
ran through me, and I wished to exchange the ghastly image of my fancy for 
the realities around. I see them still; the very room, the dark parquet, the 
closed shutters, with the moonlight struggling through, and the sense I had 
that the glassy lake and white high Alps were beyond. I could not so easily 
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get rid of my hideous phantom; still it haunted me. (“Introduction” [1831] 
168) 
 
In these passages, the potential for Freudian dream analysis seems evident. As Freud 
asserts, “all the material composing the content of a dream is somehow derived from 
experience, that it is reproduced or remembered in the dream—this at least may be 
accepted as an incontestable fact” (6). The long history of imagining, a dream that 
seems to come unbidden, and the after effects, particularly the lingering sense of 
horror and the inclusion of the lake, moonlight and Alps that would be key features 
in the novel all lend themselves to psychoanalytic interpretation linking the novel to 
the dreamer’s day residues and experiences. Yet, these same features also serve as 
evidence of Shelley invoking the Gothic heritage of the novel, featuring ghost 
stories, disturbing dreams, and sublime settings. This increased emphasis on features 
of genre shows Shelley engaging in the work of an author, rather than evidence of a 
troubled mind.  
The problems of psychoanalysis conducted through literature are evident in 
Anthony Badalamenti’s reading of Frankenstein. Badalamenti outlines his 
psychoanalytic approach of decoding as a more current interpretation of Freudian 
theory: 
  
Decoding is the chief tool used in this attempt to divine Mary Shelley’s 
motives. It is a means of finding the unconscious meanings hidden by 
substitution, a defense used to consciously express an emotionally charged 
but unconscious issue that would be unbearable were its real meaning open to 
conscious view…While Freud discussed this procedure as interpreting the 
return of the repressed, the idea of substitution, or encoding, is more current 
and more exact. (420) 
 
The use of the word “divine” immediately signals the issues of literary 
psychoanalysis. While Badalamenti claims that his approach is “more current and 
more exact”, the ancient pagan practice of divination is invoked. The claim that he 
can accurately draw conclusions about Shelley’s unconscious motivations and 
meanings through analysis of her works is tenuous, and offers little of critical weight 
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in adding to an understanding of the value or significance of the text. He concludes 
by drawing upon other psychoanalytic approaches:  
 
The specific inner processes behind the novel’s creation are more properly in 
Jung’s ideas on the transcendent function (Jung, 1967). Some of the 
explanation offered here is specific to Langs’ psychology (1994) where one 
member of a relation has feelings of persecution in response to frame breaks 
by the other. The first member uses messages that encode the perception of 
the frame breaks with story-like elements to try to communicate the event to 
the second member. This makes Shelley’s novel an effort to tell Percy 
something important about their relation. (Badalamenti 438)  
 
The definitive assertion that the work is Shelley’s attempt to communicate with 
Percy is not supported by any direct evidence. Since Shelley kept a shared diary and 
spent the vast majority of her time in his presence, other avenues of communication 
were available to the couple. While it is difficult to disprove Badalamenti’s claim, 
there is also no tangible evidence to support it. This is the fundamental flaw of 
psychoanalysis when it masquerades as literary criticism—the “right” or “true” 
answer is entirely unknowable, and so psychoanalysts continue to argue for their 
interpretation or “diagnosis” ad nauseam.  
Badalamenti decodes not only the inception dream but also the novel itself. 
One of his primary arguments is that the character of Victor Frankenstein is a 
manifestation of Shelley’s suppressed negative feelings about Percy. Badalamenti 
offers a 21-point comparative table (426-427) drawing links between Percy and 
Victor. While the similarities are there, such as a connection between character 
names and real people (Shelley and Percy’s son William, also the name of her father; 
Percy’s sister Elizabeth; and Percy’s youthful pseudonym of Victor), other links are 
much more tenuous. The claim that the novel’s opening scene being set in the North 
Pole is a direct reflection of Percy’s desire “to see the poles unfrozen” (426) is 
unsupported by any other evidence. Coincidence is also given meaning, with the 
author noting that the writing of Frankenstein began in a November, as did her 
relationship with Percy, and the opening lines of the novel (Badalamenti 427, 429). 
Again, there is no evidence to support the claim that is was intentional—relying 
instead on some presumption of the power the repetition compulsion maintains over 
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conscious activity—or that it carries significance in developing a critical 
understanding of the novel. There can be little doubt that the similarities between 
Victor and Percy were at least in some ways intentional, but the reach for much 
deeper meanings here seems implausible. Shelley herself acknowledged that she 
drew heavily upon figures from her life in her works; for example, she acknowledges 
both Percy and Byron as being represented in The Last Man in a letter to Leigh Hunt 
in 1824: “I have endeavoured but how inadequately, to give some idea of him 
[Percy] in my last published book—the sketch has pleased some of those who best 
loved him” (Shelley quoted in Luke Jr. xi). 
Badalamenti goes on to argue that if the Creature is the encoding of Shelley’s 
concerns about her relationship with Percy, Percy offers a rejection of her view of 
their relationship in his work, Prometheus Unbound:  
 
There is little, if any, hint that Percy sensed that the story and its title might 
be about him. However, there is evidence of his unconscious perception of 
that idea… If Frankenstein stands for Percy as an irresponsible lover/spouse 
then Prometheus Unbound makes his reply to Mary’s message to be exempt 
from its claims. (Badalamenti 431-432) 
 
Since even Badalamenti acknowledges that Percy’s work is written eighteen months 
after the publication of Frankenstein makes the likelihood of this claim even more 
fragile. It is here that we can most clearly see the pitfalls of psychoanalysis; links 
being drawn between texts and ideas under the claim of “unconscious perception”. If 
the author was not consciously aware of the influences upon their writing, how can 
critics assert to know their thoughts, over one hundred years after the author’s death? 
It is certainly possible to see traces and influences in works, but it is impossible to 
attribute this to the will or intent (conscious or not) of the author, without additional 
supporting evidence.  
Badalamenti interprets the inception dream as being a manifestation of 
Shelley’s dissatisfaction with her relationship with Percy at the time and a series of 
other competing emotional stressors: 
  
Mary’s dream, whose imagery is laden with feelings of persecution and 
depression, as the resultant of several emotional forces. Mary was pressured 
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to create a story by two eminent men, one of whom loved her and both of 
whom shared an interest in incest. The latter was likely known to her at some 
level, for such things tend to be sensed non-verbally if not openly. She was 
still dealing with the loss of her first child and Percy’s failure to support her 
while he was giving himself to Byron and his own interests. The frightful 
dream image can represent her loss of a child by nature’s failure to bring it to 
term and by its being the wrong gender in Percy’s eyes. (424) 
 
The claim that Percy was interested in incest is inaccurate. While some critics note 
his interest in “free love” or polygamous relationships there is little to support that 
this stretched to incest. He did encourage Shelley in a “love experiment” with 
Thomas Jefferson Hogg, but there is no evidence this was ever consummated (St 
Clair, The Godwins and the Shelleys 375) and while some critics read Shelley’s 
frustrations with both Claire Clairmont and Percy as evidence of them having an 
affair (Seymour 132) there is no definitive proof this actually occurred. Clair’s 
presence was certainly a point of contention within Shelley and Percy’s relationship, 
but we cannot assume to know more specific detail without evidence. In 
Badalamenti’s offering, the flaws of trying to know the author are manifestly 
evident. There are clear parallels between Shelley’s life and works, as is the case for 
the vast majority of authors, but to argue for a definitive causal relationship, as 
Badalamenti does, is a next to impossible task. That is not to say that there is no 
place for psychoanalysis in literary studies, but it would be better directed towards a 
study of characters, where the entire being is confined within the work, and what can 
be known is limited to the page. Hence, a study of Victor, which may acknowledge 
the biographical shades of Percy, would seek out the clues to the characters’ actions 
within the novel, rather than as a manifestation of the author’s ultimately 
unknowable mind or experience.  
Like Badalamenti, other critics adopting a psychoanalytic approach to 
Frankenstein have made much of the origin-dream. Ronald Britton states, “I treat the 
preface to the 1831 edition as if it were like a preliminary consultation, with the 
other parts of her history and the novel itself as what might have emerged in 
subsequent analysis” (3). He suggests “Mary’s daydream of scientific experiment 
opened a door to unconscious phantasies of a dreadful scene of childbirth” (3). 
Shelley’s mother died after giving birth to her and Shelley lost three children and 
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suffered a miscarriage so childbirth is an important part of her biography, yet the 
majority of her own losses post-date the writing of the first edition of the novel, 
making the suggestion that it is linked to her experiences of childbirth less 
convincing (see, for example, Knoepflmacher for more discussion). Britton 
continues his analysis:  
 
We know from Mary’s account of her daydreaming method that she inhabits 
her three characters in her novel: she speaks for them and they speak for 
her…The third and by far the most eloquent voice is that of the Monster and 
he speaks for Mary’s unconscious, saying things she does not really know 
about herself. (7) 
 
It is not clear which passage of the “Introduction” Britton is referring to here, but the 
claim that her three characters “speak for her” is overly reductive—it ignores many 
other characters that inhabit the narrative, and reduces the function of the focal 
characters to authorial mouthpieces. Given Shelley’s repeated efforts to obscure 
acknowledgement of her authorial voice, as we shall see in Chapters Three and Five, 
it seems more likely that having the characters speak for her is exactly what she 
wanted to avoid. Furthermore, Britton’s suggestion that the Monster reveals things 
Shelley does not consciously know is impossible to prove, as we cannot know how 
aware Shelley was of her own influence or subconscious manifestations in the 
narrative. While Britton’s psychoanalytic offering provides possible links between 
biography and narrative, it does little to add to our critical understanding of the text 
and its discursive function.  
Perhaps what the critics such as Britton fail most to question is the veracity 
of the inception dream. No mention of the dream is found in Shelley’s diaries or 
letters from 1816, although we have evidence that Shelley did record dreams that had 
troubled her. An example of this is recorded shortly after the death of her first child: 
“Dream that my little baby came to life again” (M. Shelley, Journals 70). The ability 
of critics to draw conclusions about the truthfulness of the inception dream account 
is hampered by the absence of Shelley’s diary from this time. The diary covering the 
period between 14 May 1815 and 21 July 1816 has not been traced and so Shelley’s 
record of the inception of Frankenstein is lost, leaving her claim in the 1831 
“Introduction” as the only record of the dream. Shelley’s Letters also make no 
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mention of the dream, neither at the time it supposedly occurred, nor at the time she 
was asked to write the 1831 “Introduction”. This lack of a primary account of the 
dream lends weight to an argument that the “Introduction” is more an authorial 
conceit than a lived experience.  
Ultimately, it is not possible to truly know what Shelley was thinking, as 
even her diaries and letters are likely to have been written with a reader other than 
herself in mind. Her early diaries are shared with Percy, and the practice of personal 
writings being made public was more prevalent at the time. Things that Shelley 
wished to genuinely conceal from others were written in code; for example, a 
number of symbols are used when she writes about Claire Clairmont. This is 
discussed in detail by the editors in The Journals of Mary Shelley (581). So even her 
most personal writings have been drafted with an eye for potential publication, and 
could be considered in some degree to be literary rather than genuinely personal as a 
result. While the assumptions or extrapolations made by literary psychoanalysis may 
be correct, or a valuable thought experiment as a study of persons, there is no 
evidence to definitively support their conclusions. Rather than being proposed to 
reveal authorial intent, then, the benefits of psychoanalysis are most suited to 
speculative biography rather than criticism.  
In surveying the evolution of academic approaches, it becomes clear that 
Shelley’s life and times are fundamental to her productions as an author and so she is 
an excellent subject for a contextual biography, as will be shown in this thesis. Initial 
criticism saw value in her work for what it revealed about her luminary circle, but at 
the expense of any revelations about the author herself. Feminist readings place 
tremendous emphasis on her womanhood and various feminine roles (daughter, 
mother, mistress, wife, widow), which inevitably influenced her work, but also place 
great emphasis on her role as author and so approach her work with a more critical 
view. While not denying the incredible significance that Shelley’s place, time, and 
personality had on her work as an author, criticism tends to consider just one element 
as the focus of any sound study. Issues of the body as represented by the Creature, 
concerns about new sciences, the consolidation of a new genre are just some of the 
aspects that are being considered by Shelley scholars today. Invariably, the result 
still remains partial, highlighting one element of Shelley, her work, or its 
background, without pulling the disparate elements together. In what follows, I 
propose that contextual biography provides the necessary coverage of place, time, 
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and personality through which it becomes possible to understand the complex 
interplay of forces acting upon Shelley as well as her capacity to act upon them. To 
demonstrate the extent of Shelley’s lasting impact on ways of thinking and writing 
about science, it is important to refigure Shelley as an agent shaping the reception of 
her work. By considering the contextual evidence, and its relationship to the works 
Shelley produced, we can build a quantitative argument for the forces that shaped 
Shelley’s writing and also see revealed her awareness of the role of author, her own 
place in this role, and her critical response and experimentation with what it is to be 






Shelley’s Context: Place, Time and Personality 
 
As the previous chapter revealed, there is a tremendous emphasis upon Shelley’s 
personal life in the criticism of her works. This chapter will revisit Shelley’s 
biographies through the lens of contextual biography to establish in richer detail the 
conditions which made the writing of Frankenstein possible. As the scholarship on 
Shelley shows, biography as a study of lives is a broad field. Biographers may 
choose from many lenses through which to view their subject. In the case of Shelley, 
she was first perceived through a canonical lens as the wife of Percy, rather than as a 
figure in her own right, and then through a feminist lens that placed greater emphasis 
on her female roles as wife and mother. These lenses place emphasis on particular 
aspects of the subject, giving the criticism a particular tint or hue, emphasising those 
‘colours’ or themes that catch the biographer’s eye, much like a black and white 
image in which only one additional colour is included. Each lens thus also skews the 
image in a particular fashion. If we look at the same image multiple times, each with 
a different dominant colouration, the eye cannot form a single composite image, so 
the effect is instead of multiple individual images—so, too, the sense of the many 
biographies of Shelley, each viewed through a different lens, is of there being 
multiple different lives rather than a coherent assemblage of place, time, and 
personality. Contextual biography allows the biographer to step back from the image 
of their subject and, instead of focusing on a single hue, see the rich multi-coloured 
and multifaceted tapestry that made up their subject’s life in a more holistic way. In 
so doing, the scholar can see the interrelationship between the differing perspectives 
offered by the many lenses available to critics today and also view the background 
within which their subject lived.  
Contextual biography does not seek to denigrate other perspectives or 
scholarship which has adopted a particular critical lens, although the biographer may 
give greater weight to some perspectives when they are considered in relation to 
others and against the socio-cultural context of the author’s time. A case in point is 
the psychoanalytic readings discussed in the previous chapter. These have merit as 
studies of persons in the discipline of biography, as pathographies or 
psychobiographies, yet may be given less emphasis in the study of the texts the 
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author produced. So too the early biographies of Shelley that were more centred on 
what they could reveal about Percy may offer less to the understanding of the 
subject. This is compounded by the early biographers having little or no access to 
much of Shelley’s personal writing, which meant that many of their conclusions 
about her life were extrapolations or assumptions gleaned from her fiction, rather 
than based upon tangible evidence. Of course, given the plethora of scholarship 
surrounding Shelley and other important literary figures, a contextual biography 
cannot attempt to create the definitive or totalising understanding of its subject; 
rather, contextual biography is the adoption of a different critical position, one which 
recognises and considers the views foregrounded by the key lenses of preceding 
scholarship and seeks to synthesise these into a broader image that takes into 
consideration events that directly affected the subject as well as the broader 
discursive and cultural shifts that form the background of the subject’s life and time. 
This wider, multi-coloured view may allow scholars to better understand the many 
forces at play in shaping the author’s work and in turn offer new ways of assessing 
the impact of these works, both within and beyond their own cultural context. 
 
2.1 CONTEXTUAL BIOGRAPHY AS METHODOLOGY 
 
While the term “contextual biography” has been in use since the early 1970s (for 
example, Cutler (1971)) the methodology remains not clearly articulated or defined. 
Two notable contextual biographies highlight this lack of clarity about the 
methodology. In James Joyce in Context, John McCourt states that a study of the 
broader context of an author allows us “to see him [the subject] as both the product 
of and interested participant in a whole variety of worlds which provide the contexts 
and co-texts of his fictional output” (xv). This is an excellent summation of the scope 
of contextual biography, however, McCourt’s collection of essays goes on to focus 
on one context at a time, not really considering the intrinsic connectedness of this 
“variety of worlds”. It is a contextual biography in that many facets of the subject’s 
life are considered as being shaped by the multiple contexts in which Joyce lived and 
wrote—his Irish heritage and youth, the European context of his adult life, and the 
British world in which his writings were circulated—yet it does not ultimately 
achieve a more holistic image of its subject as each lens is adopted individually, 
rather than being overlaid to create a synthesis of understanding. In some respects, 
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McCourt’s study of these multiple contexts also leads to a picture of a deeply 
fragmented life in writing, and an equally fragmented critical heritage to which these 
contexts give rise. 
Another successful contextual biography is James Shapiro’s 1599: A Year in 
the Life of William Shakespeare. Shapiro observes the relationship between text and 
context that can be seen through contextual biography: “it is no more possible to talk 
about Shakespeare’s plays independently of his age than it is to grasp what his 
society went through without the benefit of Shakespeare’s insights” (xvii). This 
chiastic formulation represents Shapiro’s response to a critical heritage that has 
either sought to detach the playwright from his age as if he was “for all time” or to 
embed his writing so deeply in his life that biographers need not concern themselves 
with the lack of detailed records about his life—they need only read his plays and 
poems and they will know the man himself. Focusing on a specific year in his life, 
the book positions both Shakespeare and his works alongside events to which his 
writing responds and, importantly, which Shakespeare or his works influenced. This 
is a defining feature of contextual biography: it is not only a study of the “variety of 
worlds” that shaped the author’s works, but how these works in turn shaped the 
discourses of which they become a part. The benefit in taking the multifaceted view 
offered by contextual biography resides in allowing an impression of the subject as a 
whole, rather than placing emphasis upon just a small fragment of their life. In doing 
so, we can trace the impact of culture upon the author and vice versa in a way that is 
not always possible in other biographical approaches.  
Turning to literary criticism for a definition of contextual biography offers 
little in the way of additional clarity. One such example is the half a page on 
contextual biography in Ira Nadel’s Biography: Fiction, Fact and Form, an 
introduction to the practice of biographical writing. Nadel states:  
 
in examining the life with the work in its social/historical context, the 
biography provides a broader vision and greater breadth to the subject while 
expanding the nature of the genre. Contextual biography incorporates the 
concern of group biography with the social aspects of psychobiography 
creating a form that enlarges the foundations of biographical writing … 





This is a sound outline of the scope of contextual biography, but does not go on to 
consider the weight that should be given to various components of context or clearly 
describe a methodology. Indeed, there is no easily located comprehensive scholarly 
work that offers a clear definition of contextual biography. The most frequently cited 
paper is Fernando Vidal’s 2003 offering, “Contextual Biography and the Evolving 
Systems Approach to Creativity”, which summarises the key elements of a 
contextual biography:  
 
First, the individual is considered as an evolving system structured as a 
network of intellectual and existential projects. Writing a biography implies 
tracing and reconstructing such a network. The network image emphasizes 
the nonlinear nature of an individual life and highlights the interaction 
between the different dimensions of existence. Second, different conceptual 
levels are distinguished: the internal environments that regulate the subject’s 
activity “from the inside” …, the immediate environments involved in the 
processes of socialization and individuation, and the distant contexts (history) 
... Third, the subject of the biography is attributed an intrinsic and existential 
psychology. His productions are not seen as the manifestation of some 
underlying essence, but rather as part of the construction of a mental 
universe. (81) 
 
In summary, Vidal is looking at the works of the subject, their socio-historical place, 
and the author’s personal response or approach to this, similar to Nadel’s 
identification of “group biography with the social aspects of psychobiography” 
(200).  
It is important to note Nadel’s emphasis on “totality”. This is the multi-
coloured image that can be constructed by considering a wider, more multifaceted 
view of the subject. It is an academic long-shot of the subject, where we can see the 
discursive landscape in which they stand and where the subject fits within it. Yet we 
must keep in mind that this is not a two-dimensional picture. Context seen only as a 
colourful backdrop in an image of the subject undervalues the complex interplay 
between the subject’s life and the world in which they lived and worked. Rather, we 
must imagine the subject constructed through a contextual biography to be multi-
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dimensional—we see the author as a part of their context and so can begin to see the 
interplay between the subject and their world: how they interacted and reacted to 
their context both in life and works, how they were acted upon by others, and how 
their works acted to change the context of the culture of which they were a part. In 
seeing the biographical subject in situ, contextual biography allows for a deeper and 
more nuanced understanding of the subject, not only as an individual, but as an 
integral and active part of the culture in which they lived. 
While we build this more colourful image, we must keep in mind the great 
trap of biography: the feeling that we can come to “know” our subject. For example, 
while Vidal provides some important points for consideration, the study continues to 
place significant emphasis on the internal processes of the biographical subject, 
which are difficult to definitively establish, even when evidence such as personal 
letters and diaries exist, as is the case for Shelley. If we approach contextual 
biography with this awareness of the dangers of assuming too much, Nadel and 
Vidal do offer some ideas about the potential key features of contextual biography as 
a methodology. These can be summarised as a study of the author’s socio-cultural 
place and time, their position within this landscape, and their responses (both private 
and published) to this, with the caveat that these personal responses must be 
supported by corroborating evidence and not merely represent the biographer’s 
assumptions or extrapolations.  
This recognition of the complex interplay between a biographical subject’s 
personality, place, and time are useful in further defining the method of contextual 
biography. A study of personality aligns with more traditional styles of biography 
such as psychobiography and hagiography, with their emphasis on the first-hand 
experiences and thoughts of their subject. A study of the subject’s place within their 
society and culture draws upon cultural studies, tracing the ebbs and flows of 
discursive influence. Finally, a broad view of the subject’s time draws upon 
historiography (in particular, cultural history), allowing the contextual biographer to 
trace the large forces shaping the subject’s world, and to position them within the 
many voices of the time; what McCourt refers to as “co-texts” (xv). Many 
biographies of literary figures draw on these fields, yet few consider all of them 
equally or holistically. In moving towards a definition of the methodology of 
contextual biography, the differing yet complementary perspectives offered by these 
more well-established research methodologies are useful in framing how we can 
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build a multi-dimensional image of the authorial subject as a person (biography) 
situated within a particular culture and society (cultural studies), then begin to trace 
the forces that influenced them and, in turn, how they influenced their world 
(cultural history).  
The question that follows then is how do we study these three areas and what 
weight do we give them? I argue that the answer, like any good research outcome, is 
to use evidence from the author’s place and time, including the works, personal 
writings, and others’ responses to them. Unlike openly speculative biographies or 
historical fictions such as the recent fictionalised account of the writing of 
Frankenstein, Antoinette May’s The Determined Heart, which present suppositions 
or assumptions about the author’s state of mind or feelings derived from their works, 
contextual biography must set a higher standard of evidence. Documentary evidence 
must be given to support assertions linking events and the author’s fictional works. 
This is most important when attempting to discuss the author’s personal view or 
motivations. In the case of Shelley, we are fortunate to have access to both her 
diaries and letters so we do have some evidence from which to draw conclusions, but 
this must be done with care, and with a constant eye to other contextual material that 
may shape our understanding of her work. Contextual biography must reach beyond 
the immediate to look at the cultural landscape of which the subject was a part. 
Newspaper articles, parliamentary discussions, scientific papers do not need to make 
reference to an author or their work to have relevance to a broader study of context. 
Studying this material allows scholars to establish the tenor of the time—how the 
author felt about a topic, but also how many others felt and the ideas they expressed 
about such matters—and so situate their subject within this discursive landscape.  
While I construct contextual biography as a method which draws upon a 
number of other disciplines, it is still firmly a biographical method. It may be 
tempting to position contextual biography as a form of material cultural history, such 
as in Arjun Appadurai’s cultural biography of things, which traces the history of 
objects (Elerie and Spek 90). While the works of an authorial subject may be viewed 
as objects that have a far longer history that extends beyond the life of the subject, 
and a study of works is a part of contextual biography, these works are not the focus 
of biography unless in the context of seeking to understand how they relate to their 
author. Nor is a study of the biographical subject’s physical space intended to 
become a biography of landscape. While the idea that “landscape biography is both a 
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description of the history of the material landscape and of the world of ideas grafted 
onto that landscape in various periods” (Elerie and Spek 90) is a useful one in the 
process of defining contextual biography, in that it emphasises the link between 
physical spaces and changing schools of thought, landscape biography again moves 
the emphasis away from the human subject. It may seem that by broadening our 
scope to consider the subject’s context, the subject is, as a subject, “borne away ... 
lost in darkness and distance” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818], 160). This is not 
necessarily the case. 
With its emphasis on the subject’s socio-cultural time and place, contextual 
biography can be construed as part of the cultural turn in history and literary 
criticism. In this mode of thinking, culture is seen as “collectively structured 
meaning” (Reinfandt 67) of which the author and their works are a part. The cultural 
turn places emphasis on the strong, inescapable forces of enculturated behaviour and 
this suggests a lack of agency on the part of the subject. Cultural change is 
evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, systemic rather than individual. Clifford 
Geertz defines culture as “a set of control mechanisms—plans, recipes, rules, 
instructions … for the governing of behaviour” (46). It may seem to devalue the role 
of the subject to view culture in this way, yet this is not the case for contextual 
biography, as what this view of culture allows us to see is how “collectively 
structured meaning” is evident in the author’s life and works, and how in turn, their 
works influence, and perhaps reshape, this landscape of meaning. Stephen 
Greenblatt, whose New Historicist approach was influenced heavily by Geertz and 
dominated literary history from the 1980s to 1990s, explains that “literature 
functions … in three interlocking ways: as a manifestation of the concrete behaviour 
of its particular author, as itself the expression of the codes by which behaviour is 
shaped, and as a reflection upon those codes” (4).  
It is this reflection upon the codes or rules, as Geertz would label them, 
which reveals the power of the individual within their culture. While Greenblatt’s 
work tended to focus on the power of cultural control mechanisms to contain 
individual agency, the capacity for reflection that he attributed most often to 
Shakespeare offers opportunities for the historical subject to cast a critical eye over 
their world. This is reinforced by Reinfandt’s discussion of Homi Bhabha’s Location 




culture resides in individual subject positions and in intersubjective and 
collective experiences. This cultural communality and the resultant formation 
of organisations and institutions result from a complex negotiation of both 
potential disrupting and integrating impulses. In this sense, culture is not a 
more or less stable sum total of a society’s values, but rather a mode of 
persistent self-observation which negotiates values and possible counter-
values. (69-70) 
  
It is in these acts of reflection and negotiation that we can begin to trace the 
influence of individuals in cultural change, as the “collectively structured meaning” 
or “rules governing behaviour” are changed. As Anna Green argues, “cultural 
history, therefore, can be defined as an approach to the past that focuses upon the 
ways in which human beings make sense of their worlds, and this places human 
subjectivity and consciousness at the centre of cultural inquiry” (4). So while 
contextual biography does consider the broader forces at work in culture, it must 
nonetheless retain a sharp focus upon its individual subject as an agent within this 
landscape. 
Contextual biography is thus a hybrid methodology, drawing upon a range of 
methods drawn from across multiple disciplines in constructing an understanding of 
the subject within their place and time, without becoming a study of place and time 
in their own right. What is most important is the idea of the subject within their 
context: the human subject is at the centre of the work, but drawing upon other 
approaches provides a more complete understanding and not just an image of the 
complex interrelationships between the individual and the place and time in which 
they lived—we can see them as agents within their contextual landscape. I would 
argue, as Laurie Johnson does in his brief study of the evolution of the video game 
industry from both much older histories of key technological innovations and more 
immediate cultural, industrial, and even personal contexts, that we must “attempt to 
set up some parameters for mapping what we might call the fields of influence, 
which at key historical moments (or milestones) create the possibility for an 
individual act or product to achieve widespread or long-term cultural impact” 
(“Speculation” 177).  
This is where contextual biography’s potential is seen—it allows us not only 
to construct a new image of Shelley, but it in turn offers new opportunities to engage 
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with and trace the impact of her works. As a methodology, then, contextual 
biography has the key pillars of: 
 
- a survey of the cultural landscape of which the subject was a part. This 
includes both the discourses with which they directly engaged and more 
general trends in the era; 
- consideration of the subject’s personality and personal experiences, 
which must draw upon direct evidence, rather than emotive supposition; 
- reflection on how the author’s works drew upon the discourses identified, 
again with a reliance on the evidence available; and 
- study of how the author’s works were received, and how this then 
reshaped the culture in which they lived. This final stage may be a part of 
a contextual biography, or be a standalone study, facilitated by the 
findings of a contextual biography.  
 
To use this framework, based upon Vidal’s suggestion of a study of the relationship 
between works, socio-historical place and personal responses, there is ample 
evidence for a contextual biography of Shelley. Access to all of Shelley’s works are 
readily available. Extensive personal writing in the form of diaries and letters are 
also available through the Abinger Collection, which gives insight into Shelley’s 
thoughts and feelings on various issues. We are also fortunate to have direct 
evidence of what the Shelleys were reading, and so what ideas and discourses they 
were engaged with, since they kept a reading list as a part of their shared journals. 
Additionally, a large amount of correspondence from members of their social circle 
is also available, as further evidence of the ideas that their milieu pursued. We can 
also turn to the broader historical record for corroborating evidence of major events 
and social changes that impacted the lives of the Shelleys, such as the Greek 
Revolution. Consideration of all of these factors offers an understanding of the 
conditions of and influences upon the creation of Shelley’s works, and allows us to 
see her as an active agent in the multidimensional space she occupied. 
A contextual biography of Shelley involves, as we have noted, the multifocal 
view afforded by being able to step back and look at Shelley in her place and time. 
As Foucault argues, the period in which Shelley lived was one of significant change 
(Order 217), and indeed she also moved among some of the greatest thinkers of her 
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era, with whom we tend to associate the revolutionary ideas contributing to changes 
in society. Constructing a contextual biography of Shelley allows for exploration of 
both Shelley’s place and time and how she and her works fit within this broader 
context, yet room can also be made for a study of Shelley’s writing and 
correspondence to develop an understanding of how she positioned herself within the 
socio-cultural context of her time and how she responded to events and 
developments. This enables us to add a third point of focus for the contextual 
biography: to time and place, we can add personality. This new reading of Shelley 
and her works within their context show that Shelley’s experiences, social milieu, 
and also her personal interests combined in such a way that she can be considered a 
figure who synthesised and embodied the discourses of her era, paving the way for 
the emergence of a new discourse that shaped the way scientific advancements 
would be viewed from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day.  
 
2.2 TIME AND PLACE: A CONTEXT OF REANIMATION AND REVOLUTION  
 
Shelley was born into a world shaped by revolution. This section will explore two of 
the most significant areas of change: the rapid growth of the sciences, and the 
growing call for political reform throughout Europe. These political and scientific 
revolutions have their origin in the Enlightenment, “characterized by dramatic 
revolutions in science, philosophy, society and politics; these revolutions swept 
away the medieval world-view and ushered in our modern western world” (Bristow). 
One tool that is useful in providing a snapshot of how these discourse ebbed and 
flowed during Shelley’s time is the Google Ngram search tool, which provides a 
visual and numerical representation of the word frequency in digitised books 
accessible through Google’s search engine. While this may seem a scholarly “short 
cut”, it provides a way for researchers to engage with and begin to make meaning of 
the huge number of texts now available to modern scholarship. Doing similar 
research manually to collate the results is now next to impossible—a Serial 
Summons search through the University of Southern Queensland’s Library alone 
gives 99 279 results in a search for texts with both “Frankenstein” and “Shelley” as 
key words, as of 20 December 2017. By the time this thesis is being read, the 
number is sure to be in excess of 100 000, highlighting the challenges facing 
researchers in ensuring they cover the wide range of content now available.  
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 This huge volume of material presents a challenge to modern scholars and 
while nothing will take the place of thorough and discerning engagement with source 
materials, tools like the Ngram search can highlight patterns, both in popularity and 
in discursive shifts that may not otherwise be discernible as part of a traditional 
research approach. The 99 000+ results for “Frankenstein” and “Shelley” reveal the 
large pool of material a researcher would have to wade through and stands as 
evidence of the enduring interest in Shelley and her most famous work. However, 
this is unsurprising and does not offer a great deal of new insight. Using the Ngram 
tool in a more nuanced way can allow scholars to trace the way discourses can ebb 
and flow over time, by selecting key words that have emerged in their research and 
analysing the frequency of their collective occurrence over time. As an example, a 
search of the key terms “rights” (which was selected as the rights of the individual 
was one of the key concepts in political reform) and “science” highlights how these 
two fields of discourse grew in reach during the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
(see Figure 1). The terms “religion” and “god” are also included to show that while 
the traditional influence of organised religion was in decline (Elson Roessler and 
Miklos 2), religion was still an area of significant discussion; “science” does not 
surpass “religion” in terms of frequency of use in the published works available to 
the Ngram search engine until 1935. Interestingly, there is a sharp spike in “religion” 
in approximately 1750 that coincides with the upward movement of both “rights” 
and “science”. It is a logical correlation that rights and science were both discussed 
through a religious lens: how did God intend people to govern themselves, and was 


















































What the Ngram data does not represent is the way in which the author was 
discussing religion, whether writing in support of its traditional institutions or 
lamenting its fall in the face of scientific and social change. Enlightenment 
“philosophes saw no or little incompatibility between science and religion” 
(Merriman 313), so it is likely that both “science” and “religion” could be used 
within the same texts, which is what the Ngram results reflect. What is important to 
note is the steady decline in discussion of religion from 1826 (coincidentally, the 
year Shelley’s The Last Man was published). “Science” and “rights” follow a very 
similar upward trajectory right into the latter half of the twentieth century. It also 
seems that reference to “God” remains relatively constant, despite fluctuations in the 
use of “religion”. These results do not in and of themselves provide a nuanced 
understanding of the differing ways these terms were used, or the details about the 
variances in attitudes towards religion at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but 
they do reveal trends that can serve as a starting point for deeper research. Such data 
sets remain of value to scholars as this kind of broad survey of language use is only 
possible using a tool like the Ngram search of digitised books, one of the 
applications of big data that only a couple of generations ago was unavailable. While 
the data provided by this Ngram search reflects frequency rather than being able to 
pinpoint attitudes towards the areas of religion, science, and rights, it does serve to 
highlight the rapid growth in the discourse of science and also the concurrent 
increase in the use of “rights”, used here to reflect rising political and social 
consciousness. 
“Rights” has a distinct peak in 1793, which coincides with the French 
Revolution and the publication of Thomas Paine’s The Rights of Man and the many 
subsequent responses to his work. It is clear that rights, representative of reform and 
socio-political change, and science were areas that had been of significant interest 
since the 1750s and only continued to grow throughout the nineteenth century. It is 
within this rapidly shifting discursive landscape that Shelley lived and worked, and 
the influence of these burgeoning discourses upon her work is evident. William 
Bristow (2011) states that the Enlightenment changed philosophy from ”a 
handmaiden of theology, constrained by its purposes and methods, to an independent 
force with the power and authority to challenge the old and construct the new, in the 
realms both of theory and practice, on the basis of its own principles”. This is most 
evident in the way that philosophical debate about the nature of man and social order 
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underpinned the political revolutions of the eighteenth century. The French 
Revolution was particularly influential, as Shelley’s mother travelled to France 
during the Revolution and was asked by her publisher, Joseph Johnson, to write a 
response to Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolutions in France. It was during 
this time that she developed her ideas for her famous Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman. Taking up some of the ideas that Wollstonecraft explores, Thomas Paine’s 
slightly later Rights of Man argued for universal or natural rights, a more equal 
relationship between the classes, which would in turn reshape society:  
 
Man is not the enemy of man, but through the medium of a false system of 
Government. Instead, therefore, of exclaiming against the ambition of kings, 
the exclamation should be directed against the principle of such governments; 
and instead of seeking to reform the individual, the wisdom of a nation 
should apply itself to reform the system. (170)  
 
This idea would be taken up, challenged, and reshaped throughout the next century, 
but the overall theme was the same: a greater equality amongst men (and for some 
writers, women), and an end to unquestioned institutional power of State and 
Church. 
Scientific discoveries fuelled a questioning of established religion and the 
church. While some Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment figures, such as Percy 
Shelley, turned to atheism, most retained some engagement with the idea of a higher 
power. At the same time, new denominations continued to form. This destabilisation 
of the established church had two effects: in the socio-political realm, the dominance 
and control of the church over both the State and social order was called into 
question; and the nature of God was thrown into doubt. On the first of these, as Jean 
Jacques Rousseau argued, “the law of Christianity at bottom does more harm by 
weakening than good by strengthening the constitution of the State”, however, he 
still advocated that there should exist a “religion of Man” in which the individual had 
a personal relationship with God. The questioning of the nature of God had arguably 
more profound impact on the hegemonic hold of religion over the lives of post-
Enlightenment subjects: if Man could discover the hidden workings of nature, was 
God really all-powerful? This destabilisation and decentring of organised religion 
resulted in a significant discursive shift: “Just as the sun replaces the earth as the 
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center of our cosmos in Copernicus’ cosmological system, so humanity itself 
replaces God at the center of humanity’s consciousness in the Enlightenment” 
(Bristow). This is clearly an idea that Shelley drew upon, as Frankenstein centres on 
a man-made Man, and God is conspicuously absent from her original narrative. 
Scientific and technological advancement also had a more tangible impact in 
Shelley’s world. A United Nations report on urban population growth observes that 
the population explosion of the past century has its origins in these advancements: 
“Currently, the world is in a new revolutionary phase of human settlement pattern 
which became conspicuous less than 200 years ago [i.e. during the nineteenth 
century]. This new revolution is associated with the modern revolutions of 
philosophy, science, technology and power-using machinery” (United Nations 1). 
Urbanisation was a key outcome of this revolution as people moved to new industrial 
centres. The field of Literature and, with it, the nature of authorship were also 
radically altered by these shifts: in conjunction with the improvements in printing 
and publication technology and increasing rates of literacy, urbanisation created 
centralised, easily accessible markets for author’s works in a way that had not been 
possible previously. Yet if these global shifts had their origins in the Industrial 
Revolution, it is also fair to say that Shelley’s world was as yet relatively untouched 
by the shifts—they lay in the future. If Shelley’s work could be shown to have 
changed the way people think about science, then it may even be that the field of 
discourse she propagated has had a more significant impact than has previously been 
recognised. This remains, of course, to be shown. 
The brief introductory survey provided here establishes the philosophical context in 
which Shelley’s works emerged as one centred in revolutionary thought, with the 
broader industrial boom to follow. The influence of ideas around science and human 
rights is evident in both broad social trends, as seen in the Ngram data, and also in 
her personal life, with both her parents having strong views on the need for social 
change. A more detailed exploration of the political and scientific influences on her 








2.3 TIME: THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 
 
The sciences that held such fascination for nineteenth century Europe had begun to 
emerge almost two centuries prior. John Merriman proposes this as a kind of “culture 
of science” that began in Western Europe and spread throughout the continent: 
 
By the 1660s, letters, newsletters, and periodicals linked Europeans interested 
in science. Gradually a “republic of science” took shape, spawning meetings, 
lectures, visits by travelling scholars, correspondence, book purchases, 
personal libraries, and public experiments. (Merriman 302) 
 
This “republic of science” became progressively more democratic as literacy spread 
from the upper classes, as a result of social programs motivated by the 
Enlightenment emphasis on education. The first circulating library was established in 
London in 1740 (Bruno 191) and “by the end of the [eighteenth] century, perhaps 
half of the men in England, France, the Netherlands, could read, A smaller 
proportion of women—between a third and a half were literate” (Merriman 328). 
Melvyn Bragg adds a third, even earlier strand that impacted this significant social 
change, acknowledging the development of printing and increase of literacy but 
adding that through “the translations from Latin into English there was a new 
dynamic—the King James Bible.… both in itself and what it led to and inspired was 
a transfusion which revitalised the consciousness of the post-medieval world” 
(Bragg). Bragg disputes the idea that religion and science were antithetical to one 
another during the seventeenth century, arguing that in this time “the King James 
Bible joined religion and science together in a marriage which has just about held 
despite massive bombardment”.  
Just as the King James Bible, written in English and printed en masse, 
allowed the wider population to explore the word of God for themselves, so too the 
new sciences allowed educated men to investigate the world of God directly. Bragg 
explains that this relationship “validated” the work of scientists: “The intellectual 
energy, social acceptability and moral authority that science gained through such 
close association with the King James Bible were undoubtedly of benefit to the 
scientists” (Bragg). I would dispute that “moral authority” was one of the direct 
outcomes of this book, as ultimately the revelations of science did challenge some 
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more literal readings of the Bible, but overall Bragg’s argument that the King James 
Bible did in some ways enable a “republic of science” to form is surely valid. What 
cannot be disputed is that the changes occurring during the seventeenth century were 
foundational to the writing of Wollstonecraft and Godwin and, in turn, their 
daughter. As Merriman points out, “the seventeenth-century Scientific Revolution 
was above all a revolution in thought. Technological inventions that would change 
the way people lived lay for the most part in the future” (Merriman 307). By the time 
Shelley was born, the Industrial Revolution was in full swing and the scientific and 
technological advances being made shaped the world in which she lived—her 
writing needs to be understood as positioning itself in relation to this scientific 
revolution.  
Shelley’s exposure to and engagement in scientific discussion is well 
documented. Her father introduced her to some of the most preeminent scientists of 
the era: Godwin’s friends, William Nicholson and Anthony Carlisle, would discover 
electrolysis while working on a voltaic pile (Seymour 4) and in 1803 Carlisle 
witnessed the ‘reanimation’ of a dead dog through the application of electricity 
(Seymour 44), which he possibly shared with the Godwin household. Godwin 
himself published Lives of the Necromancers, which evaluated the ideas of 
‘scientists’ in the light of rationalism and reason (Knellwolf and Goodall, The 
Significance of Place 197). Throughout England and Europe, scientific experiments 
were becoming more and more commonplace; for example by the 1830s almost two 
thirds of those who died had autopsies performed (Furst 6). This practice impacted 
the Godwin household directly: after Mary Wollstonecraft’s death, Godwin was 
asked to donate her body to science for dissection, an offer that he declined 
(Seymour 30). Miranda Seymour suggests that despite not believing in an afterlife, 
Godwin’s love for Wollstonecraft meant he could not bear the thought of dissection 
and she was given a traditional funeral in a church (Seymour 30). This demonstrates 
a key trait of Godwin: while he was willing to discuss scientific and political reform, 
he was often unwilling to act upon those beliefs within his own life. Wollstonecraft’s 
writing and the portrait of her in the Godwin home meant that she remained present 
in Shelley’s life (Grylls 26 and Seymour 31). Godwin’s inconsistency in living out 
the beliefs he espoused was also evident in the attitude he adopted toward marriage 
in his writing, wherein he called for the abolition of the institution of marriage and 
labelled it “a system of fraud” (Godwin, Political Justice Vol II, 849). Yet when 
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Wollstonecraft fell pregnant with Shelley, Godwin arranged for them to be married 
rather than have Wollstonecraft deal with the stigma of being an unwed mother.  
Godwin saw no inconsistency in this action. He wrote to a friend, Thomas 
Wedgwood in April 1797: 
 
Some people have formed an inconsistency between my practicing this 
instance and my doctrine but … attachment … between two people of 
opposite sexes is right, only that marriage as practiced in European countries 
is wrong. I still hold to that opinion. … Having done what was necessary for 
the peace and respectability of the individual … I hold myself no otherwise 
bound than I was before the ceremony took place. (Godwin MS Abinger c.3 
fol. 61r).  
 
After Wollstonecraft’s death, Godwin actively sought a new wife to assist with the 
raising of his children, marrying his neighbour Mrs Clairmont (Spark 13). The 
mismatch between his espoused beliefs and lived actions would again arise when 
Shelley and Percy began their relationship, with Godwin’s rejection of their union 
remaining until they were wed (Seymour 121). This rejection by her father would be 
the first of many that would make her feel a social outcast for the rest of her life. The 
clash of new ideas and lived realities had a profound impact on Shelley and her 
work. Godwin was often host to eminent scientists and philosophers and so Shelley 
grew up hearing about and discussing many of the advancements occurring in 
science and technology. As an example, Shelley took a keen interest in the emerging 
science of geology. The term “geology” had only really emerged in the previous 
thirty years, first being used regularly by Horace Benedict de Saussure in Voyages 
das les Alpes in 1779, after he had climbed mountains to explore them scientifically 
(Bruno 282). The Geological Society of London had only been established in 1807 
(Bruno 286). Shelley’s interest in this new field of geology (Sunstein 307) was such 
that she proposed publishing a history of the earth before ‘regular history’ 
commenced (Seymour 403).  
Having been raised by Godwin and exposed to a range of scientific ideas, 
Shelley would continue to develop her interest in science once she eloped with 
Percy. During her life with Percy, Shelley continued her education, learning Latin 
(Seymour 142) and attending a number of scientific lectures (Seymour 155), in 
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addition to her well-documented wide reading. Shelley’s interest in the new sciences 
is borne out by the evidence that she and her husband attended the popular scientific 
lectures of the aeronaut Garnerin (M. Shelley, Journals 56) and in 1816 another 
series at the Bath Literary and Philosophical Society Rooms (Seymour 166). She 
also read a number of scientific works, including Humphrey Davy’s Elements of 
Chemical Philosophy (Sunstein 127). Although there is no record of Shelley having 
attended lectures or read Davy’s other work, Davy’s representation of what we have 
come to term a scientist reflects how Shelley’s culture understood the work of 
natural philosophers like Victor: 
  
Science has given to him an acquaintance with the different relations of the 
parts of the external world; and more than that, it has bestowed upon him 
powers which may be almost called creative; which have enabled him to 
modify and change the beings surrounding him, and by his experiments to 
interrogate nature with power, not simply as a scholar, passive and seeking 
only to understand her operations, but rather as a master, active with his own 
instruments. ( “Discourse” 319) 
 
In Elements of Chemical Philosophy, which Shelley did read, Davy debunks 
Agrippa, who would be one of Victor’s greatest influences:  
 
Agrippa, Paracelsus and their followers above mentioned all professed to 
believe in supernatural powers in an art above experiment in a system of 
knowledge not derived from the senses. It would be a tedious and useless 
task to describe all the absurdities in the opinions and practices of this school. 
(Davy, Elements of Chemical Philosophy: Part 1 9) 
 
Davy also states, “The laws which govern the phenomena of chemistry ... which 
insure the uniformity of the system of nature the arrangements of which are marked 
by creative intelligence and made constantly subservient to the production of life and 
the increase of happiness” (Elements of Chemical Philosophy: Part 1 287). 
Unfortunately for Victor, Shelley was not as inspired by the link between the 
“production of life and the increase of happiness”.  
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Another prominent scientist also had direct contact with the Shelleys, as 
Shelley’s first pregnancy was attended by Dr William Lawrence (M. Shelley, 
Journals 55), and he also treated Percy. Lawrence was considered a leading 
physician, holding such views as the soul being present in matter itself (Pelis 11) and 
being a critic of the idea that African people were more like monkeys than humans 
(Seymour 137). Lawrence rejected the argument that there was a link between 
Africans and apes, arguing the “notion of specific identity between the African and 
orang-utang … is as false, philosophically, as the moral and political consequences, 
to which it would lead, are shocking and detestable” (108). It is also fair to say that 
scientific development was not merely a backdrop to Shelley’s life; she actively 
engaged with science through her reading and attendance at lectures and 
demonstrations. Her circle included some of the field’s leaders and various sciences 
were often topics of discussion with Percy and others. Understanding that Shelley 
and her milieu were actively engaged with the new sciences strengthens an argument 
that her work in Frankenstein is responding to these ideas and in so doing establishes 
at the very least a new, literary mode of responding to scientific developments. 
 
2.4 TIME: THE REVOLUTION IN POLITICS 
 
Concurrent with the emergence of modern science was the call for political reform 
throughout Europe. Napoleon’s reign ended in 1815, just as Shelley began her 
literary career with the conception of what would become Frankenstein in 1816. 
Timothy Ruppert observes that the changes that swept through Europe after 
Napoleon’s defeat, in effect, “transported Europe backward in time to the ancien 
régime … Mary Shelley and her circle evoked the Miltonic tradition in works 
designed to inspire both immediate socio-political change and permanent 
transformations in the human mind and heart” (143). This is clear in both 
Frankenstein and The Last Man, where Shelley considers the impact of science and 
also conveys her political concerns through her fiction. Milton reimagined the story 
of Satan’s fall, and Shelley invoked Milton’s imagery of a fallen figure in 
Frankenstein’s creature to reimagine the potential outcomes of science. When we 
take a slightly wider view, we can also see that Shelley had already had first-hand 
experience of fiction as social commentary in her father’s work, Caleb Williams, and 
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this may have shaped her writing to a degree, a prospect that will be discussed 
further here in Chapter Five.  
In the eighteenth century, increasing literacy and the development of the 
middle class saw the political landscape change, as Merriman notes: “In Britain, as 
the role of the House of Commons expanded and political parties emerged, 
newspapers and organizations in which politics was discussed created public 
opinion, transforming the public sphere as more people demanded political reform” 
(387). Increasing literacy was a major driver of social change, the inverse of which is 
also true, through the emergence of a culture of reading:  
 
Literary and “philosophical” societies, which had sprung up in most large 
towns, facilitated the emergence of an even wider political culture than that 
which had developed during the political crises of the seventeenth century. 
Inns and coffeehouses added special reading rooms to accommodate their 
clientele. By 1760, London printing presses … had increased from seventy-
five in 1724 to over 200 … by 1790, there were fourteen daily London 
newspapers, and the number of provincial papers had multiplied by four 
times. (Merriman 414) 
 
It is clear that the general populace’s interest in and engagement with the processes 
of government underwent a radical change during this time as the increased 
availability of information and more people being able to read the material enabled 
them to participate in a way that was not previously possible. This is the landslide of 
literacy that reshaped Shelley’s culture. There is no more famous example of the 
outcome of this increased literacy and political engagement than the French 
Revolution, news of which contributed to fervour for change in England. As 
Merriman explains, “The French Revolution mounted the first effective challenge to 
monarchical absolutism on behalf of popular sovereignty. The creation of a 
republican government in France and the diffusion of republican ideals in other 
European countries influenced the evolution of European political life long after the 
Revolution ended” (435). This is evident in much of Shelley’s writing, including The 
Last Man, and also in her personal writings that express her interest in and hopes for 
political reform in England, Spain, and particularly Greece (Sunstein 178). In all her 
writings, she conveys her interest in the “republican ideals” of the revolution, 
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supporting the call for change in Greece and experimenting with representing 
different forms of government in The Last Man. 
Shelley inherited her political interest from her parents. Godwin and 
Wollstonecraft “were young adults when Watt invented the steam engine and Cook 
discovered the new continent, Australia; … As they turned thirty the French 
Revolution began” (Sunstein 11). They were part of a group of English 
revolutionaries who “hailed science as a symbol of change. To the government and 
the less educated, it had become a threat” (Seymour 6). Their concerns with the 
development of an egalitarian social structure (including the rights of women) is 
evident in both their publications and their close interest in the French Revolution. 
Godwin argued against monarchy, describing it as “unavoidably corrupt” (Political 
Justice Vol I, vii). Wollstonecraft demanded social change, accusing the monarchy 
and aristocracy of “false-refinement, immorality, and vanity” and of being “weak, 
artificial beings, raised above the common wants and affections of their race, in a 
premature unnatural manner [who] undermine the very foundation of virtue, and 
spread corruption through the whole mass of society” (3). The call for 
enfranchisement of the growing middle class and greater rights for those of the third 
estate would be a defining feature of the political life of Europe for the next century 
and would be reflected in Shelley’s work. 
Shelley, having missed the Revolution that so shaped her parent’s world 
view, inherited their interest in egalitarian models of society and she was a keen 
supporter of the Greek Revolution, which commenced in 1821 when Greece revolted 
against Ottoman rule, ultimately being declared an independent nation in 1830 
(Elson Roessler and Miklos 132-133). The rights of the individual were paramount 
to the Revolution, with the Greek Proclamation of Independence declaring, “It is not 
aimed at the advantage of a single part of the Greek people; it is a national war, a 
holy war, a war the object of which reconquer the rights of individual liberty, of 
property which the civilized people of Europe, our neighbours, enjoy to-day” 
(Robinson). Shelley’s interest in the Greek Revolution was also personal, as she 
became friends with and was taught Greek by the leader of the Revolution, Prince 
Mavrocordato. Byron was also a supporter of the Greek cause, working closely with 
Mavrocordato and ultimately dying while in Greece from fever and bloodletting 




Political revolution was not Shelley’s only interest. Her concern with social 
and political change also encompassed slavery and the rights of the working class. 
There are some readings of Frankenstein that consider the Creature as a metaphor 
for the enslaved races (Mulvey-Roberts) or the plight of the working class 
(Brantlinger 63-64). Shelley was also influenced by her time in Scotland in her early 
teens, which helped shape her knowledge of politics, as both the Booths and Baxters 
with whom she spent her time were politically active Jacobins (Seymour 74). As was 
the case with science, Shelley was raised surrounded by and continued to engage 
with political ideas. She was not merely an observer but a participant. By using this 
contextual information to look at the broader discursive forces at work in shaping 
Shelley’s world, we can see a more complete image of Shelley. She was deeply 
interested and engaged in the major upheavals of her time and her responses are 
played out in her works.  
It was not just Shelley’s broad cultural engagement that drove her interest in 
science and politics. If we apply another lens to consider the influence of her milieu 
and her personal thoughts we can develop an understanding of how Shelley 
positioned herself within these discourses. Shelley’s politics and love of learning 
would be fostered by her husband, who would come to be viewed as one of the most 
significant figures in British Romanticism, thanks in large part to her work in later 
life editing and collating his works. Accordingly, Shelley’s interests coincided with 
the social and cultural movement that 
 
focussed on classicism, the secular study of myth and religion, and 
condemned the evils of despotic and over-extended governments. In short, 
this particular Romanticism championed individual, creative thought.… “The 
unknown” was there to feed the imagination and provoke exploration—
impulses fuelled by the Romantic fascination with scientific knowledge. 
(Pelis 13) 
 
This description embodies the beliefs of both the Shelleys, not just Percy. Shelley 
married a known atheist, demonstrating that she did not entirely value religion, 
although she did not forsake her beliefs, attending church both during and after her 
time with Percy (M. Shelley, Journals 386 and 448). The condemnation of 
government she inherited from her parents was applied in her support of the Greek 
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Revolution. Ultimately, she applied her creative thought to the unknown potential of 
new scientific knowledge that was of great interest both to her and her circle in her 
authorship of Frankenstein.  
Shelley was initially a strong supporter for reform in Britain, but she 
moderated her position over time, particularly following her return to England after 
Percy’s death. In her youth, her politics was radical, and shaped by the works of her 
parents. She defied social norms to elope with Percy and supported revolution, as her 
mother had done. Sunstein provides a summary of Shelley’s attitude by quoting from 
her letters at the time:  
 
“Will not England fall? I am full of these thoughts” … In a long hot letter to 
the Hunts she vowed she would not return to England’s degradation and 
maddening cant. “No—since I have seen Rome, that City is my Country, & I 
do not wish to own any other until England is free and true”. (Sunstein 178) 
 
In December of 1820, Shelley explicitly identifies herself as political in a letter to 
Leigh Hunt: “But perhaps we exiles are ultra-political —but certainly I have some 
hopes that something fortunate will soon happen for the state of things in England” 
(M. Shelley, Letters 173). Later in life, as Europe became more conservative and 
early Victorian morality began to emerge, Shelley moderated her position. Debate 
about the degree to which Shelley’s later politics can be considered more 
conservative is ongoing, with Jane Blumberg arguing that Shelley always 
emphasised the importance of the domestic sphere in her politics (32), so this shift 
was not as radical as scholars such as Poovey suggests in her argument Shelley was 
pressured to be a “proper lady” (123).  
It is clear that Shelley’s Europe was a changing political landscape and just 
as her interest in science was active, she maintained her political engagement and her 
willingness to moderate her position as times changed. This interest would underpin 
works such as The Last Man, which uses bleak dystopian tropes to critique 
monarchy and other traditional political institutions. By taking this broad view of 
Shelley we can see how contextual biography builds a more complete picture of the 
subject and enables us to trace the interconnections of her personal beliefs, 
experience, and engagement with socio-political forces. Shelley is not a rogue 
political radical nor is her interest in science unusual—these were the dominant 
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discourses that shaped the world in which she lived. Her work can thus be seen as an 






2.5 PLACE: AN EXPERIENCE OF SUBLIME ISOLATION  
 
Context refers not only to engagement in the discourses of the time, but also physical 
spaces. Shelley travelled throughout Europe from her early teens. This was not an 
uncommon practice, particularly amongst those of a similar or higher social class 
(the eponymous Grand Tour), but the experience of place has a dual significance 
when considering the context for Shelley’s writings. Her travels not only provided 
the landscapes in which she would set her novels, but also served as the backdrop to 
some of her most significant personal experiences, which helped shape her 
understanding and interpretation of the world. Growing up in nineteenth century 
England meant Shelley was surrounded by some of the most rapid industrial, 
technological and scientific developments occurring at the time. As Seymour 
describes, “Up and down the country, the inventions of chemists and electricians 
were being observed and discussed” (4). Shelley was actively engaged in these 
discussions, however her sense of place at times also contributed to a feeling of 
isolation, which is evident in both Frankenstein, as Victor and the Creature leave 
civilization behind to do battle, and in The Last Man as Lionel Verney is ultimately 
left totally alone. Throughout her life, Shelley felt that she was a social outcast. 
While her parents were famed, they were not always well regarded. Even in 
childhood, Shelley was raised in Somer’s Town, which housed many French exiles, 
fleeing the war between England and France. Because of this, the area was not 
considered a desirable address, with some giving it the derogatory name “Botany 
Bay” (Seymour 42), a reference to the Australian penal colony. 
This experience of being physically exiled from ‘good society’ was only 
reinforced with Shelley’s youthful travels in remote and challenging landscapes. 
Shelley travelled widely from a young age, sent to Ramsgate in 1811 for 6 months 
for her health and then spending almost all of the years between 1812 and 1814 in 
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Scotland (Seymour 60). The influence of this early travel is evident, Shelley herself 
stating that it was while in Scotland that her imagination first took flight (Seymour 
72). The descriptions of whaling ports and vessels in Frankenstein clearly draw upon 
what she would have seen in Dundee (Seymour 111). Even in childhood, Shelley’s 
sense of place was one of isolation and difference. On her return from Scotland she 
would meet her future husband, with whom she would travel throughout Europe. 
Having being raised in a community of exiles, sent away in childhood, then rejected 
by her father when enacting the ideals he espoused in forsaking marriage as she 
eloped to Europe, Shelley would again experience being an outsider, shut out from 
her husband’s life at times. For example, Percy was aware of Claire Clairmont’s 
pregnancy to Byron a full month before Shelley was told (Seymour 160). Her 
frustrations with Claire’s presence manifest themselves clearly after the death of 
Shelley’s first child in March 1815. Her brief notes display her desire for Claire to 
leave: “talk about Clary’s going away—nothing settled—I fear it is hopeless—she 
will not go to Skinner St.—then our house is the only remaining place—I see plainly 
—what is to be done” (M. Shelley, Journals 69). Three days later her dislike of 
Claire is even more clear: “S & I go upstairs & talk a Clary’s going—the prospect 
appears to me more dismall than ever—not the least hope—this is indeed hard to 
bear” (M. Shelley, Journals 69). While no reason is given for her strong wish to be 
free of Claire’s presence, it is evidently a source of anxiety for Shelley. She received 
a reprieve when Claire departed for Lynmouth on 13 May 1815 (M. Shelley, 
Journals 78).  
By the time her journal recommences, Claire has rejoined them. In June 1820 
Shelley is again pleased to be rid of Claire: “Better day than most days & good 
reason for it though Shelley is not well. C[laire] away at Pugnano” (M. Shelley, 
Journals 320). What we can conclude from this is Shelley’s dislike of Claire’s 
intrusions upon her marriage. While some critics read this as evidence of an affair, 
the documentation available as part of this contextual biography does not definitively 
support that idea. Godwin espoused an end to the institution of marriage, and Percy 
believed in a model of ‘free love’, for example, encouraging Shelley to attempt a 
‘love experiment’ with Thomas Jefferson Hogg, which she initially agreed to, 
although it was never consummated and ended when Shelley fell pregnant (St Clair, 
The Godwins and the Shelleys 375). In this context, it is not surprising that the 
Shelley’s marriage seems tenuous at times, and Claire’s intrusions are obviously 
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unwelcome. Shelley’s complex relationship with her husband and step-sister, in 
which she was sometimes the outsider or interloper, contributes to the sense of 
isolation that shapes Shelley’s world view and appears in her fiction. Despite the 
ongoing tension between Shelley and Claire, they travelled with Percy across France 
and settled for a time in Switzerland—it was here amongst the sublime mountainous 
landscape that Frankenstein began. They roved further afield, with Italy being a 
particular favourite of Shelley’s, despite the death of her daughter in Venice. As 
Shelley commenced work on Frankenstein, she visited Mer de Glace, which she 
described as “the most desolate place in the world—iced mountains surround it—no 
sign of vegetation appears except on the place from which [we] view the scene—we 
went on the ice—It is traversed by irregular crevices whose sides of ice appear blue 
while the surface is of a dirty white” (M. Shelley, Journals 119). This setting is one 
of the key battlegrounds within the novel, where Frankenstein agrees to create a 
second creature (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818], 104). It is also notable for its 
isolation and desolation. 
Her extensive travels exposed her to a range of people, ideas, and experiences 
that would not have been possible otherwise. While England was at the forefront of 
the Industrial Revolution, Shelley’s travels broadened her horizons as she saw the 
living conditions of others. Less than two months into her life with Percy, when 
particularly displeased by the appearance and conduct of foreign travelling 
companions, Shelley commented in her diary: “‘Twere easier for god to make 
entirely new men than attempt to purify such monsters as these” (M. Shelley, 
Journals 21). Applying the standards of evidence needed for a genuine contextual 
biography we cannot fall into the trap of suggesting this foreshadows the inception 
of Frankenstein, almost two years before the idea for the novel developed. However, 
it is uncanny that Shelley was considering the making of “entirely new men”. A 
fortnight later, in September 1814, Shelley notes having a dispute with a traveller 
about the slave trade (M. Shelley, Journals 24). A popular concern of the period, 
some have argued that Shelley’s Creature was a representation of the enslaved races 
and again evidence is presented that she held these concerns about how man is 
formed both physically and morally from an early age. Shelley was not only 
influenced by the landscapes she saw first-hand. Her reading went well beyond 
Gothic and scientific texts; she also read a number of travel or expedition works, for 
example Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa and Outlines of the Globe (M. 
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Shelley, Journals 51). Text such as these allowed her to create a number of 
significant landscapes in Frankenstein, most notably her descriptions of the Artic 
landscape, which she never experienced first-hand.  
Shelley enjoyed her time living in continental Europe and its influence upon 
the settings within her novels is evident. As her return to England approached after 
Percy’s death, her frustration and disappointment grew. Percy’s death left her alone 
in a world where he was viewed with derision and she was the benefactor of this 
dislike. She stated that, “here or in England I must suffer many humiliations & 
horrors” (M. Shelley, Journals 433), as she would become reliant on her father-in-
law for financial support. After Percy’s death, on her return to England, Shelley’s 
father-in-law suggested she give Percy Florence up to be raised by the Shelleys. 
Shelley declined, and so was only ever given a small allowance to support her 
raising of her son (Seymour 322). Shelley again experienced a type of social exile as 
she could not risk drawing too much attention that might result in Sir Timothy 
refusing to pay her allowance—she ultimately had to choose between her own 
happiness and the welfare of her son. In making this choice she was forced to remain 
in England, where she could not see the people she wished to, disliked the environs, 
and was generally a social outcast. She states that her only reason for returning to 
England in 1823 was for her son Percy’s advantage (M. Shelley, Journals 462). A 
year after her arrival, the negative impact of both her social isolation and England’s 
climate became intolerable: 
 
This then is my English life! And thus I am to drag on existence! No—I must 
make up my made mind to break through my servitude and go—I cannot—
cannot live here. Of what use am I? confined in my prison-room—
friendless—Each day I string me to task; I endeavour to read & write—my 
idea a [for are] stagnate and my understanding refuses to follow the words I 
read—day after day passes while torrents fall from the dark clouds, and my 
mind is as gloomy as this odious sky—but though I talk of the country what 
difference shall I find in this miserable climate. (M. Shelley, Journals 475-
476). 
 
Shelley’s sense of belonging (or unbelonging) in the various places she lived and 
visited is important to understanding both her pervasive sense of isolation and also 
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her interest and engagement in the wider politics of Europe. Consideration of 
Shelley’s place/s through the lens of contextual biography allows us to conclude that 
her many experiences informed not only the settings of her works, but broadened her 
horizons culturally and politically through exposure to a wide range of people and 
ideas. Shelley’s personal experiences of exile and exclusion were reinforced by her 
experiences of place, sent from her home and then choosing to roam Europe as an 
English exile. 
 
2.6 PLACE: GENEVA AND THE POLITICS OF ‘HOME’ 
 
Victor’s hometown is a significant location both in Shelley’s world and in the novel. 
As Anne Mellor points out in Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters, 
Geneva is symbolic of a particular ideology, as it is the birthplace of Rousseau (81). 
Patrick Vincent argues “Shelley’s contemporaries would readily have made the 
parallel between Geneva and Britain” as a site of reactionary politics (646). Vincent 
argues that Shelley’s setting of the novel in Geneva is a deliberate act, because as 
Shelley was “drafting volumes two and three of her novel in 1817, [British] 
magistrates were using bribery, spying and outright violence to quell the Manchester 
‘blanketeers’ and the Pentridge rising” (646). This class conflict echoed the previous 
revolutions in Geneva, and held the same moral ambiguity: 
 
As in neighboring France, the “disastrous consequences” of the 1792 
Revolution in Geneva made it more difficult for foreign observers to 
establish a moral distinction between the patrician class, who used rule of law 
to deny citizens their liberties, and the revolutionaries, who used “liberty” as 
an excuse to violate the rule of law. (Vincent, 650) 
 
The Creature and Victor mirror this political stalemate, as Victor uses his superior 
standing and knowledge to deny the Creature that which he justly deserves, and so 
the creature in turn violates the rule of law in killing Victor’s family. Ultimately, 
Vincent concludes that “Shelley’s novel warns us of the dangers inherent in this false 
sense of trust in a state’s institutions” (657).  
Fred V. Randel corroborates this perspective, arguing that, like Percy, 
Shelley “views revolutionary thinking and practice as an informed, critical observer 
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and liberal sympathizer who wishes to prevent both continued injustice and 
revolutionary violence, by motivating readers to overcome their prejudices 
sufficiently to accept fundamental reform” (488). Frankenstein certainly does offer 
political reflections, however to argue that the novel has such an explicit agenda is 
difficult to support. Like The Last Man, Frankenstein explores but does not dictate 
various political positions. Randel sees Geneva as a conflicted site for Shelley, one 
in which:  
 
The legacy of Rousseau, including the treatment of women and the 
sidestepping of personal responsibility, is as Janus-faced and problematic for 
Mary Shelley, as it had been for her mother in Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman. She is much indebted to the Genevese thinker, but she seeks a more 
balanced and inclusive way to rectify the social wrongs that he exposes. 
(474) 
 
Shelley was concerned with concepts of justice, and it is little surprise that this is 
played out in Geneva as the site of Justine’s farcical trial. Randel argues that Victor’s 
visit to Hampden further reinforces the political overtones of the novel as both 
Godwin and Percy were ardent admirers of Hampden’s politics (479). 
Geneva’s influence on Frankenstein may also extend beyond the 
philosophical and revolutionary past it symbolises, to include the current conditions 
and mood the location actualised for Shelley. John Clubbe argues that it is not only 
the four months Shelley spent in Geneva and its surrounds that shaped the writing of 
Frankenstein—he makes the hyperbolic claim that “The weather in 1816 may even 
be the single most determining influence upon the novel’s creation” (27). Clubbe 
goes on to argue that the influence of the bad weather of 1816 is evident not only in 
Shelley’s works, but Byron’s and Percy’s as well (32). As is discussed in the close 
reading in Chapter Four, storms are an important symbol within the novel and 
Shelley remarked on the storms she witnessed while in Geneva. So it is not only the 
political landscape of Geneva that shapes the novel, but also the physical surrounds. 
As Clubbe reminds the modern reader, much of the world was still uncharted in 
Shelley’s time: maps still bore the warning “here there be monsters” in locations like 
the Arctic and large parts of Africa and the Americas (37). These isolated and 
desolate landscapes are where the exiled find refuge in Shelley’s novel.  
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 In her short article, “The Interaction of Humans and the Landscape in 
Frankenstein”, Yuhong Zhao argues that the landscapes of the novel reflect 
Romantic ideals: “In the case of Frankenstein, landscapes seem often to be about 
escape, in the case of the daemon they are about learning. This underlines a key 
Romantic theme; the wisdom of acquiring affinity with nature—to which the 
monster aspires—rather than running from it, like Frankenstein” (Zhao, 34). This 
idea that the Creature is representative of the Romantic veneration of nature  and it is 
when he is isolated from men (even if in close proximity but concealed, as with the 
DeLaceys) that he experiences the greatest peace will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
This stands in contrast to Victor, who seeks refuge in the familiarity of Geneva after 
his Creature flees, yet the Creature intrudes upon the site of Frankenstein’s 
childhood idyll, bringing violence and death. Having the safety of his home 
destroyed, Frankenstein then sets out into increasingly wild locations, the Orkneys 
and the Arctic. The significance of both the Creature’s experience of being driven 
into the wilderness and the destruction of Victor’s peaceful home mirror Shelley’s 
own life to a degree. Shelley’s home was intruded upon by Godwin’s second 
marriage, and the conflict caused when Shelly and Percy eloped meant that any 
happiness associated with her childhood home was lost as she experienced a form of 
social exile as her father placed his own needs above hers. Like the Creature and her 
Romantic contemporaries, Shelley revelled in the sublime landscapes of Scotland, 
Switzerland and Italy. However, these locations would become tainted, just as the 
Alps are tainted for Victor when he meets the Creature on Mer de Glace, as it is 
while she travelled through Europe that Shelley lost all but one of her children and 
her husband. Despite this, Shelley could not bear the thought of returning to 
England, as she dreaded the weather and the social isolation which awaited her. As 
Zhao observes of Victor, “on the one hand there is the landscape of home, sister and 
father, lowland, urban, cultivated, civilised. On the other are those regions in which 
he must interact with the daemon, the wild and the sublime” (Zhao, 36). Just like 
Victor, Shelley was suspended between these landscapes, and both offered hope and 
heartache at the same time.  
Jane Nardin’s account of the history of Alpine mountaineering is helpful here 
in understanding Shelley’s engagement with this landscape, which is so key to the 
novel. Nardin explains that prior to the scientific expeditions of the late eighteenth 
century, alpine regions were viewed as “haunts of gods and demons, [men] venturing 
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into the mountains only when the exigencies of war or commerce required them to 
do so” (442). It is not surprising then that Victor’s “daemon” is at home in this 
treacherous landscape. However, as Enlightenment scientists sought to reveal the 
mysteries of the Alps and the Romantic authors wanted to commune with nature in 
these sublime settings, the secrets of the Alpine regions were slowly uncovered. 
Nardin credits the inclusion of the monster amongst the Alps to the Shelleys’ first 
hand experience and Percy’s (although I think she overlooks Shelley’s) interest in 
geology. Nardin recounts the Shelleys’ tour of Chamonix and explains what this 
afforded Shelley: 
 
opportunities to learn this history that were not available to most 
Englishwomen of her class. In July 1816, while Mary was in the early stages 
of writing Frankenstein, she and Percy left their headquarters on Lake 
Geneva for a six-day excursion to Chamonix. On muleback, they toured the 
area, visiting valleys and glaciers, always accompanied by guides. Mary’s 
journals record the many details about the local people which one guide 
related. (445) 
 
Nardin also notes the shift in Victor’s relationship with the Alps between the 1818 
and 1831 editions; in the first, he is both a Romantic wanderer, entranced by their 
beauty, and a scientist, hoping to reveal nature’s secrets. In 1831, he is a scientist 
only, rarely effected by the landscape, instead only wanting to conquer and 
understand its workings: “Instead of adoring the peaks for the treasures they 
willingly reveal, Victor, like Saussure and his fellows, thinks in terms of forcing 
them to surrender their secret” (448). Mont Blanc and the Arctic are both sites of 
isolation and exile. Shelley made her monster at home in these uncharted and 
inhospitable landscapes, just as she herself sought a home in exile from England, 
despite the fact that these locations would become memorials to her husband and 
children who did not survive.  
 Just as Victor and the Creature both flee and pursue one another at different 
points in the novel, Shelley’s experience of place was both one of running away and 
running towards. Shelley fled the Godwin home, in pursuit of a life with Shelley, 
although Claire Clairmont (literally, clear mountain) was a problematic obstacle in 
Shelley’s attempt to reshape her personal landscape. The choice to visit Lake Geneva 
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was motivated by Percy’s wish to spend time with Byron, so they moved towards 
what would be one of the most influential landscapes in both Shelleys’ works. 
During their later travels in Europe, as her children and husband perished, the 
Shelleys were often fleeing their debts or racing towards another location that 
offered the promise of better health. While Shelley’s self-imposed exile in Europe 
was a time of tremendous loss, she saw England as an inhospitable place, just as the 
Creature realised he can never be welcome in society with man. Shelley became an 
exile at home. Shelley’s sense of place, and experience of isolation, loneliness and 
exclusion resonate throughout both her life and works.  
 
2.7 PERSONALITY: MARY SHELLEY’S SENSE OF SELF 
 
This section outlines, as best as can be done, some of the key relationships and ideas 
that shaped Shelley as both a person and an author. This is the most difficult part of 
any contextual biography, which does not aim to be a mere documentary study, but 
also must avoid narrativising the author’s life and interpretation of the subject’s 
thoughts and feelings. In the case of Shelley we are fortunate to have access to a 
significant supply of extant personal correspondence so observations can be well-
supported. While Shelley travelled to some of Europe’s most sublime locations and 
moved within the loftiest of intellectual circles, engaging in the discourses of science 
and politics, her personal experience in this context was marked most by loss and 
loneliness.  
The brief preceding study of the places and times in which Shelley lived and 
wrote reveals that they are marked by constant change. Her engagement with and 
interest in both science and politics has been made clear, but the nature of this 
engagement may seem purely reactive if not understood in the light of a study of her 
personal experience. The Abinger Collection has preserved the majority of Shelley’s 
diaries and a good deal of correspondence, providing a wealth of source material for 
Shelley’s thoughts and feelings. As this is a contextual biography this material will 
not be read for psychoanalytic purposes, although some understanding of her 
motivations and drives is necessary, albeit only to draw conclusions where the 
evidence clearly supports the interpretation. Shelley and Percy kept a joint diary 
from the date of their elopement, with Shelley being the main contributor (M. 
Shelley, Journals 1987, xv). The entries during her time with Percy are frequent yet 
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brief, noting visitors, books read, and key conversations. Percy’s contributions tend 
to be more cohesive prose, but are infrequent. There are some long breaks in the 
diary, usually at the times of significant stress (usually over Claire or Godwin) and 
long breaks after the death of her children. The diary for the period between 14 May 
1815 and 21 July 1816 has not been traced and so Shelley’s record of the inception 
of Frankenstein is lost. She starts the following journal with an inscription: “Begun 
July 21—1816 Ended with my happiness June 7th 1819” (M. Shelley, Journals 112), 
the latter being the date her son William died. On Percy’s twenty-ninth birthday, 
which would later prove to have been his last, Shelley reflected: 
 
7 years are now gone—what changes what a life—we now appear tranquil —
yet who know[s] what wind—I will not prognosticate evil—We have had 
enough of it—When I came to Italy—said all is well if it were permanent—it 
was more passing than an Italian twilight—I now say the same—May it be a 
polar day—Yet that too has an end. (M. Shelley, Journals 377). 
  
After Percy’s death in July 1822, she opens her journal with the lines, “The Journal 
of Sorrow Begun 1822 But for my Child it could not End too soon” (M. Shelley, 
Journals 428). 
In the post-Percy diaries, there is a significant change in style; a shift away 
from the brief notes to comparatively long tracts in which Shelley pours forth her 
grief over the loss of Percy and her largely negative feelings about the future. As 
Paula R. Feldman and Diana Scott-Kilvert note, “the journal is thus in many ways a 
reflection of the conflict in her own character between her outward reserve and the 
intense emotionalism she concealed beneath it” (M. Shelley, Journals xvi), a 
dichotomous sense of self that was explored extensively in Chapter One. A reading 
of her journals allows us to see her sense of loss and rejection that fostered her desire 
for acceptance later in life. Shelley and Percy, despite their marital issues, had four 
children, but only one was to survive childhood. Her first child lived for only days 
and she noted its death on March 6, 1815 with the record, “find my baby dead” (M. 





My dearest Hogg my baby is dead—will you come to me as soon as you 
can—I wish to see you—It was perfectly well when I went to bed—I awoke 
in the night to give it suck it appeared to be sleeping so quietly that I would 
not awake it—it was dead then but we did not find that out till morning—
from its appearance it evedently died of convulsions Will you come—you are 
so calm a creature & Shelley is afraid of a fever from the milk—for I am no 
longer a mother now Mary. (M. Shelley, Letters 10-11) 
 
Over the following fortnight, glimpses of her grief can be seen. On 9 March Shelley 
notes, “still think about my little baby—’tis hard indeed for a mother to loose a 
child” (M. Shelley, Journals 68). On 13 March, she outlines, “stay at home & think 
of my little dead baby—this is foolish I suppose yet whenever I am left alone to my 
own thoughts & do not read to divert them they always come back to the same point-
that I was a mother & am so no longer” (M. Shelley, Journals 69).  
Almost a week later, Shelley records a dream: “that my little baby came to 
life again—that it had only been cold & that we rubbed it by the fire & it lived—I 
awake & find no baby—I think about the little thing all day—no good spirits” (M. 
Shelley, Journals 70). The final entry that refers to this child is a record that she 
dreamt of her baby again (M. Shelley, Journals 71). The stress of this period was 
exacerbated by Claire’s presence and concerns about the Godwins’ finances: 
“Skinner St.—they are very badly off there—I am afraid nothing can be done to save 
them” (M. Shelley, Journals 70). Shelley records the death of her step-sister Fanny 
on 9 October 1816 simply as, “Fanny died this night” (M. Shelley, Journals 139). 
Fanny had remained at Skinner Street when Shelley and Claire left with Percy, and 
became a key connection between the two parties. However, left behind while her 
sisters travelled, Fanny committed suicide.  
Shelley and Percy’s son William was born on 26 January 1816 (M. Shelley, 
Journals 106) and they were married on 30 December 1816, although Shelley’s brief 
note about the event has the incorrect date: “a marriage takes place on the 29th” (M. 
Shelley, Journals 152). On William’s first birthday, Shelley confides her hopes: “My 
William’s birthday—How many chances have occurred—during this little years—
May the ensueing one be more peaceful and my William’s star be a fortunate one to 
rule the decision of this day” (M. Shelley, Journals 155). Shelley gave birth to their 
third child Clara on 2 September 1817 (M. Shelley, Journals 179). On 24 September 
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1818, her daughter Clara died while waiting for a doctor to arrive in Venice 
(Seymour 214). Less than a year later, her son William died of malaria (Seymour 
231). Two months afterwards, Shelley’s sense of loss is made clear: “to have won & 
then cruelly have lost the associations of four years is not an accident that to which 
the human mind can bend without much suffering” (M. Shelley, Journals 293). 
Percy and Shelley’s last child, Percy Florence, was born on 12 November 1819, with 
Shelley commenting on New Year’s Eve that, “I now begin a new year—may it be a 
happier one than the last unhappy one” (M. Shelley, Journals 302). Shelley almost 
lost her own life in 1822, when a miscarriage caused haemorrhaging that was only 
stopped by Percy making her sit in a bucket of ice (Seymour 299). This traumatic 
series of events, the death of three children and her step-sister, all happened while 
Shelley was preparing to publish Frankenstein, but the novel had actually already 
been completed earlier, in May 1817 (M. Shelley, Journals 169), predating the 
deaths of her children and husband.  
While this contextual biography does not seek to undertake a psychological 
analysis of the impact of these events upon the work, the evidence of loss, 
particularly of her own children, may seem to support an argument that questions 
about the nature of life and death were particularly poignant for Shelley as she wrote. 
One critic argues that this is evidence of Shelley spiralling into depression and 
perhaps even contemplating suicide (Seymour 235). However, to conduct this kind 
of diagnosis with two centuries of hindsight is a difficult contention to support and it 
is the kind of conjecture that the methodology of contextual biography seeks to 
avoid. It is indeed worth observing that rather than the prevalence of loss, births were 
the more common occurrence as Shelley was writing the novel—the deaths of Percy 
and their children ultimately can only be said to have flavoured the memory of the 
writing after the fact. Following Percy’s death, one of Shelley’s had most significant 
tasks was the collation and editing of Percy’s works, although she was reluctant to 
publish as his father would cut off her income if she did so. Only three months after 
his death, Shelley had identified the promotion of Percy’s works as her key purpose: 
“And I am then moonshine, having no existence except that which he lends me, & 
through his influence glimmering on the earth, known & sought through the light he 
bestows upon me. Thus I would endeavour to consider myself a faint continuation of 
his being, & as far as possible the revelation to the earth of what he was” (M. 
Shelley, Journals 436). While Shelley felt the glorification of Percy’s work was her 
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key endeavour, she in fact continued to contribute both essays and novels that 
developed into a significant body of work in their own right; she built a career as an 
author. 
Evidence reveals that Shelley’s sense of social and personal isolation did not 
stem only from Percy’s death. As early as November 1814, Shelley’s relationship 
with Percy was costing her social connections. The husband of her close friend 
Isabel Booth wrote to Shelley explaining that he had forbidden his wife to 
correspond with Shelley. Her disappointment is clear when she states, “so all my 
hopes are over there—ah Isabel—I did not think you would act thus” (M. Shelley, 
Journals 42). In April 1815, Shelley received, “a parcel from Fanny in which is a 
letter from Christy Baxter received last September in which she professes 
friendship—but such friendship—we see how much worth it is” (M. Shelley, 
Journals 75). These two events foreshadow Shelley’s social experience throughout 
the remainder of her life. She did experience explicit rejection which bred a sense of 
distrust and at times unwarranted dislike of those closest to her. After Percy’s death 
some of her circle saw her as cold and unfeeling, but her diary belies this, both 
indirectly through the intense outpouring of grief and directly in statements such as, 
“I feel dejected & cowed before them, feeling as if I might be the senseless person 
they appear to consider me. But I am not” (M. Shelley, Journals 441).  
It also reveals the frustration she felt at the way she was treated: “More 
usually the unfeeling nature of my companions rekindles my misery” (M. Shelley, 
Journals 451). In December 1824 this frustration and disappointment culminated 
with a lament: “I am sick at heart—I shall grow proud—disdainful of ye all—
careless of your censures or praise—yet cannot yet forego the hope of loving & 
being loved—the failure of this sweet nourishment fills my heart with gall my soul 
with sorrow” (M. Shelley, Journals 488). One of the greatest betrayals Shelley 
would suffer occurred in July 1827, when her closest friend, Jane Williams, whose 
husband had died with Percy, remarried. Shelley perceived this to be a personal 
betrayal: “my friend has proved false & treacherous” (M. Shelley, Journals 502). 
She does not seem to acknowledge or accept her potential to be socially accepted 
until almost a decade after Percy’s death, noting in January 1830 that “I have begun 
a new kind of life somewhat—going a little into society— & forming a variety of 
acquaintances—People like me flatter & follow me, & then I am left alone again. 
Poverty being a barrier I cannot pass—still I am often amused & interested” (M. 
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Shelley, Journals 512). While her financial situation would always limit her to a 
degree, by this time, just prior to the release of the 1831 edition of Frankenstein, 
Shelley had finally found some degree of the acceptance she so craved. 
This sense of being outcast, both geographically and socially, plays a huge 
role in understanding Shelley, despite the fact that her milieu consisted of some of 
the most significant figures of the day: “Not only Coleridge, Byron, Scott, Trelawny, 
but Melbourne, Disraeli, Lady Blessington and Caroline Norton—Mary had known 
them all. Outcast though she felt herself to be, her friends had included the most 
fascinating and influential people of her times” (Seymour xiv). Shelley’s desire for 
social acceptance is evident in the many changes she makes to the 1831 edition of 
Frankenstein, which is a great deal more moral in its tone and focus, and downplays 





Authorship and the Founding of Discourse 
 
Shelley’s account of the inception dream should not be read in isolation from the 
critical reception of the 1818 edition of Frankenstein, to which it explicitly responds. 
It is not taken from a personal record, such as a diary or letter, and it quite clearly 
seeks to answer the questions of Frankenstein’s original critics, who labelled the 
work “a tissue of horrible and disgusting absurdity” (“Rev. of Frankenstein or the 
Modern Prometheus” 382). Most reviews oscillated between praise for the writing 
style and repulsion at the content.2 A clear example of this comes from the April 
1818 edition of The Gentlemen’s Magazine, which described Frankenstein as “the 
production of no ordinary Writer; and, though we are shocked at the idea of the event 
on which the fiction is founded, many parts of it are strikingly good, and the 
description of the scenery is excellent” (Gentlemen’s Magazine). Other reviews were 
more overtly positive, with one labelling the work “a very bold fiction” displaying 
“originality, excellence of language, and peculiar interest” (La Belle Assemblée). In 
contrast, The Literary Panorama had little praise: “a feeble imitation of one that was 
very popular in its day,—the St. Leon of Mr. Godwin. It exhibits many 
characteristics of the school whence it proceeds; and occasionally puts forth 
indications of talent; but we have been very much disappointed in the perusal of it” 
(The Literary Panorama). The mixed reception of Shelley’s style provides no clear 
reason for the novel’s enduring impact, it being just as likely that no attempt would 
have been made to later resurrect critical interest in the novel based on its literary 
merits if its early reception is any gauge. Yet the almost universal disgust at the 
novel’s content surely makes its enduring impact even more bewildering. 
These conflicting views of early critics were also fuelled by debate about the 
identity of the author. In March 1818, Sir Walter Scott offered a positive review in 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, describing Shelley’s novel as an “extraordinary 
tale, in which the author seems to us to disclose uncommon powers of poetic 
imagination”, but of course it is altogether possible that his perception was framed 
                                                          
2 In addition to The Mary Shelley Chronology and Resource Site that is cited throughout this section, 




by his belief that the novel “ is said to be written by Mr Percy Bysshe Shelley, who, 
if we are rightly informed, is son-in-law to Mr Godwin; and it is inscribed to that 
ingenious author” (Scott). By contrast, in April of 1818, The Literary Panorama 
offered a different view: “We have heard that this work is written by Mr. Shelley; 
but should be disposed to attribute it to even a less experienced writer than he is. In 
fact we have some idea that it is the production of a daughter of a celebrated living 
novelist” (The Literary Panorama). While Shelley did not want to be acknowledged 
as the author, she was quick to correct those who asserted that it was Percy. In 
response to Sir Walter Scott’s review, she wrote to him explaining, “I am anxious to 
prevent your continuing in the mistake of supposing Mr. Shelley guilty of a juvenile 
attempt of mine; to which—from its being written at an early age, I abstained from 
putting my name—and from respect to those persons from whom I bear it. I have 
therefore kept it concealed except from a few friends” (M. Shelley, Letters Vol. I 71). 
From the outset, then, Shelley was not averse to setting the record straight on the 
question of her authorship of the novel, even if only via personal correspondence, 
but even this—knowing of Scott’s literary reputation—must be considered as a 
potentially deliberate attempt to reveal instead of conceal her identity. It follows that 
Scott would dissuade others from offering the same misattribution. By the second 
edition of 1823, her name was emblazoned on the title page.  
Conversely, her reluctance to engage with critics concerning the content of 
the novel remained unshaken until the publishers of the Standard Novels Series, 
Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, asked her to write a few words on this very 
question to accompany the third edition of 1831. I will argue here that her response 
frames not just the 1831 edition, in which telling changes were made also on the 
basis of criticism of the novel’s content in the dozen years that had passed since its 
first release. Her “Introduction” to the 1831 edition also frames a rereading of the 
1818 edition and of Shelley’s own agency or, as she might say, “guilt” in the 
inception of what she described to Scott as her “juvenile attempt”. In so doing, she 
raises important questions about the role of the author both in the creation of the 
work and in its reception. I will propose that these questions anticipate what Michel 
Foucault describes as the “author-function”, the attachment of the name of an author 
being a necessary precondition to its legitimation as a work of literature even as this 
process also strips the individual of her ability to control the wider uses of the work. 
Yet Shelley’s engagement with such questions, and her amendments to the 1831 
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edition, suggest an attempt to wrest control from a public that were already shaping a 
dominant perception of the novel as defined simply by its shock factor within a 
tradition of Gothic literature. It is in relation to Shelley’s attempt to reclaim an 
authorial stake in the novel, while also divesting herself of a claim on a singular 
moment of conscious creativity in the novel’s central idea, that I will then raise the 
issue of whether the novel’s synthetic origin constitutes what Foucault called the 
founding of a new discourse. 
 
3.1 A DREAM OF AUTHORSHIP 
 
Shelley states the intent of her 1831 “Introduction” as being to “give a general 
answer to the question, so frequently asked me—’How I, then a young girl, came to 
think of, and to dilate upon, so very hideous an idea?’” (“Introduction” [1831] 165). 
By providing the inception dream as the introduction to the 1831 edition, Shelley 
acknowledges her role as author, but also distances herself from the work, crediting 
the idea to a dream, rather than to her own literary ability. In this way, she both 
claims and denies her authorship of the novel. Shelley’s attribution of the idea to a 
dream further problematises the already complicated question of authorship in the 
novel. In Frankenstein, Shelley creates three authorial voices, since Walton, Victor, 
and the Creature all tell their stories in narratives nested in one another. The lack of a 
credited author for the first edition only gives a greater sense of veracity to the story; 
the reader’s ability to suspend disbelief and engage with Walton’s account would 
perhaps be more limited if there was a known author. However, by 1831, Shelley’s 
authorship of Frankenstein was acknowledged, but by nesting her story within a 
dream, she again reframes the narrative. Just as Walton’s narrative frames Victor’s 
and the Creature’s in turn, in the 1831 addition, Shelley frames the whole narrative 
again as a dream, linking it more firmly to its Gothic heritage and her identity as an 
author.  
The addition of the inception dream “Introduction” were not the only changes 
made to the 1831 edition. These changes can be read in two ways: as evidence of the 
personal experiences and changes Shelley had undergone since writing the original 
Frankenstein; and as evidence of her awareness of her work as a commodity 
(according to which the attribution of an author and the content may affect the 
potential audience and sales). A brief account of some of these changes, understood 
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in such terms, thus helps to reframe the dream account as part of a suite of changes 
that move the novel further away from its inception. Shelley was eager to improve 
upon what she had described to Scott as her “juvenile attempt”, recording revisions 
to a copy of the novel as early as 20 December 1818. This annotated copy was given 
to a Mrs Thomas (M. Shelley, Journals 245) and contains editorial notes about the 
structure of the novel. Shelley wanted to “re-write [the] two first chapters. The 
incidents are tame and ill arranged—the language sometimes childish— They are 
unworthy of the rest of the … narration” (Ch.2 fn39 New Annotated). Shelley 
ultimately did rewrite the first two chapters in the 1831 edition, and these revisions 
reveal her awareness of the moral potential of her work and a desire to make it more 
palatable to the society in which she sought to find acceptance. This is clear in the 
increase in overt moral references, which respond to critics’ observations that the 
original work led “to no conclusion either moral or philosophical. In some passages, 
the writer appears to favour the doctrines of materialism” (The Monthly Review). 
This moral ambiguity, which I will argue in Chapter Four is what gives the novel its 
power and longevity, and why it can be seen as foundational to both genre and 
discourse, is less evident in the 1831 edition although not erased altogether. 
Evidence of this can be seen in a comparative reading of the two editions. 
When Victor is taken in by Walton, he is initially reluctant to share his story. 
In the 1818 edition, when he invites Walton to listen to his tale, he states,  
 
I believe that the strange incidents connected with it will afford a view of 
nature, which may enlarge you faculties and understanding. You will hear of 
powers and occurrences, which as you have been accustomed to believe 
impossible: but I do not doubt that my tale conveys in its series internal 
evidence of the truth of the events of which it is composed. (M. Shelley, 
Frankenstein [1818] 17) 
 
By 1831, Shelley’s desire to make her work more palatable to her more conservative, 
proto-Victorian, social circle is evident with the addition of Victor’s statement that, 
“I imagine that you may deduce an apt moral from my tale” (Frankenstein [1831] 
31).This short addition radically shifts the revised edition away from its predecessor. 
In 1818, Shelley’s modern Prometheus invited the reader to explore the 
consequences of playing with the fire of creation, but did not overtly moralise 
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against this. By 1831, the tale has become explicitly moral. Perhaps this can be 
attributed to Shelley’s desire to be more accepted, or perhaps she herself had come to 
recognise the moralising potential of narrativising new science.  
In 1818, Victor begins his education with letters of introduction to a number 
of eminent scientists. In 1831, a malevolent guiding force is credited for setting him 
on this road to his ultimate destruction: “Chance—or rather the evil influence, the 
Angel of Destruction, which asserted omnipotent sway over me … led me first to M. 
Krempe” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 47). This is one of the most overt 
allusions to a more Christian dichotomy between good and evil than was present in 
the original work. Another significant addition follows, with the description of the 
moment that inspiration strikes. Fate is again invoked: “Such were the professor’s 
words—rather let me say the words of fate—enounced to destroy me” (M. Shelley, 
Frankenstein [1831] 49). Victor goes on to boldly claim,  
 
my mind was filled with one thought, one conception, one purpose. So much 
has been done, exclaimed the soul of Frankenstein, more, far more, will I 
achieve: treading in the steps already marked, I will pioneer a new way, 
explore unknown powers, and unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of 
creation. (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1831] 49) 
 
This dramatic declaration is absent from the earlier edition and again explicitly 
invokes Victor’s goal to equal God in the creation of life, which in turn has clear 
biblical connotations for the late Romantic reader. With these more overt references 
to morals and religious ideas, such as fate or a demonic force driving Victor, rather 
than a spirit of scientific enquiry, Shelley as author shows her awareness of her 
audiences’ changing tastes and also links the work back to more traditional novel 
forms, where a clear moral lesson is taught. When Clerval seeks to comfort Victor 
after the Creature has murdered William in the 1818 edition, he advises against the 
Stoic approach, commenting “even Cato wept over the dead body of his brother” (M. 
Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 48). However, this reference is removed in the 1831 
edition. Here again, we see a move away from a genuine Romantic approach, which 
holds the Classics in high regard. In making the characters less radically Romantic, 
Shelley distances them from herself and her infamous husband, and so makes the 
work accessible to a wider readership. The linking of Victor to a higher power gives 
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the 1831 edition a religious overtone which was absent in the original work, and also 
demonstrates Shelley’s awareness of what will make the work more palatable to her 
audience, as his downfall can be construed more directly as a consequence of his 
daring to delve into God’s domain.  
In some instances, in the 1831 edition, Shelley has removed more direct 
references to scientific specifics, effectively removing the science from her science 
fiction. In 1818, had Victor’s father steered him away from Cornelius Agrippa, 
Victor “should probably have applied myself to the more rational theory of 
chemistry which has resulted from modern discoveries” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein 
[1818] 22). By 1831, he would have merely “returned to his former studies” (M. 
Shelley, Frankenstein [1831] 41). Victor was “floundering in a slough of 
multifarious knowledge” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1831] 42) in 1831, as opposed 
to the following from 1818, which is removed in the revised edition: “The natural 
phenomena that take place every day before our eyes did not escape my attention. 
Distillation, and the wonderful effects of steam, processes of which my favourite 
authors were utterly ignorant, excited my astonishment; but my utmost wonder was 
engaged by some experiments on an airpump” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 23). 
The clearly negative connotations of “slough” again suggest the idea that seeking too 
much knowledge is inherently wrong; therefore, it makes sense that Shelley would 
remove evidence of her detailed knowledge of the wonders of the new sciences. 
Additionally, with a decade of advancement, the wonders of steam may have become 
more commonplace. Taken in conjunction with the conservative revisions of the text, 
it can be argued that Shelley is repositioning both herself and the work as part of a 
past Gothic heritage, and so responding to the backlash against the original 
publication.  In considering Shelley’s origin dream, written fifteen years after the 
actual event, a case can be made that the inception dream is itself a work of fiction, 
designed to again deny direct authorship of the novel.  
I suggest that what the denial of authorial intention in the inception dream 
account reveals is Shelley’s awareness of and experimentation with the role of 
author. Evidence supports a psychoanalytic argument that the identity of author is 
essential to Shelley’s sense of self—as she acknowledges in her dream introduction 
(M. Shelley, “Introduction” [1831] 165), she is the daughter of two famous authors. 
Shelley’s writing could be interpreted as an attempt to take the place of her mother, 
as she is simultaneously the reason for her mother’s absence but also the victim of 
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her loss. Barbara D’Amato applies a psychoanalytic lens to the question of Shelley’s 
motivations to write: “On an unconscious level her novel may have symbolised more 
than a writing contest with her husband. The fantasy of both oedipal strivings to 
outshine and replace her mother, and preoedipal desires to become her mother” 
(121). This Freudian reading is certainly possible, as evidence exists of Shelley’s 
fascination with her mother. While this insight into the possible state of mind 
Shelley had is interesting as an intellectual exercise or as a study of personality, it is 
still a psychobiography rather than literary criticism.  
The uncertainty of psychoanalysis is apparent in D’Amato’s musings on the 
function or cause of the inception dream:  
 
This dream may have been Mary’s solution to the problem of creating fiction 
that could compete with that of Percy Shelley and Lord Byron…. She may 
also have struggled with a conflict about writing itself. Did you want to 
compete with her husband in the literary world of men? Or did she want to 
produce babies as a way to fulfil her creative energies? (121) 
 
Some of these questions are definitively answered if consideration is given to the 
historical record of Shelley’s life, particularly after Percy’s death. It is unlikely 
Shelley saw herself as in competition with Percy, as she wrote novels like her father, 
rather than poetry. She also continued to support herself for the remainder of her life 
as a writer, despite strong opposition from her father-in-law, upon whom she was 
reliant for support for her one surviving child. This clearly suggests that Shelley did 
see herself as a writer even after Percy’s death. It also highlights how significant the 
mantle of author was to Shelley, and I posit that this is the more valid reading of 
both the dream inception and the novel itself—as evidence of Shelley’s 
experimentation with the role of author. In Geneva, she was with two other great 
authors, Percy and Byron, whose conversation gave rise to her inception dream. 
While Percy was yet to reach the level of fame (or infamy) as Byron, Shelley viewed 
both men as part of a great literary community. Her desperation to think of a story 
reflects her desire to identify as an author, and so occupy the same intellectual space 
as Percy and Byron. Additionally, this would also make Shelley more like Byron and 
Percy than like Claire, so creating a distance between the two stepsisters that Shelley 
was eager to increase. 
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Katherine Montwieler and Mark E. Boren claim that “Shelley’s characters’ 
articulated confessions before a witness (the reader) anticipate Freud’s ‘talking 
cure’” (16). This idea of Shelley as proto-Freudian is emphasised by D’Amato, who 
contends that Frankenstein “is one author’s desire to understand herself through 
unconscious dream material” (119). Anthony Badalamenti echoes this idea: “The 
present view is that the story she chose to write is the story she needed to write and, 
further, that her need was already expressed in the seminal dream itself. The novel 
uses the image of the monster to accommodate encoded images of hurtful parts of 
her life with Percy, just as the inspiring dream served the same function” (438). 
While obvious parallels between Shelley’s life and works are undeniable, the claim 
that Shelley was conducting Freudian “literary therapy” for herself by writing 
Frankenstein is difficult to substantiate. I argued in the previous Chapter that 
psychoanalytic approaches to Frankenstein may offer interesting points of 
speculation on which to construct biographical readings of the text, but they suffer 
too often from lack of any direct evidence in support of their claims. Where the 
psychoanalytic framework might help here by providing a language through which 
to explain the extent to which Shelley’s sense of self became bound up in her 
authorial identity, it can weaken the case when it runs toward hyperbole, as it does 
when claiming that the novel is Shelley’s own psychotherapy. By the same token, 
the psychoanalytic method can at times lead to finding abstraction where things are 
really very explicit as, for example, in in claims that the novel “symbolises” the 
competition with Percy—Shelley’s account makes it clear that the competition was 
very real. I therefore want to move away from this model by incorporating 
Foucault’s ideas about the relationship between authorship and the individual whose 
name adorns a work.  
 
3.2 AN AUTHORIAL VOICE 
 
Foucault asked “what is an author?” in 1969, but I would argue that Shelley was 
exploring possible answers to this question 150 years before Foucault and Barthes. 
As Foucault observes, “the coming into being of the notion of ‘author’ constitutes 
the privileged moment of the individualisation in the history of ideas, knowledge, 
literature, philosophy, and the sciences” (“Author” 101). While much is made of the 
inception dream outlined in the 1831 “Introduction”, little attention has been given to 
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the content that suggests Shelley is looking at the role and function of the author and 
at the creative process. The “Introduction” starts with a self-effacing justification of 
its inclusion, noting “it will be confined to such topics as have connection with my 
authorship alone, I can scarcely accuse myself of a personal intrusion” (M. Shelley, 
“Introduction” [1831] 165). This explanation is significant as it clearly states 
Shelley’s intent to focus on her work as an author, thus framing the inception dream 
recollection as less of a personal insight and rather an exploration of her literary 
creative process. She conveys her frustration at being unable to conceive a suitable 
ghost story: “I felt that blank incapability of invention which is the greatest misery of 
authorship, when dull Nothing replies to our anxious invocations. Have you thought 
of a story? I was asked each morning, and each morning I was forced to reply with a 
mortifying negative” (M. Shelley, “Introduction” [1831] 167). This “writer’s block” 
and resultant frustration can be interpreted as the common experience of the author 
and a part of their role, rather than a manifestation of a troubled mind. It may be a 
professional complaint, rather than a personal one. 
As has been seen in the psychoanalytic readings already discussed, much is 
made of the obvious parallels between events and characters in Frankenstein and 
Shelley’s personal experiences and what this reveals about her mental state, the 
perception of her relationships or impact and meaning of the novel. Yet Shelley 
herself acknowledges the impact of past experiences in the authorial process: 
 
Every thing must have a beginning, to speak in Sanchean phrase; and that 
beginning must be linked to something that went before. The Hindoos give 
the world an elephant to support it, but they make the elephant stand upon a 
tortoise. Invention, it must be humbly admitted, does not consist in creating 
out of the void, but out of chaos; the materials must, in the first place, be 
afforded: it can give form to dark, shapeless substances, but cannot bring into 
being the substance itself. In all matters of discovery and invention, even of 
those that appertain to the imagination, we are continually reminded of the 
story of Columbus and his egg. Invention consists in the capacity of seizing 
on the capabilities of a subject, and in the power of moulding and fashioning 




Shelley’s life and times provided ample “substance” to which she applied her 
authorial “power of moulding and fashioning ideas”. In her diaries and also her 
letters, Shelley’s interest in science is evident, with a reading of Humphry Davy’s 
Elements of Chemical Philosophy (Journals 142) and attendance at public scientific 
displays (Journals 56) recorded, for example. She also had a political and social 
awareness that is manifest in her works. Her father’s and husband’s ideas are often 
referenced, and she took a keen interest in the Greek Revolution while in Europe. 
This contextual information shows how Frankenstein is both a reflection of and a 
response to the place and time in which Shelley lived, but does not assume to guess 
at her mental state or intention in writing. This evidence-based contextual study 
allows us to see how Shelley’s work reflects and reframes the ideas of her times and 
so accurately places the work within its discursive context.  
Furthermore, Shelley also denies the deep melancholy many psychoanalytic 
readings find present in the novel. She describes the novel as,  
 
the offspring of happy days, when death and grief were but words, which 
found no true echo in my heart. Its several pages speak of many a walk, many 
a drive, and many a conversation, when I was not alone; and my companion 
was one who, in this world, I shall never see more. But this is for myself; my 
readers have nothing to do with these associations. (“Introduction” [1831] 
169) 
 
This closing is particularly significant as Shelley recognises that the reader is outside 
of the control or influence of the author’s motivations for writing—they will not 
make the associations that Shelley drew upon in writing the novel. This is the flaw of 
psychoanalysis; it is critics assuming to know or be able to divine the associations 
that inspired and influenced Shelley as she wrote. Here Shelley recognises the 
unknowability of the author that Foucault describes: “Using all the contrivances that 
he sets up between himself and what he writes, the writing subject cancels out the 
signs of his particular individuality. As a result, the mark of the writer is reduced to 
nothing more than the singularity of his absence; he must assume the role of the dead 
man in the game of writing” (Foucault, “Author” 102). This closing, in which her 
readers “have nothing to do with these associations”, demonstrates Shelley’s full 
awareness of her role as an author and the scope of her influence upon her reader.  
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If we read the inception dream as Shelley experimenting with the notion of 
author, we have new opportunities for critical engagement. Katherine Montwieler 
and Mark E. Boren argue that Frankenstein’s creature serves as a critique of the 
Romantic creative ego. The Creature reveals that “although solitude is necessary for 
intellectual and creative development, the survival and emotional health of the self 
depends, however, not on distancing oneself from others, but through inter-
subjectivity, if not community” (Montwieler and Boren 3). What Shelley presents in 
Frankenstein, with Walton only surviving because he agrees to return to society 
rather than continue his individual quest, is a refutation of the Romantic belief in the 
genius alone in nature. Montwieler and Boren touch upon the idea that Shelley is 
critiquing and posing an alternative to the archetypal Romantic author: 
 
Through parodies of narcissistic melancholia throughout Frankenstein and 
Mathilda, and overt authorial “interventions” at the end of both texts, Shelley 
distances herself from the alienated subject and imagines a different way of 
being for some of her characters, and potentially for the reader. (3) 
 
I would extend this to argue that she is also imagining a different way of being for 
herself as an author. Like the lone Romantic genius, “Women, Shelley observes, 
respond to trauma through a kind of folding in, or reclusion” (Montwieler and Boren 
4). This was certainly Shelley’s response to the traumatic loss of her children and 
husband. She describes her perception of being isolated from others: “I feel dejected 
& cowed before them, feeling as if I might be the senseless person they appear to 
consider me. But I am not” (M. Shelley, Journals 441). Shelley quite clearly longs 
for the connection that she suggests would redeem her characters and in so doing 
rejects the isolation of being both a woman and an author in the Romantic era. This 
rejection and subsequent reimagining of what it is to be author is manifest in her 
works.  
Montwieler and Boren’s analysis of Frankenstein centres on the characters 
and content of the novel. This seems a more valid application of psychoanalysis, as 
we are provided with the character “complete”—whatever there is to know about 
them as an individual is contained within the work. Montwieler and Boren argue that 





The idealised Romantic subject suffers from a condition similar to Freud’s 
melancholia, akin to our modern pervasive and ever-expanding diagnosis of 
depression. That is, to divorce oneself from humanity, to see oneself as 
fundamentally apart, bespeaks not autonomy and greatness, but rather a kind 
of despair that, although perhaps generative, is more often destructive. (1) 
 
Their application of Freud’s concept of melancholia is evident in the actions of the 
characters. Victor Frankenstein’s isolation results in an unprecedented achievement 
in creation, which is ultimately a hugely destructive force. This use of 
psychoanalysis, when applied to characters, has merit, as the evidence is self-
contained: if it is not present in the text, it is not present. This approach makes 
Montwieler and Boren’s use of Freudian theory more successful, as it provides 
insight into the text and its possible meanings, without resorting to divination of 
authorial intent. They also reinforce the idea that Shelley was reflecting upon what it 
is to be an author: 
  
In both novels, Shelley hints at a way out of morbid melancholia—a cure, if 
you will. Almost as a coda, at the end of Frankenstein, Walton follows his 
men’s suggestion, and turns his ship towards home. This turn to an 
intersubjectivity that is not solely interiorised and thus doomed, this 
acceptance of community indicates that unlike Frankenstein, who does not 
approve of this decision, Walton has learned the importance of listening and 
negotiating with others. (Montwieler and Boren 20) 
 
This ending does reflect Shelley’s concerns about the isolation of the Romantic 
subject, but particularly the Romantic author—connection and community is 
necessary for the author to be successful both professionally and personally. 
Frankenstein is not the only evidence of Shelley’s exploration of authorship. 
The Last Man also reveals Shelley’s critique of the role of an author. The complex 
premise of the text, having been written by the last man in 2100 yet being discovered 
in 1818 and reinterpreted by the nameless adventurer who found the Sibylline leaves, 
creates questions about who the real author of the text is. This unnamed translator-
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editor-narrator explains their method and offers their musings on what form the work 
would have taken should another person have found the leaves:  
 
I present the public with my latest discoveries in the slight Sibylline 
pages. Scattered and unconnected as they were, I have been obliged to add 
links, and model the work into a consistent form. But the main substance 
rests on the truths contained in these poetic rhapsodies, and the divine 
intuition which the Cumaean damsel obtained from heaven. 
I have often wondered at the subject of her verses, and at the English dress of 
the Latin poet. Sometimes I have thought, that, obscure and chaotic as they 
are, they owe their present form to me, their decipherer. As if we should give 
to another artist, the painted fragments which form the mosaic copy of 
Raphael’s Transfiguration in St. Peter’s; he would put them together in a 
form, whose mode would be fashioned by his own peculiar mind and talent. 
Doubtless the leaves of the Cumaean Sibyl have suffered distortion and 
diminution of interest and excellence in my hands. My only excuse for thus 
transforming them, is that they were unintelligible in their pristine condition. 
(M. Shelley, The Last Man ix-x) 
  
This passage clearly denies authorial ownership in its questioning of what another 
translator-editor would have produced. It shows Shelley directly questioning the role 
and work of the author. This ongoing critique and experimentation with the role of 
author and the act of attribution position Shelley as a writer actively engaged in her 
craft and profession, but not in the workmanlike fashion of a guild member, for 
example—here, Shelley participates in the process of inquiry through which, in the 
Romantic era, the individual author becomes an important concept (Foucault, 
“Author” 109). As Martha Woodmansee outlines, in response to Foucault’s call to 
examine “how the author became individualised in a culture like ours” (“Author” 
101), the idea of the author was initially twofold, seen either as a craftsman who 
plied a given set of tools to produce an expected product or as someone “inspired”, 
who went beyond the rules and tools of the craftsman-author (Woodmansee 427). 
But by the eighteenth century, theorists began to place greater emphasis on the role 
of inspiration as an internal rather than external force and so the concept of the 
“‘original genius’, with the consequence that the inspired work was made peculiarly 
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and distinctively the product—and the property—of the writer” (Woodmansee 427). 
Shelley was writing at the time that authorship as a profession was a still-emerging 
and under-legislated area, and so her experimentations with authorship can be seen 
as an attempt to define what it is to be an author in her place and time.  
 
3.3 DISCOURSE AND DISRUPTION: BEYOND THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL PARADIGM 
 
Foucault describes the author-function as the dead zone into which the individual 
who writes will inevitably recede, stripped of agency and adopting the role of the 
“dead man in the game of writing”, but he does reserve a place for a special class of 
author—those he calls “founders of discourse” (“Author”, 113). To understand how 
an author might escape the fate of the dead man by exceeding the author-function 
role, and to begin to explain how Shelley achieves this particular feat, it is necessary 
to focus momentarily on Foucault’s explanation of authorship as a construct of a 
discursive formation. He explains “whenever one can describe, between a number of 
statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of 
statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, 
correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say, for the sake 
of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation” (Foucault, 
Archaeology 38). This idea of ‘statement sets’ sounds like a form of linguistic 
analysis, but as Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace clarify the point, “Foucault thinks of 
discourse (or discourses) in terms of bodies of knowledge. His use of the concept 
moves it away from something to do with language (in the sense of a linguistic 
system or grammar) and closer towards the concept of discipline” (26). This idea of 
“bodies of knowledge” is useful in moving the definition of discourse toward the 
way we might think of disciplines, but we make a mistake if we move away from 
language altogether. The move is necessary for Foucault to take us away from seeing 
thought restrained by operations or structures within language, and to move us 
toward systems of control that apply to language in use: the ‘language rules’ that 
operate within bodies of knowledge. McHoul and Grace observe that in any given 
historical moment, “we can write, speak or think about a given social object or 
practice (madness, for example) only in certain specific ways and not others” (31).  
These ideas of bodies of knowledge, bounded by rules of what can and 
cannot be said helps us move toward a clear understanding of Foucauldian discourse. 
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An important point to consider is where these rules are established. If discourses are 
relatively static bodies of knowledge, discursive practice (that is, how the body of 
knowledge is used or deployed in culture) is what creates these rules of what can and 
cannot be said: “Fundamentally, then, Foucault’s idea of discourse shows the 
historically specific relations between disciplines (defined as bodies of knowledge) 
and disciplinary practices (forces of social control and social possibility)” (McHoul 
and Grace 26). While discourses shape the rules for what can and cannot be said, 
they are themselves shaped and perpetuated by practices of “social control” 
(behaviour codes, laws, and such), but then there are also forces for “social 
possibility” representing the prospect for cultural change that can occur within a 
discipline—that is, changes that mean new things can be said. If we accept a general 
definition of Foucauldian discourses as “bodies of knowledge” or disciplines, there 
is a tendency to focus on the static qualities of discourse but I am interested here 
more in the forces of change that constantly reshape the boundaries of what can and 
cannot be said. This also gives rise to consideration of Foucault’s concept of the 
“founder of discourse”, an author who creates something entirely new, thereby 
shifting the discursive boundaries once more. The shift does not come from outside 
discourse—rather, the author works upon the existing materials and the rules of 
language as they pertain at any given time—so it should be thought of more as a 
disruption than a total rupture. Foucault uses the language of rupture, as I will show, 
because he relies on geological metaphors to emphasise the relatively static but 
sedimentary nature of discourse (revealing the gradual change as well as the 
potential for cross-sectional analysis over time). I will argue here that if we think in 
more fluid terms about how change emerges from the “possibility” that inheres in 
discourse, we can gain a clearer analogy for the role of an author in founding 
discourse. This is possible, I suggest, because bodies of knowledge behave more like 
bodies of water. 
In Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault explains the function of the “work” 
within discourse partly in terms that explain why reading literature in the New 
Critical mode—to understand the literary work on its own—both ignores the role 
that books play in certain kinds of things unsaid and participates in perpetuating that 




The frontiers of a book are never clear-cut: beyond the title, the first lines, 
and the last full stop, beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous 
form, it is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, 
other sentences: it is a node within a network. And this network of references 
is not the same in the case of a mathematical treatise, a textual commentary. 
A historical account, and an episode in a novel cycle; the unity of the book, 
even in the sense of a group of relations, cannot be regarded as identical in 
each case. The book is not simply the object that one holds in one’s hands; 
and it cannot remain within the little parallelepiped that contains it: its unity 
is variable and relative. As soon as one questions that unity, it loses its self-
evidence; it indicates itself, constructs itself, only on the basis of a complex 
field of discourse. (Archaeology 23) 
 
This construction of the “book” as a “node within a network” is particularly useful in 
this study as it allows us to trace the complex interactions between the discourses 
from which it derives and the discourses which it writes back into. However, the 
linear, structural nature of a “network” does not enable us to capture the more 
organic nature of discursive interactions. It is necessary to keep in mind the capacity 
of the nodes within the network to be sites where the possibility of the founding of 
discourse is also always potentially in play. The nodes are not mere meeting points 
for mouthpieces of discourse; rather, they are sites in which agents act upon one 
another, and they are sites where competing or at least parallel discourses may come 
into contact.  
In his discussion of the development of Original and Regular discursive 
formations, Foucault uses the language of geology and archaeology to describe the 
formation and fracturing of discourse. Original discourses are compared to violent 
forces at work beneath the earth, which over time in the past “rose up in turn to 
produce the landscape that we know today; it is the task of the historian to 
rediscover on the basis of these isolated points, these successive ruptures, the 
continuous line of an evolution” (Archaeology 141; emphasis added). Continuity is 
thus ascertained after the fact, a product of historical recovery and interpretation 
rather than a feature of discursive change itself. His greater interest is of course in 
showing how discourses and their operations can be discerned, after the fact, in any 
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given period in history, which is why he applies the archaeological model to Regular 
discourses: 
 
The second group [Regular], on the other hand, reveals history as inertia and 
weight, as a slow accumulation of the past, a silent sedimentation of things 
said; in this second group, statements must be treated by weight and in 
accordance with what they have in common; their unique occurrence maybe 
neutralized; the importance of their author’s identity, the time and place of 
their appearance are also diminished; on the other hand, it is their extent that 
must be measured; the extent of their repetition in time and place, the 
channels by which they are diffused, the groups in which they circulate; the 
general horizon that they outline for men’s thought, the limits that they 
impose on it; and how, in characterizing a period, they make it possible to 
distinguish it from others” (Archaeology 141; emphasis added). 
 
Applying Foucault’s model to the period of relevance to this study, we can use the 
idea of sedimentation to picture the gradual emergence of a bedrock layer, built up 
over centuries, broadly labelled “Western Christian Tradition”. This is the 
foundation on which medieval and Renaissance European socio-political structures 
are built. To represent this, in Figure 2, I show the deep substrate of the Western 
Christian Tradition, on which a surface layer of more permeable, shifting sediment 
constituting “Socio-political Boundaries” is accumulated. These top layers also serve 
as the horizon or boundary for discursive formations.  
 
 




The same figure illustrates how even the violent ruptures of Original 
discourses will deposit the record of the event in sedimentary fashion, if we are to 
extend the analogy to account for how the documentary record retains evidence of 
such ruptures. Foucault argues that one such rupture, “certainly one of the most 
radical that ever occurred in Western culture” (Order 220), was the “somewhat 
enigmatic event, [a] rising up from below which occurred towards the end of the 
eighteenth century” (Order 220). The rupture and subsequent evolution and growth 
of Enlightenment ideas and scientific thought are represented here as a massive fault 
within the bedrock, a radical break in the foundations of the Western Christian 
Tradition. This rupture caused shifts in the socio-political boundaries; for example, 
the questioning of monarchy and the calling for greater recognition of human rights 
in all classes. “Scientific Thought” is represented as a layer of fresh sediment, arising 
from the new channels opened by the rise of the Enlightenment. I have represented 
science in this way, as I would argue that it has become a part of the bedrock of 
modern Western society since this time: what was once radical or revolutionary is 
now part of the substrate on which our own Regular discourses are grounded, and are 
deeply embedded in the disciplinary practices of the modern world. 
What I want to now consider is the capacity for Original discourse to emerge 
as a result of processes that occur on top of the bedrock, if it is to be at all possible 
for the writings of an individual to contribute to or even to bring about changes of 
such magnitude. If we retain Foucault’s view of the bedrock of society as one of the 
strata in a deep geologically embedded structure, the model need not be discarded for 
this change element to be added at the top level—it is in culture that I see this 
element being added, if imagined here as a lake or pool that rests atop these solid and 
slow-moving foundations. Positing culture atop Foucault’s geological analogy is also 
useful in differentiating between society and culture. Raymond Williams defines 
society as “clear in two main senses: as our most general term for the body of 
institutions and relationships within which a relatively large group of people live; 
and as our most abstract term for the condition in which such institutions and 
relationships are formed” (291). These “institutions and relationships” are the more 
static formations of a society, the socio-political boundaries delimiting discourse as a 
set of disciplinary practices. Defining culture is more problematic. As Williams 
explains, it can have three main meanings: “a general process of intellectual, spiritual 
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and aesthetic development”; the resultant “works and practices of intellectual and 
especially artistic activity”; but it also “indicates a particular way of life, whether of 
a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general” (90). This last definition seems 
to be more relevant to a discussion of “society” and it is from this sense that 
Williams seeks to move culture into the domain of the social sciences. Combining 
the three points Williams makes, culture can be described broadly as the creative, 
intellectual output of a society, and this output provides the field of evidence from 
which historians or archaeologists derive similarities to construct broad-reaching 
categories like “Renaissance culture”—the most obvious early example of a study 
that used such an approach was Jakob Burkhardt’s The Civilization of the 
Renaissance in Italy (1860).  
 My approach to culture, interested as I am in demonstrating the potential for 
the individual to be able to activate changes in both society and culture, does not do 
away with the broad-reaching focus that combines the various definitions identified 
by Williams, but it does insist on a return to the less fashionable early definition of 
“culture” as a process of intellectual and artistic activity. A culture, even understood 
more broadly, thus reflects those who do not just live in but are actively involved in 
shaping the modes of expression of their society, by which I mean those who read, 
write, or practise within a field of cultural production. Contrast this with the 
individual who takes no interest in art, literature, or politics—this person may be 
counted as a member of society from the perspective of a social or demographic 
study, yet the same individual is not an active participant in culture. We can envisage 
such a character as one of the many anonymous grains of sand that do, however, 
participate in and thus make up the socio-cultural boundary of the cultural pool. 
While the ripples of culture may wash over such people, or perhaps even change 
their surrounding landscape, they remain inanimate, touched and moved by the 
cultural currents but lacking the agency to create ripples of their own. Here, it is 
important to keep in mind Shelley’s context. Increasing rates of literacy (Merriman 
327-329), more affordable printing technology (Merriman 414), and greater social 
agitation for education and rights of the lower classes (Merriman 454)  meant that 
the number of people engaged in the cultural pool was far greater than previously 
possible. That is, in what we may imagine as a landslide of literacy, many of these 
grain of sand figures slipped into the cultural pool as they began to be able to engage 
both as individuals and larger groups with the discursive formations of their culture. 
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3.4 RIPPLES ON THE SURFACE OF THE CULTURAL POOL 
  
In The Order of Things, Foucault re-envisions history not as a linear sequence of 
events, but rather as a number of epochs, each marked by its dominant discourses. 
Epochs end not with a gradual evolution into a new age, but in a radical rupture in 
the discursive field or practice. Foucault argues that one such shift occurred during 
Godwin and Wollstonecraft’s lifetime and the landslide of literacy that changed the 
shape of Shelley’s cultural pool is just one such rupture: 
  
And it took a fundamental event—certainly one of the most radical that ever 
occurred in Western culture—to bring about the dissolution of the positivity 
of Classical knowledge, and to constitute another positivity from which, even 
now, we have doubtless not entirely emerged. This event, probably because 
we are still caught inside it, is beyond our comprehension. Its scope, the 
depth of the strata it has affected, all the positivities it has succeeded in 
disintegrating and recomposing, the sovereign power that has enabled it, in 
only a few years, to traverse the entire space of our culture, all this could be 
appraised and measured only after a quasi-infinite investigation concerned 
with no more nor less than the very being of our modernity. (Order 220) 
 
While this claim may sound hyperbolic, the changes wrought on our world that can 
be traced back to the emergence of modern science in the sixteenth century, and its 
exponential growth from the eighteenth century onward, coupled with the social 
changes wrought by Enlightenment thinking, are self-evident. Foucault goes on to 
outline some of the specific events that are evidence of this rupture: “The 
constitution of so many positive sciences, the appearance of literature, the folding 
back of philosophy upon its own development, the emergence of history as both 
knowledge and the mode of being of empiricity, … the formation, here of philology, 
there of economics, there again of biology” (Order, 220). The most concentrated 
expression of this rupture arises, he explains “between easily assignable dates (the 
outer limits are the years 1775 and 1825)” (220), which of course coincide not only 
with the careers of Godwin and Wollstonecraft, but of Shelley herself. 
While Foucault sees this momentous cultural shift as rupture, his attempt to 
describe the scale of the phenomena of human activity touched by the shift leads him 
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to find a need to move his language toward the fluid analogy I have sought to use 
here:  
 
This somewhat enigmatic event, this event rising up from below which 
occurred towards the end of the eighteenth century in these three domains, 
subjecting them at one blow to one and the same break, can now be located 
within the unity that forms a foundation for its diverse forms. Quite 
obviously, it would be superficial to seek this unity in some progress made in 
rationality, or in the discovery of a new cultural theme. The complex 
phenomena of biology, of the history of languages, or of industrial 
production, were not, in the last years of the eighteenth century, introduced 
into forms of rational analysis to which until then they had remained entirely 
foreign; nor was there a sudden interest - provoked by the “influence” of a 
budding “romanticism”—in the complex forms of life, history, and society; 
there was no detachment, under the pressure of its problems, from a 
rationalism subjected to the model of mechanics, to the rules of analysis and 
the laws of understanding. Or rather, all this did in fact happen, but as a 
surface movement: a modification and shifting of cultural interests, a 
redistribution of opinions and judgements, the appearance of new forms in 
scientific discourse, wrinkles traced for the first time upon the enlightened 
face of knowledge. (Foucault, Order 238) 
 
Where he starts with an enigmatic event “rising up from below” that subjects 
everything at the same time to the same “break”, he ends “rather” with “surface 
movement”, “modification and shifting”, and “wrinkles” as he realises the breadth 
and range of the phenomena that he is describing. Even then, the shifting and 
wrinkles are an uneasy fit for the sedimentary image of bedrock and strata, but if we 
shift this to flows and ripples the model opens up more easily to account for the 
relationship between agents of cultural production and the operations of deeply 
embedded discursive formations. Just like a spring-fed lake, whose waters rise up 
thought the bedrock and sediment below, the discourses that dominate a culture 
“bubble up” from below, rising out of the more slow-moving forces that shape a 
society. When these “thought bubbles” break the surface, they cause ripples that 





FIGURE 3: Top view: Discursive Formations in Culture  
 
Figure 3 represents three major discourses that dominated society and culture 
at the time of the great rupture described by Foucault: politics, religion, and science. 
Three key points follow from viewing discourses as ripples within a pool. The first is 
that a large discourse, such as “Politics”, is not really seen as one set of ripples, but 
rather as a series of overlapping and intersecting ripples that occupy a large space 
within the cultural pool. For example, Tory and Whig ideas are different, yet both 
belong within political discourse. The second point to note is the interactions 
between the discursive fields: just as in a real pool, if two points of disruption break 
the surface, they will both create ripples that interact with one another. This is 
represented here where the ripples of Religion touch upon the political structure of 
the monarchy. It is important to note that these ripples do not travel in only one 
direction, and each interaction triggers yet another set of ripples, which may vary in 
size. Foucault observes in “What is an Author?” that discursive fields produce a 
necessary “return” to a point of origin which is both “part of the discursive field 
itself” and yet “never stops modifying it” (116). By looking back, the “return” also 
redefines the discourse, changing the way statements operate within it. Thinking of 
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the surface of culture as a pool, the “return” is always visible in the ripples that 
emanate from the source even as they spread out further from the source. Ripples 
may fold back towards their origin point, or interact with other ripples, all of which 
serves to “transform the discursive practice itself” (Foucault “Author” 116).  
Importantly, the pool analogy reinforces the point that change does not only 
come from below. Significant ripples are also caused by throwing rocks into the 
pool, and these resultant ripples interact with the others already present. To further 
extend this idea, the formation of Regular discursive fields occurs as ripples form a 
regular wave motion or become incorporated into a current, or over longer time 
spans as they simply settle into becoming a stagnant body of water. Here, too, the 
geological model is not abandoned, since bodies of water also interact with the earth 
through the water table, and it is this that eventually leads to the greatest source of 
instability in the ground on which we walk. Just as water settles downwards, so too 
the most disruptive Original discursive formations may originate not from the 
depths: they may occur when a rock is thrown into the pool, creating a splash and 
then a series of new waves. Shelley’s Frankenstein hardly rated as a work of 
Literature in its time but I will argue in what follows that it connected the discourses 
of science and religion/morality in new ways, and that this was possible only if it 
created enough ripples to enable new points of intersection to emerge on the surface 
of her culture. Shelley drew her work from the pool of existing ideas, but when she 
published Frankenstein she created a new set of interactions: she founded a new 
discursive space. Figure 4 shows how the novel intersected, for example, with 
science in its deployment of the principles of Galvanism, but it also moved toward 
key political ideas that had been expressed in the work of her parents. Later, in The 
Last Man, Shelley would revisit these ideas, and having seen the impact of Shelley’s 
work, other authors later began to absorb her originating ideas into their own literary 
practice. While not a critical success, the novel’s impact was certainly felt elsewhere 
throughout the culture. As a founder of the discourse in which science and fiction 





FIGURE 4: New Discursive Formations 
 
To further delve into the ripples metaphor: the superposition of waves is a 
useful metaphor for exploring how ideas intersect and interact in the pool of culture. 
When two waves with positive amplitude (or, for the metaphor, two congruent ideas) 
intersect, the size of the wave is amplified. That is, the idea gains strength. The same 
is true of two waves of a negative amplitude. To apply this to ideas or discourses, 
two negative representations will further strengthen the negative representation of 
the idea. When two waves of differing amplitude intersect, that is when two 
conflicting ideas intersect, a new waveform is the result. This is depicted in Figure 5. 
The yellow wave and blue wave are negative and positive respectively. At the 
moment they intersect a new waveform which is the sum of the two results. In 
physics, this new waveform only occurs at the point of intersection, with the original 
waveforms continuing after the moment of intersection. That is, the yellow and blue 
lines are unchanged, even after intersection. However, for this metaphor, I bend the 
laws of physics, as the resultant (green) waveform, representing the comingling of 
the two ideas/ discourses continues onwards. I argue that significant moments of 
discursive intersection operate like new origin-points for discourse – it is as though 
when two ideas meet with sufficient impact or force, an entirely new object enters 
the cultural pool. That is, the collision between these ideas triggers a new moment so 




FIGURE 5: The superposition of discursive ripples 
 
This has a two-fold effect of both changing the two original (ideas/discourses) waves 
as they intermingle and also creating new ripples. These resultant waves carry ideas 
from both of the original discourses and these in turn may perhaps form a new 
discursive space. One small example of this is the way the term “Franken-” has 
entered scientific and popular discussion of genetic modification. Ksenia 
Gerasimova gives an account of the emergence of one such term: “In 1977, Arthur 
Lubow in the New Times newspaper article raised concerns that ‘modern Dr 
Frankensteins have found a way to create brand new forms of life’. Once the debate 
on GMOs focused on food … a new term, ‘Frankenfood’ appeared. It was coined by 
Paul Lewis … in his letter to the New York Times in 1992”. This adoption of the 
‘Franken-” stem demonstrates how the core imagery of the monstrous assemblage of 
the Creature has entered popular culture as a broad reference to anything that is 
manipulated by science to create new, ‘unnatural’ forms. Susan Merrill Squiers 
conception of Catherine Waldby’s “biomedical imaginary” as understanding 
“narratives to function as working objects, in experiments that take place not in the 
biomedical laboratory but in the biomedical imaginary: the rich intertidal zone 
where, as Waldby puts it, ‘biomedicine makes things up’” (16). The use of 
“Frankenfood” is one example of the “imaginative” – the adoption of narrative 
elements to explain science and also express the fear that it could go wrong, as it did 
in Shelley’s novel. Squiers argues that “fiction, the zone where objective truth is not 
told, paradoxically becomes the site where one specific kind of truth is best 
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articulated … the workings of the biomedical imaginary, the desires propelling 
biomedicine, can be expressed in fiction” (17). This “intertidal zone” of interaction 
extends the metaphor of two ripples interacting. In the case of “Frankenfoods” we 
see the overlap of the ripples caused by Shelley’s novel, the developments in the 
complex science of genetic modification and the fear that this evoked. Ultimately, 
the discursive space which Shelley established provides the spark of humanity to 
pure science. It is a space where we can respond not only intellectually but emotively 
to scientific potential. Waldby’s “intertidal zone” is the space in which these new 
discursive forms can be observed, as the ideas from the novel interact with and in 
turn reshape our conception of science, and at times, our understandings of the 
novel’s potential meanings.  
We can also use this metaphor of ripples as a way of measuring the impact of 
a work. Recall Foucault’s description of the book as a system of references to other 
books—here we can see this also as a reaching back toward the origin, as in the 
pattern made on the surface of the pool by the ripples. The smaller ripples, close to 
the origin-point of the discourse represent the most direct impacts and references to 
the origin-work/idea, while the outer ripples may be more tangential references or 
interactions with the discourse, which nonetheless serve as a measure of reach and 
impact of a discourse. As Laurie Johnson explains, “When we find patterns, we are 
exercising the wholly productive force of the imagination. Beyond creators, 
generators, programs, archives and so on, there is the observer whose capacity for 
making sense of texts is what ultimately gives to culture its contours, patterns and 
limits” (Johnson “Agency”). I frame these “contours, patterns and limits” as ripples 
in the pool of culture. Because a book can function to reiterate and standardise these 
contours, patterns, and limits, it can also serve as a force for disruption by 
originating a new waveform. 
 It is this shifting of cultural interests, marked by the almost exponential 
growth in the fields of science, that coincided with “a redistribution of opinions and 
judgements”. What Foucault suggests is that as cultural knowledge changed, so did 
people’s way of judging (or drawing moral boundaries around) these changes. It is in 
this moment that Shelley writes Frankenstein and so finds a new way for the fields 
of science and literature to interact, and in turn one new way for people to form 
“opinions and judgements”. These passages establish the time in which Shelley 
wrote was one of significant upheaval in terms of the dominant discourses within her 
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culture. Not only did she bear witness to these changes, she and her milieu were 
active participants in these discursive spaces. Her father was a political writer and 
her husband explored religious and political themes and had a deep interest in the 
new sciences. Shelley synthesised these factors—her milieus’ politics, her (and 
Percy’s) interest in science, and the group’s general apathy towards religion—
through her writing to speak about science in a new way. In doing so, she founded a 
new discursive space and also explored what it meant to be an author.  
 
3.5 SHELLEY’S AUTHORSHIP: THROWING STONES 
 
For an author whose body of work has been read through a biographical lens for 
decades, it may seem counter-intuitive to take on a Foucauldian approach when 
analysing Shelley and her works, as Foucault seems to strip the author’s biography 
of its significance. As Foucault asserts, “author function … does not refer purely and 
simply to a real individual, since it can give rise simultaneously to several selves, to 
several subjects—positions that can be occupied by different classes of individuals” 
(“Author” 113). However, the contextual biography I have offered in Chapter Two 
did not seek to read Shelley’s biography to find the “real individual”, because, as 
Hermione Lee points out, “there is no such thing as a definitive biography” (18). 
Rather, an analysis was undertaken of Shelley’s biography to discern the conditions 
that made it possible for her to found a discourse, while recognising that she 
experienced a conflict between her “several selves” —the roles in which her society 
cast her and the roles which she sought. This conflict of self was not unique to 
Shelley, as many women writers struggled to establish themselves during the period. 
However, her conflict was exacerbated by her circumstances—famed parents, 
infamous husband, and a circle that included some of the most well-regarded authors 
of the age, meant the mantle of author held a particular significance to Shelley. 
In Shelley’s time, the idea of the author as an individual, and as a career, was 
a relatively new one. Foucault states the “coming into being of the notion of ‘author’ 
constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, 
knowledge, literature, philosophy and the sciences” (“Author” 101). It is in this time 




Furthermore, in the course of the nineteenth century, there appeared in 
Europe another, more uncommon, kind of author, whom one should confuse 
with neither the “great” literary authors, nor the authors of religious texts, nor 
the founders of science. In a somewhat arbitrary way we shall call those who 
belong in this last group “founders of discursivity”. They are unique in that 
they are not just the authors of their own works. They have produced 
something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts. 
(“Author” 113-114) 
 
Foucault expands upon this unique/repeated binary in his later book, Archaeology of 
Knowledge, when he discusses Original and Regular discursive formations. As we 
have seen, his description of Original discursive formations tends to disregard the 
potential for the originating force behind their eruption to come from within the field 
of an existing discourse. By opposing Original to Regular formations, he tends to 
constrain cultural activity to the latter and sees new discourses rising up from below 
in a sudden momentous break from the past. Yet in “What is an Author?” he clearly 
moves away from this idea by positing the special class of author as one who triggers 
the formation of discourse. Thus, it may be said that this class of author provides the 
break that Foucault had viewed as the Original discursive formation. As I have 
argued in the adjustment to Foucault’s geological metaphor, this can be understood 
not as a single moment of break; rather, the work that precipitates a momentous shift 
must first be cast into the pool of existing discourses and only through its 
interactions with the other wave formations in the same pool can its influence begin 
to spread throughout the culture and then filter into the bedrock of thought on which 
social formations are founded. 
 In “What is an Author?” Foucault concerns himself with “the solid and 
fundamental unit of the author and the work” (101). Having given some 
consideration to Shelley as an author we must also give equal weight to her works, 
then, and their discursive function. As previously discussed, Foucault describes 
founders of discourse as “unique in that they are not just the authors of their own 
works. They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the 
formation of other texts” (“Author” 114). This stands in contrast to those authors 
who merely replicate previous works. This echoes Foucault’s Original/Regular 
binary. He states in relation to a Regular discursive formation that “the importance of 
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their author’s identity, the time and place of their appearance are also diminished” 
(Archaeology 141). Seeing Shelley as a founder of an Original discursive formation 
also lends weight to the argument that some consideration of her identity as author is 
justified. 
The vehicle for this moment of original creation is the author’s work. The 
works an author produces are inextricably linked to their discursive context: they 
both come out of and write back into the discursive fields of their culture. As such, 
we must analyse Frankenstein as a new stone, cast into the cultural pool, and Shelley 
then as a founder of discourse. As I will discuss in Chapter Five, Frankenstein has 
long been regarded as a Gothic novel (Mulvey-Roberts 211), but then it has also 
been credited as a foundational work in the history of science fiction. This focus on 
genre would of course be a way to situate Frankenstein within a Regular discursive 
formation; that is to say, it is derivative, “sometimes going so far as to repeat it word 
for word, from what has already been said” (Foucault, Archaeology 141). As Lobke 
Minter points out, “Shelley combines the Gothic genre with an investigation into the 
transgressions of scientific inquiry. Shelley’s tale of horror is not in the classical 
sense a story about ghosts or monsters, but rather an insight into the consequences of 
technological or scientific research” (n.p.). This focus on the possible outcomes of 
scientific inquiry shifts Frankenstein from the Gothic to something new, the nascent 
science fiction genre. Yet I will argue that it does more than merely offer the 
necessary “insight” needed to transform literary genres. 
Foucault was mindful of the potential for readers to misconstrue his 
definition of discourse as an account of genre, so to explain the distinction, he 
discusses Anne Radcliffe, pioneer of the Gothic. He argues that Radcliffe’s novels, 
 
put into circulation a certain number of resemblances and analogies patterned 
on her work—various characteristic signs, figures, relationships, and 
structures that could be integrated into other books. In short, to say that Anne 
Radcliffe created the Gothic Romance means that there are certain elements 
common to her works and to the nineteenth-century Gothic romance 
(“Author” 114). 
 
While Radcliffe’s work was foundational to the Gothic, for Foucault it is more a 
genre than a discourse as her tropes were merely adopted and adapted by later 
101 
 
writers—it is a part of a Regular discursive formation. Foucault identifies the 
characteristic features of a discourse using Marx and Freud as examples: 
 
on the other hand, Marx and Freud, as “initiators of discursive practices” not 
only made possible a certain number of analogies that could be adopted by 
future texts, but, as importantly, they also made possible a certain number of 
differences. They cleared a space for the introduction of elements other than 
their own, which, nevertheless, remain within the field of discourse they 
initiated. (“Author” 114) 
 
I would reframe Foucault’s “clearing of space” as instead the filling of a previously 
empty space; that is, casting a stone outside the bounds of the current discursive 
formations within the pool. While Shelley did draw upon the Gothic genre, and 
Victor was adopted as the archetypal mad scientist trope, she also created a new 
space for subsequent authors to respond in their own way to scientific developments. 
This strengthens the case for a Foucauldian reading, as unlike Radcliffe, whose 
works created a series of tropes that were replicated ad nauseum, Frankenstein was 
an idea rather than a rigid set of generic rules. It gave readers and viewers of the 
stage plays it spawned space to explore and answer their own questions about the 
moral rightness of Victor’s actions. The field which Shelley created is a space in 
which narrativising science allows for moral thought—it is far more than a series of 
tropes that have been adopted by a genre. This new space is the broader social and 
cultural discourse underpinning science fiction, which, through exploration of 
scientific potential, allows for a new way for both authors and readers to create 








Mirror Fragments: A Close Reading of the 1818 Edition of 
Frankenstein 
 
The strong emphasis on biography in Shelley scholarship demonstrates the 
importance that has been ascribed to Shelley’s lived experience, but with a 
contextual biography it becomes possible to reveal the broader conditions under 
which Frankenstein was authored, without ceding Shelley’s agency as author. Using 
the revised model of Foucault’s discursive formations, either Original or Regular, as 
revealing themselves in culture like ripples across water, the author’s agency can be 
understood as participating in the propagation of existing discourses but also 
potentially always capable of creating a big enough splash as to give rise to a new 
discourse. Importantly, I reject any sense in which this new discourse emerges from 
nowhere—instead, Foucault’s explanation of the role of the book as an intersection 
of past texts enables us to see where the materials from which a new discourse is 
produced are drawn. In this close reading of the 1818 edition of Frankenstein, I will 
demonstrate how the novel creates a space for making open-ended moral judgments 
about the achievements of the new science, by presenting these achievements in a 
fictive space with mirrored narrative structures focused on the characters whose lives 
are touched by these advances.  
Fred Botting, in Making Monstrous: Frankenstein, Criticism, Theory, 
observes that in Shelley’s novel, “the complex epistolary structure of three 
interdependent and interrupted narratives incorporates, displaces and questions acts 
of reading, while the internal organisation leaves the oppositions and divisions 
irresolvably shifting and doubling” (36). The structure of Frankenstein is sometimes 
referred to as a frame or box narrative (Schug 608), however, a case can be made 
that the structure is more interwoven than either frames or boxes suggests. Taking 
Botting’s “shifting and doubling” as a way of conceptualising the novel’s structure, 
Frankenstein could be termed a mirror narrative, with each of the characters offering 
a reflection of elements of one another. These mirrored “doublings” are fragmented 
and distorted, as Botting continues, “open to productive conflicts and plays of 
difference that undermine the possibility of identifying an authorial voice or fixing 
the text with a final authoritative meaning” (36). By offering differing perspectives 
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through the three narrators without giving any one voice primacy, Shelley avoids “a 
final authoritative meaning” and so closes the novel with the moral ambiguity that 
makes it such a significant work. As Botting elucidates, “the frame that delimits the 
borders of the text also functions as the edge of the mirror wherein the reader may 
recognise his/her own position” (7).  
Percy’s introduction to the 1818 edition claims that the author does not seek 
to convey her own beliefs or morals and also recognises that each reader will be 
affected differently: 
 
I am by no means indifferent to the manner in which whatever moral 
tendencies exist in the sentiments or characters it contains shall affect the 
reader; yet my chief concern in this respect has been limited to the avoiding 
the enervating effects of the novels of the present and to the exhibition of the 
amiableness of domestic affection, and the excellence of universal virtue. The 
opinions which naturally spring from the character and situation of the hero 
are by no means to be conceived as existing always in my own conviction; 
nor is any inference justly to be drawn from the following pages as 
prejudicing any philosophical doctrine of whatever kind. (M. Shelley, 
Frankenstein [1818] 5-6) 
 
The final claim that she does not favour any particular doctrine does seem 
contradictory given the book is dedicated to a philosophe, Godwin. Against Percy’s 
claims the work is an “exhibition of the amiableness of domestic affection, and the 
excellence of universal virtue”, Michael Scrivener proposes that the novel is overtly 
moral, giving it a “generic identity as a didactic fiction in the tradition of the Jacobin 
novel of the 1790s” (305). He argues the novel is an exploration of Godwinian 
utilitarianism.  
Additionally, Lee E. Heller presents a case that Frankenstein  
 
focuses on the problematic influence of experience—both social and 
literary—on those vulnerable, unstable groups around whom cluster cultural 
concerns about education and reading. Although Mary Shelley does not seem 
explicitly to raise issues of class and gender, her novel is very much about 
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controlling the formation of character among potentially dangerous and 
endangered social groups.  
 
Heller links “formation of character” with education while, like Scrivener, Anne 
Mellor sees the novel as having a clear moral purpose related to family. She argues 
that it is a moral defence of the nuclear family, the “domestic affections” that all 
should value: 
  
Mary Shelley endorsed a traditional mimetic aesthetic that exhorted literature 
to imitate ideal Nature and defined the role of the writer as a moral educator. 
Her novel purposefully identifies moral virtue, based on self-sacrifice, 
moderation, and domestic affection, with aesthetic beauty. (Mellor 
“Processing Nature”, 230) 
 
The dangers of isolation and non-participation in “domestic affection” are clear in 
both Victor’s account of the time preceding the Creature coming to life, where he 
worked in solitude, and in the outcome of the DeLaceys’ rejection of the Creature 
from the domesticity of which he had come to feel a part. Devon Hodges argues that 
Shelley is providing a defence of traditional family structures and gender roles, 
citing Percy’s introduction to the 1818 edition. Hodges argues that this is 
 
an apologia for Frankenstein that attempts to blur the contradiction between 
the text’s transgression of and adherence to the familiar opposition of 
masculine and feminine. He insists that the text functions to show the virtue 
of the domestic sphere—a place for women that has been largely defined by 
men (Hodges 160) 
 
While all three of these scholars view the work as a didactic defence of 
family values, even when the novel transgresses these boundaries, my thinking 
aligns with Sarah Canfield Fuller’s view that “the consistent sympathy for the 
Creature, the apparent failure of domestic institutions, and the relative lack of virtue 
exhibited by Victor despite Walton’s hero-worship suggest the inadequacy of this 
authorized interpretation” (223). The “authorised interpretation” Fuller refers to is 
both Percy’s initial “apologia” and Shelley’s later recollections of the novel’s 
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inception, the problematic nature of which was discussed in Chapter One, which 
have informed scholars’ perception of the work as overtly moral. Frankenstein is not 
a defence of “domestic affection, and the excellence of universal virtue”, but more 
an exploration of how these things interact, can be dependent upon on another, or 
operate entirely separately. Shelley includes a subtle critique of novels with overt 
moral lessons, as Victor chastises himself for boring Walton: “But I forget that I am 
moralizing in the most interesting part of my tale; and your looks remind me to 
proceed” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 35). This lack of moral didacticism is 
precisely what makes the novel so powerful and enduring and it is where the space is 
established for a new discourse to emerge. The fact that academic debate about the 
moral purpose of the work continues shows that Frankenstein’s message is 
ambiguous; just as the novel’s structure and characters are fragmented and distorted 
shards of one another, so too the novel’s moral lesson cannot be definitively located 
amongst the refracted and reflected possibilities of meaning.  
 The fragmented mirroring of the characters can be organised into a number of 
broad themes: curiosity, education, fraternity, responsibility, and nature. A thread 
that runs through all these themes is the threat of isolation and the impact it has upon 
how the three narrators view and engage with the world around them. While the 
narrators are in many ways a reflection of one another, a key feature that causes 
distortion in this mirroring is the degree to which the character is isolated. For 
example, Victor completes his education in isolation and so his curiosity is 
unfettered, not moderated by others’ views. In contrast, Walton seeks someone to 
“regulate his mind” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 10) and temper his decision 
making. Mary Poovey recognises some of these interwoven threads: 
 
More in keeping with eighteenth-century moralists than with either William 
Godwin or Percy Shelley, Mary Shelley characterizes innate desire not as 
neutral or benevolent but as quintessentially egotistical. And, unlike Mary 
Wollstonecraft, she does not conceive of imaginative activity as leading 
through intimations of mortality to new insight or creativity. Instead, she sees 
imagination as an appetite that can and must be regulated—specifically, by 
the give-and-take of domestic relationships. If it is aroused but is not 
controlled by human society, it will project itself into the natural world, 
becoming voracious in its search for objects to conquer and consume. This 
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principle, which draws both mechanistic and organic models under the 
mantle of conventional warnings to women, constitutes the major dynamic 
of Frankenstein’s plot. As long as domestic relationships govern an 
individual’s affections, his or her desire will turn outward as love. But when 
the individual loses or leaves the regulating influence of relationship with 
others, imaginative energy always threatens to turn back on itself, to ‘mark’ 
all external objects as its own and to degenerate into ‘gloomy and narrow 
reflections upon self’. (123) 
 
I frame Poovey’s “desire” and “imagination” as curiosity, which must be regulated 
to a degree. Poovey’s assertion that domestic relationships are an essential part of 
this regulatory framework is reiterated throughout the novel, in Victor’s single-
minded experimentations and the anger the Creature reveals when rejected by the 
DeLaceys. Yet Shelley’s work is not a morality tale espousing proto-Victorian 
domestic bliss, rather in the fractured reflections of each character Shelley explores 
the complex interplay of human desire, curiosity and fallibility with the social forces 
of her era which impact upon the development of the characters’ actions and sense of 
self.  
 
4.1 THE COST OF CURIOSITY   
 
Curiosity is a driving force for all three of Shelley’s narrators, who are on “a voyage 
of discovery to the land of knowledge” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 38). We 
meet Walton as he prepares for his (literal) journey to seek the North-West Passage, 
Victor undertakes a voyage of intellectual endeavour in seeking an elixir of life, and 
the Creature is on a journey of self-discovery, seeking to understand his origins and 
selfhood. The mirroring of these characters’ journeys is evident; one physical, one 
intellectual, and one spiritual. Additionally, all of their quests have a mythic 
quality—the North-West Passage was ultimately proven to be a false hope and while 
Victor technically succeeds in his Promethean quest, it has none of the mythic 
wonder or glory associated with such an achievement. The Creature’s search is for 
the most unattainable of myths: true self-knowledge. Not only are each of the 
narrators driven by curiosity, but each quest has with it a series of obligations. To 
achieve his goal, Walton must have a crew, and so is obligated to keep them safe as 
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they journey north. Victor has an obligation both to his creation and society at large, 
as his success would have significant ramifications for all humanity if he has indeed 
conquered death. The Creature is bound only by social convention, which his creator 
does not teach him, but he gleans through observation and his own inherent 
understanding of right and wrong.  
Curiosity is the major motivator for both Walton and Victor. Walton 
describes the motivations for his northward expedition using language such as “I 
shall satiate my ardent curiosity” (7) and “the inestimable benefit which I shall 
confer on all mankind to the last generation” (8). Walton links his personal ambition 
to a greater good that will result from his efforts. This closely reflects Victor’s own 
aims later in the novel, when he states, “what glory would attend the discovery, if I 
could banish disease from the human frame, and render man invulnerable to any but 
a violent death!” (23). Curiosity to find new knowledge that will benefit mankind 
seems to be an inherent good, however, the dangers of unfettered curiosity are 
realised as the novel closes, with Victor’s staunch refusal to disclose the secret of 
how he gave life to his Creature to Walton: “‘Are you mad, my friend?’ said he. ‘Or 
whither does your senseless curiosity lead you? Would you also create for yourself 
and the world a demoniacal enemy? Or to what do your questions tend? Peace, 
peace! Learn my miseries, and do not seek to increase your own’” (151). The famed 
ambiguity of the ending of Shelley’s novel begins to emerge when, despite having 
berated Walton for his “senseless curiosity”, Victor exhorts that the would-be 
mutineers should not abandon their quest. This ambiguity is further reinforced as 
Victor dies: “Walton! Seek happiness in tranquillity, and avoid ambition, even if it 
be only the apparently innocent one of distinguishing yourself in science and 
discoveries. Yet why do I say this? I have myself been blasted in these hopes, yet 
another may succeed” (157). While Victor discourages Walton from seeking to know 
how the Creature was made, he is not condemning curiosity out of hand, as he 
encourages the sailors not to give up because they are afraid, perhaps reflecting the 
key flaw in Victor—he should have given up when (and if?) he had reservations 
about making his creature, instead of persisting, which ultimately leads to his 
downfall. He also fully expects that curiosity in the form of scientific inquiry will 
continue, and continue to improve on the failed experiments of the past. The various 
and at times contradictory ways in which Victor speaks about curiosity in these 
passages creates a degree of ambiguity the reader must navigate alone. 
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Walton offers a more positive reflection on the cost of curiosity. The benefits 
of curiosity in the form of intellectual endeavour for the greater good have a 
reciprocal benefit to the subject, as Walton suggests: “for nothing contributes so 
much to tranquillize the mind as a steady purpose, a point on which the soul may fix 
its intellectual eye” (8). Victor too sees the potential benefits of exploring the 
boundaries of knowledge: “In other studies you go as far as others have gone before 
you, and there is nothing more to know; but in a scientific pursuit there is continual 
food for discovery and wonder” (30). However, Victor’s narrative shows the 
outcome of this search for “discovery and wonder” being taken too far. His focus 
upon his goal is too intense, and comes at the expense of his wellbeing and 
relationships with others. This abandonment or neglect of his domestic sphere or 
community is portrayed negatively. It is here that the thematic thread of isolation 
emerges—it is his self-imposed isolation from others that allows Victor to transgress 
the boundaries of death without any voice to caution him.  
Additionally, this intense, isolated focus means Victor does not consider the 
full impact of his actions. In his confrontation with the Creature on Mer de Glace, 
Victor acknowledges his folly, the “spark which I so negligently bestowed” (68). 
The Creature’s impassioned plea to have his maker hear his story causes Victor to 
reflect, “For the first time, also, I felt what the duties of a creator towards his 
creature were, and that I ought to render him happy before I complained of his 
wickedness” (69-70). His sense of responsibility does not last, however. As Victor 
approaches the completion of the second, female creature, he considers the potential 
consequences of his actions: 
 
As I sat, a train of reflection occurred to me which led me to consider the 
effects of what I was now doing. Three years before, I was engaged in the 
same manner and had created a fiend whose unparalleled barbarity had 
desolated my heart and filled it forever with the bitterest remorse. I was now 
about to form another being of whose dispositions I was alike ignorant; she 
might become ten thousand times more malignant than her mate and delight, 
for its own sake, in murder and wretchedness. He had sworn to quit the 
neighbourhood of man and hide himself in deserts, but she had not; and she, 
who in all probability was to become a thinking and reasoning animal, might 
refuse to comply with a compact made before her creation. They might even 
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hate each other; the creature who already lived loathed his own deformity, 
and might he not conceive a greater abhorrence for it when it came before his 
eyes in the female form? She also might turn with disgust from him to the 
superior beauty of man; she might quit him, and he be again alone, 
exasperated by the fresh provocation of being deserted by one of his own 
species. Even if they were to leave Europe and inhabit the deserts of the new 
world, yet one of the first results of those sympathies for which the daemon 
thirsted would be children, and a race of devils would be propagated upon the 
earth who might make the very existence of the species of man a condition 
precarious and full of terror. (118-119) 
 
This long passage stands in contrast to the lack of reflection Victor undertakes 
during his first act of creation. It is not until this moment that he realises the female 
is likely to be just as individual as the Creature, with her own wants and needs and 
will. In yet another blow to the Creature, Victor goes on to destroy the female, seeing 
his obligation to humankind as greater than that he owes his creation. Victor argues,  
 
Had I right, for my own benefit, to inflict this curse upon everlasting 
generations? I had before been moved by the sophisms of the being I had 
created; I had been struck senseless by his fiendish threats; but now, for the 
first time, the wickedness of my promise burst upon me; I shuddered to think 
that future ages might curse me as their pest, whose selfishness had not 
hesitated to buy its own peace at the price, perhaps, of the existence of the 
whole human race. (118-119) 
 
While it seems Victor is willing to sacrifice his own wellbeing to save humanity, his 
self-involvement is cemented when the Creature threatens, “I shall be with you on 
your wedding night” (121). Despite having spent most of his narrative agonising 
over the safety of his family, he sees this as a personal threat and is more concerned 
about how bereft Elizabeth will be without him. It is difficult for the modern reader 
not to wonder at the seeming arrogance of this passage: “The prospect did not move 
me to fear; yet when I thought of my beloved Elizabeth—of her tears and endless 
sorrow, when she should find her lover so barbarously snatched from her” (121). 
When Victor realises the real target on his wedding night, he claims, “I would rather 
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have banished myself for ever from my native country, and wandered a friendless 
outcast over the earth, than have consented to this miserable marriage” (137-138). 
Victor continues: “when I thought that I prepared only for my own death, I hastened 
that of a far dearer victim” (138). The mirroring of the characters here is twofold. In 
his appeal for a mate, the Creature promises Victor that he will leave Europe and 
travel only with the other creature to the wilds of South America. Ironically, both the 
Creature and Victor end up friendless outcasts as they pursue one another across the 
frozen north. The mirroring is also present in the Creature’s murder of Elizabeth: just 
as Victor destroyed his intended mate, so too the Creature destroyed Victor’s bride. 
Upon seeing Elizabeth dead, Victor cries, “A fiend had snatched from me every 
happiness: no creature had ever been so miserable as I was; so frightful an event is 
single in the history of man” (142). Victor’s claim that no event could equal this is 
untrue; these exact words could easily have been spoken when the Creature observes 
Victor’s destruction of his intended mate.  
Victor returns again to his theme of his obligation to humanity: “A thousand 
times would I have shed my own blood drop by drop, to have saved their lives but I 
could not, my father, indeed, could not sacrifice the whole human race” (134). The 
cost of Victor’s curiosity is stunningly high—despite the Creature’s claim that 
should Victor create a mate he would retire from the world, Victor chooses his 
perceived obligation to humankind as greater than his obligation to his own creation. 
As a consequence, Victor loses everyone he loves, and ultimately his own life. But 
this was only possible because Victor isolated himself from the moderating voices of 
his father and the scholars at Ingolstadt who sought to temper and direct his studies. 
Instead, in what would become the ‘mad scientist’ trope of science fiction, Victor 
isolated himself in his garret-lab to “penetrate the recesses of nature” (29). Shelley 
does not condemn curiosity, but she does offer an indictment of the consequences of 
unchecked curiosity, suggesting that both community and education can protect 
against dangerous follies like Victor’s.  
 
4.2 A MORAL EDUCATION 
 
If the pursuit of curiosity through endeavour entails a series of obligations, from 
whence does this awareness of obligation come? Why does Victor fail in his 
obligations to his creation, despite receiving an extensive education? The merits of 
111 
 
education are explored throughout the novel, with each of the three narrators 
recounting their formative experiences. Walton’s early reading was limited, as “a 
history of all the voyages made for purposes of discovery composed the whole of our 
good uncle Thomas’s library. My education was neglected, yet I was passionately 
fond of reading. These volumes were my study day and night” (8). Like Walton, the 
Creature receives an opportunistic education, studying that which he finds and hears 
around him, rather than having a structured course of learning. The Creature 
stumbles upon an abandoned portmanteau which contains Paradise Lost, Plutarch’s 
Lives, and the Sorrows of Werter (89). From these texts the Creature learns about 
human nature, values the lessons of the peaceful lawmakers in Lives and sees what 
responsible creators do, as God cares for Adam in Paradise Lost.  
The lack of structure in the self-directed educations of Walton and the 
Creature is problematic. While Shelley seems to suggest that this leaves them both 
with a lack of intellectual discipline, they also seem to be more well-rounded than 
Victor, whose education was far more directed by his father and M. Waldman. 
Walton recounts the problems his lack of formal education have afforded him:  
 
But it is a still greater evil to me that I am self-educated: for the first fourteen 
years of my life I ran wild on a common, and read nothing but our uncle 
Thomas’s books of voyages. At that age I became acquainted with the 
celebrated poets of our own country, but it was only when it had ceased to be 
in my power to derive its most important benefits from such a conviction, 
that I perceived the necessity of becoming acquainted with more languages 
than that of my native country. Now I am twenty-eight, and am in reality 
more illiterate than many school-boys of fifteen. It is true that I have thought 
more, and that my day dreams are more extended and magnificent; but they 
want (as the painters call it) keeping—and I greatly need a friend who would 
have sense enough not to despise me as romantic, and affection enough for 
me to endeavour to regulate my mind. (10)  
 
This passage seems to associate Walton’s reading of voyages, poetry, and foreign 
languages as “romantic”. He immediately follows that he wants someone to 
“regulate his mind”. This suggests that a ‘romantic/Romantic’ education (which 
parallels Shelley’s reading list) results in a mind that needs regulation; that is, a 
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romantic education is not a strong foundation for common sense (which at its 
extreme can extend to morality). Victor’s education is less romantic: his modern 
education includes,  
 
the mathematics, and most of the branches of study appertaining to that 
science. I was busily employed in learning languages; Latin was already 
familiar to me, and I began to read some of the easiest Greek authors without 
the help of a lexicon. I also perfectly understood English and German. This is 
the list of my accomplishments at the age of seventeen and you may conceive 
that my hours were fully employed in acquitting and maintaining a 
knowledge of this various literature. (24).  
  
Regardless of the form or quality (romantic or not) of education, having an education 
stifled or misdirected can have dire consequences. This is compounded if the student 
works in isolation, with no suitable guiding voice, no one to “regulate” the learner’s 
mind.  
Walton is disappointed when he learns that the dreams he has built, based on 
his early readings, cannot become reality, as “my father’s dying injunction had 
forbidden my uncle to allow me to embark in a sea-faring life” (8). Victor 
experiences a similar paternal injunction when he shows his father his copy of 
Cornelius Agrippa’s work: “My father looked carelessly at the title-page of my book, 
and said, ‘Ah! Cornelius Agrippa! My dear Victor, do not waste your time upon this; 
it is sad trash’” (22). Both sons defy their fathers, yet Victor blames his father’s 
“careless” response for “the fatal impulse that led to my ruin” (22), as, had his father 
more thoroughly debunked Agrippa, Victor may have turned to more suitable 
studies: “the cursory glance my father had taken of my volume by no means assured 
me that he was acquainted with its contents; and I continued to read with the greatest 
avidity” (22). This marks the beginning of Victor’s turn away from the domestic 
connections that had shaped his education thus far. In his childhood, Victor’s father 
“devoted Himself to the education of his children” (19) and the children’s “studies 
were never forced; and by some means we always had an end placed in view, which 
excited us to ardour in the prosecution of them. It was by this method, and not by 
emulation, that we were urged to application” (21). This seemingly idyllic childhood, 
which featured indulgent parents and amiable companions (21), breaks down with 
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the casual dismissal of Agrippa, and is cemented when Elizabeth also shows no 
interest in Victor’s reading: “I was left by her to pursue my studies alone” (23). In 
his isolation, with no friend or father to guide his reading to more fruitful ground, 
Victor’s “dreams were therefore undisturbed by reality; and I entered with the 
greatest diligence into the search for the philosopher’s stone and the elixir of life” 
(23). It is not only alchemy that appeals to Victor, as “the raising of ghosts or devils 
was a promise liberally accorded by my favourite authors, the fulfilment of which I 
most eagerly sought” (23). Shelley’s conflation of the “science” of alchemy and the 
supernatural shows how misguided Victor’s autodidactic approach is; despite being 
told that alchemists were more like magicians or sorcerers than modern scientists, he 
attempts to use modern methods to achieve “magic”.  
Victor’s father does achieve the overthrow of Agrippa when he performs 
Benjamin Franklin’s kite and key experiment before a wondering Victor, who had, 
after seeing a lightening-blasted tree, inquired of his “father the nature and origin of 
thunder” (24). However, this is undone when his father sends him to a lecture series 
on natural philosophy: 
 
The professor discoursed with the greatest fluency of potassium and boron, 
of sulphates and oxyds, terms to which I could affix no idea; and I became 
disgusted with the science of natural philosophy, although I still read Pliny 
and Buffon with delight, authors, in my estimation, of nearly equal interest 
and utility. (24) 
 
Victor’s turn to Pliny and Buffon, and another missed opportunity to study the 
emerging science of chemistry, suggests his education at the hands of his father has 
been a failure. Instead of joining the contemporary academic debate about the 
sciences, Victor, isolated, pursues an arcane, semi-mystical course of learning. His 
father, and father-figures at Ingolstadt, fail to guide Victor into contemporary 
debates and so his education is misdirected and incomplete. Victor’s treatment of his 
creature is a reflection of this; his failure to care for and educate his creation results 
in the Creature literally wandering through the wilderness to discover what it is to be 
human.  
As a counterpoint to the close ministrations of Victor’s father in his 
education, Clerval’s father wishes to deny him an education all together, preferring 
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him to immediately enter the world of business. Yet Clerval’s father finally relents: 
“But his affection for me at length overcame his dislike of learning, and he has 
permitted me to undertake a voyage of discovery to the land of knowledge” (38). 
Just as Walton rejoices as he prepares for his journey north, so too Clerval relishes 
his experiences as a student: 
 
The delight of Clerval was proportionally greater than mine; his mind 
expanded in the company of men of talent, and he found in his own nature 
greater capacities and resources than he could have imagined himself to have 
possessed while he associated with his inferiors. (115) 
  
Clerval blossoms as he is educated amongst like-minded men, whereas the results of 
Victor’s isolated study is misery and death. Unsurprising, the opportunities for 
women are even fewer, as suggested by Elizabeth’s response to Victor’s supposed 
study tour of England: “Elizabeth approved of the reasons of my departure, and only 
regretted that she had not the same opportunities of enlarging her experience, and 
cultivating her understanding” (110). All of Shelley’s characters have their education 
limited in some way, either through a failing to have it properly guided, or the 
restrictions of a father or gender. Perhaps Shelley is suggesting that no education can 
be complete and therefore education is not essential to a good moral grounding.  
Shelley devotes a significant section of each narrator’s time to these accounts 
of their education. The Creature, the most self-educated of all the characters, values 
justice and care, and while he commits horrendous crimes, does so knowingly 
breaking the ideals which he has come to value. Walton is lured by adventure, yet 
uses his education to serve and protect those that accompany him. Victor in contrast, 
receives a comprehensive education yet seems to miss the vital lesson that Walton 
and the Creature have both learned: that care and community are essential to 
wellbeing and success. Victor, while aiming to conquer death for the good of all 
mankind, sees this as a personal and individual challenge, something that will bring 
him glory. His concern is only for his immediate circle and he does not show the 
care he should for the creature to which he gave life. There is no equation of a formal 





4.3 FRATERNITY AND FAMILY 
 
If a good education does not necessarily entail a strong moral framework, what can? 
I argue that Shelley sees intellectual endeavour as only being beneficial if done 
amongst and for community. Walton studies topics of interest with great zeal: he 
“voluntarily endured cold, famine, thirst, and want of sleep; I often worked harder 
than the common sailors during the day, and devoted my nights to the study of 
mathematics, the theory of medicine, and those branches of physical science from 
which a naval adventurer might derive the greatest practical advantage” (8-9). 
Walton’s efforts are akin to Victor’s, as both suffer privations as they strive to 
master new knowledge. Victor is “so ardent and eager, that the stars often 
disappeared in the light of morning whilst I was yet engaged in my laboratory” (30). 
However, the two accounts differ in that Walton’s studies are of practical benefit to 
his goal of safely navigating a crew through the north-west passage, while Victor’s 
result in illness and isolation. 
Walton clearly outlines the benefit of having human connections as he 
laments his lack of a friend of equal standing on his voyage: 
 
But I have one want which I have never yet been able to satisfy and the 
absence of the object of which I now feel as a most severe evil. I have no 
friend, Margaret: when I am glowing with the enthusiasm of success, there 
will be none to participate my joy; if I am assailed by disappointment, no one 
will endeavour to sustain me in dejection. I shall commit my thoughts to 
paper, it is true; but that is a poor medium for the communication of feeling. I 
desire the company of a man who could sympathize with me; whose eyes 
would reply to mine. You may deem me romantic my dear sister, but I 
bitterly feel the want of a friend. I have no one near me, gentle yet 
courageous, possessed of a cultivated as well as of capacious mind, whose 
tastes are like my own, to approve or amend my plans. How would such a 
friend repair the faults of your poor brother! I am too ardent in execution, and 
too impatient of difficulties. (10) 
 
Walton describes the absence of a friend to “approve or amend” his plans as “a most 
severe evil”. This impact of not having this moderating voice of friendship, which 
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may “repair the faults” of Margaret’s poor brother, is seen in Victor’s narrative, 
where there are none to intercede and question the wisdom of his actions. Walton’s 
wish for a friend and appreciation of the value of community is reflected in the care 
he shows for his crew and himself. While he acknowledges the dangers of his 
voyage, he reassures Margaret that she knows him “sufficiently to confide in my 
prudence and considerateness whenever the safety of others is committed to my 
care” (12). He will not “rashly encounter danger. I will be cool, persevering and 
prudent” (13). Walton recognises his obligation to the crew to keep them safe. While 
throughout the novel Victor often frets about the safety of his family, he does little to 
remain “cool” or “prudent” in his decision-making. This lack of regard for the 
wellbeing of others, should it stand in the path of his intent, is clear from his first 
introduction in the novel, where, upon being discovered languishing on the sea ice, 
he asks Walton, “will you have the kindness to inform me whither you are bound?” 
(14). Walton reacts with incredulity that Victor would not welcome being rescued: 
“You may conceive my astonishment on hearing such a question addressed to me 
from a man on the brink of destruction, and to whom I should have supposed that my 
vessel would have been a resource which he would not have exchanged for the most 
precious wealth the earth can afford” (10). In this exchange, Victor’s relentless focus 
on his goal, at the cost of others’ wellbeing and potentially his own life is 
established, as is Walton’s contrasting inclination towards building human 
connections. Despite this inauspicious start to their brief relationship, Walton is 
effusive in his joy at having found the friendship and connection he so craved as he 
commenced his journey: “I said in one of my letters, my dear Margaret, that I should 
no friend on the wide ocean; yet I have found a man who, before his spirit had been 
broken by misery, I should have been happy to have possessed as the brother of my 
heart” (16). 
Like Walton, the Creature longs for a friend: companionship. In a Godwinian 
passage, the Creature explains how he came to learn of human society: 
 
For a long time I could not conceive how one man could go forth to murder 
his fellow, or even why there were laws and governments; but when I heard 
details of vice and bloodshed, my wonder ceased, and I turned away with 
disgust and loathing. Every conversation of the cottagers now opened new 
wonders to me. While I listened to the instructions which Felix bestowed 
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upon the Arabian, the strange system of human society was explained to me. 
I heard of the division of property, of immense wealth and squalid poverty; 
of rank, descent, and noble blood. The words induced me to turn towards 
myself. I learned that the possessions most esteemed by your fellow-creatures 
were, high and unsullied descent united with riches. A man might be 
respected with only one of these acquisitions; but without either he was 
considered, except in very rare instances, as a vagabond and a slave, doomed 
to waste his powers for the profit of the chosen few. (83) 
 
The opening of this passage reveals the Creature’s natural state, one disinclined to 
violence, as when he hears about why laws are needed to prevent “vice and 
bloodshed”, he feels disgusted. Like Godwin, who believed that wealth should be 
shared (Godwin, Political Justice, 484) the Creature is bemused by the respect given 
to those of noble birth who have great wealth, which leaves others in “squalid 
poverty”. The Creature does not become didactic, but this passage does suggest 
Shelley’s interest in and concern for the structures of society and reflects some 
Godwinian ideals. The Creature then reflects on his place within this structure: 
 
And what was I? Of my creation and creator I was absolutely ignorant; but I 
knew that I possessed no money, no friends, no kind of property—I was, 
besides, endowed with a figure hideously deformed and loathsome; I was not 
even of the same nature as man. I was more agile than they, and could subsist 
upon coarser diet; I bore the extremes of heat and cold with less injury to my 
frame; my stature far exceeded theirs. When I looked around, I saw and heard 
of none like me. Was I then a monster, a blot upon the earth, from which all 
men fled, and whom all men disowned? (83) 
 
He does not know from whence he is descended and has none of the things valued by 
society.  
Unlike Victor, who possesses these things and despite having isolated 
himself can return to society and be warmly welcomed, the Creature is truly and 
utterly isolated because he has nothing to make him endearing, except his acts of 
kindness, performed under the cover of darkness. In this scene, the Creature 
repeatedly refers to himself as a monster, yet as Shelley poignantly shows, he is not 
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monstrous by nature, but made monstrous through rejection both by individuals and 
society at large. His actions become monstrous when he seeks to impose a similar 
isolation upon his creator, killing those around Victor so he no longer feels safe 
sharing and connecting with his loved ones.  
The Creature at this moment is also an intertextual mirror, closely aligning 
with the experience of Godwin’s title character in Caleb Williams. As explored more 
fully in Chapter Five, Caleb is driven from society into the rural environment by his 
more educated and higher-class benefactor. Just as the Creature is forced into 
isolation and ultimately criminality, so too is Caleb driven to desperation by his 
master’s desire to keep his secret misdeeds hidden. Yet unlike Caleb, who strives to 
do what is right throughout Godwin’s novel despite the huge toll this takes, the 
Creature comes to see his murderous acts as justified. The Creature’s final rejection 
of the inherently good nature which he first possessed is completed in Victor’s act of 
destruction. The Creature frames the injury Victor does him in terms of a loss of 
connection with others: 
 
“Shall each man,” cried he, “find a wife for his bosom, and each beast have 
his mate, and I be alone? I had feelings of affection, and they were requited 
by detestation and scorn. Man! You may hate, but beware! Your hours will 
pass in dread and misery, and soon the bolt will fall which must ravish from 
you your happiness forever. Are you to be happy while I grovel in the 
intensity of my wretchedness? You can blast my other passions, but revenge 
remains—revenge, henceforth dearer than light or food! I may die, but first 
you, my tyrant and tormentor, shall curse the sun that gazes on your misery. 
Beware, for I am fearless and therefore powerful. I will watch with the 
wiliness of a snake, that I may sting with its venom. Man, you shall repent of 
the injuries you inflict.” (120-121) 
 
Here the Creature suggests he is at the mercy of Victor, who is now both “tyrant and 
tormentor”. The Creature also refers to himself as a slave at the close of the novel. In 
another Miltonic passage, he states, “I knew that I was preparing for myself a deadly 
torture; but I was the slave, not the master of an impulse, which I detested, yet could 
not disobey. Yet when she died!—nay, then I was not miserable. I had cast off 
feeling, subdued all anguish to riot in the excess of my despair. Evil thenceforth 
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became my good” (159) This turn away from what he knows to be right and the 
suggestion that the Creature is slave to Victor’s powers (just as Satan is still bound 
by God’s powers) is reversed and distorted, as Victor positions himself as a slave 
subject to the Creature’s superior strength.  
The Creature’s education, his care for the cottagers and similarly Walton’s 
concern for his crew, all highlight that the development of community, of human 
connection, is really about obligation to do what is right by one another. When this 
obligation is forced rather than voluntary, the relationship is no longer of two people 
in community, but of master and slave. Victor portrays himself as a slave of the 
Creature’s desire for a mate. Victor wishes that, “some accident might occur to 
destroy him, and put an end to my slavery for ever” (107). Victor feels bound to do 
as the Creature wishes as he fears what the Creature will do to his family. He refers 
to this as “the whole period during which I was the slave of my creature” (109). This 
sense of forced obligation is further established with the use of “promise” and “free” 
as Victor departs for England, he “resolved to fulfil my promise while abroad, and 
return, if possible, a free man” (110). Throughout his journey, Victor feels the 
weight of his obligation to the Creature again drawing on the imagery of a 
master/slave relationship: 
 
We visited the tomb of the illustrious Hampden, and the field on which that 
patriot fell. For a moment my soul was elevated from its debasing and 
miserable fears to contemplate the divine ideas of liberty and self-sacrifice, of 
which these sights were the monuments and the remembrances. For an 
instant I dared to shake off my chains, and look around me with free and lofty 
spirit; but the iron had eaten into my flesh, and I sank again, trembling and 
hopeless, into my miserable self. (115)  
 
The “chains” which weigh down Victor’s spirits are so burdensome that “the iron 
had eaten into my flesh”. The irony of this is that while his soul reflects upon the 
“divine ideas of liberty and self-sacrifice” he cannot see that these are the ideals he is 
duty-bound by the act of creation to perform for his creature. The Creature should 
not need to force his compliance. Victor is blind to the moral crime he has 
committed in casting out his creature into a world where it is impossible for him to 
experience genuine friendship or community. He says, “I felt as if I had committed 
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some crime, the consciousness of which haunted me. I was guiltless, but I had had 
indeed drawn down a horrible curse upon my head, as mortal that of crime” (116). 
Just as Victor seems to be about to atone for his neglect by creating a companion for 
the Creature, he instead destroys his work. The Creature berates him: “Slave, I 
before reasoned with you, but you have proved yourself unworthy of my 
condescension. Remember that I have power; you believe yourself miserable, but I 
can make you so wretched that the light of day will be hateful to you. You are my 
creator, but I am your master; obey!” (120). The Creature’s assertion that his 
physical (and perhaps by this time, moral) mastery trumps Victor’s negligent act of 
creation further highlights the obligation Victor owes the Creature. This language 
reinforces the idea that obligations should be met willingly; Victor and the Creature 
are both enslaved to one another because of their failure to meet their obligations. 
Had Victor discharged his obligation to his Creation, he would not owe the Creature 
anything and so be ‘free’. 
 
4.4 A MORAL DILEMMA: WHO IS TO BLAME? 
  
Ultimately, Frankenstein gives readers the opportunity to explore the question of 
who should be held responsible when science goes awry. Blame cannot be laid at 
God’s feet, but is it the hubristic scientist, the community that fostered him, failings 
in his education, his lack of connection with others, or indeed is it even perhaps his 
creation who is to blame? What if he had been less monstrous in appearance? Would 
he still have been the same character if given an education by Victor? Shelley’s 
novel suggests both all and none of these factors are to blame for the tragic outcome 
of Victor’s experiments, and that each character has a degree of responsibility (and 
guilt) for their part in the tragedy. One’s conscience is fundamental in shaping a 
sense of responsibility and feelings of guilt. Victor, in describing his own childhood, 
suggests his parents provided an idyllic and ideal role-modelling of parental 
responsibility: 
 
their child, the innocent and helpless creature bestowed on them by heaven, 
whom to bring up to good, and whose future lot it was in their hands to direct 
to happiness or misery, according as they fulfilled their duties towards me. 
With this deep consciousness of what they owed towards the being to which 
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they had given life, added to the active spirit of tenderness that animated 
both, it may be imagined that while during every hour of my infant life I 
received a lesson of patience, of charity, and of self-control. (42) 
 
Despite this upbringing, Victor fails to mirror or imitate his parents, not developing 
the “deep consciousness of what they owed towards the being to which they had 
given life” that his parents recognised.  
The Creature calls upon this sense of conscience to no effect: “Listen to me, 
Frankenstein. You accuse me of murder, and yet you would, with a satisfied 
conscience, destroy your own creature” (69). Victor does eventually recognise he has 
a degree of responsibility for the Creature, and admits to feeling guilt. After Justine 
dies, Victor reiterates that he acted with nothing but the best intentions: 
 
Yet my heart overflowed with kindness, and the love of virtue. I had begun 
life with benevolent intentions, and thirsted for the moment when I should 
put them in practice, and make myself useful to my fellow-beings. Now all 
was blasted: instead of that serenity of conscience, which allowed me to look 
back upon the past with self-satisfaction, and from thence to gather promise 
of new hopes, I was seized by remorse and the sense of guilt. (61)  
 
He does acknowledge feeling guilty, but this seems fleeting or insincere, as he later 
claims in his act of creation he was “guiltless” (116). After the death of Clerval, 
while imprisoned awaiting trial, Victor muses, “At one time I considered whether I 
should not declare myself guilty and suffer the penalty of the law, less innocent than 
poor Justine had been” (129). Still, he does not in fact do so, even when the woman 
sent to care for him outlines her belief in his guilt, yet discharges her duty: “I am sent 
to nurse you and get you well; I do my duty with a safe conscience; it were well if 
everybody did the same” (128). Here, in another subtle mirroring, the woman 
suggests that conscience rests easy when obligations are met, and they should be 
met, even to those we despise—even as Victor despises his creature, this does not 
abdicate his moral responsibility. Victor acknowledges feeling some degree of 
responsibility for Clerval’s death, but this does not translate into a confession or 




I remember, as I quitted the prison, I heard one of the men say, “He may be 
innocent of the murder, but he has certainly a bad conscience.” These words 
struck me. A bad conscience! Yes, surely I had one. William, Justine, and 
Clerval, had died through my infernal machinations. (132) 
  
His “surely” here seems as much an attempt to convince himself of the possibility 
that he has something for which to be guilty than it does a definitive admission of the 
same. 
These passages suggest that Victor recognised that he, through his failure to 
meet the obligations he has to the Creature, is to a degree responsible for the 
Creature’s subsequent actions. The theme of conscience is mirrored in a number of 
other characters. Justine’s mother believes all of her children’s deaths except Justine 
were “a judgement from heaven to chastise her partiality” (42). Just like Victor, 
Justine’s mother showed contempt for her offspring and so was punished. The 
Creature too offers a suggestion that conscience should shape action. Walton accuses 
the Creature of acting without conscience: “‘Your repentance,’ I said, ‘is now 
superfluous. If you had listened to the voice of conscience and heeded the stings of 
remorse before you had urged your diabolical vengeance to this extremity, 
Frankenstein would yet have lived’” (158). The creature responds in a way that 
shows he has a conscience and feels guilt: “Do you think that I was then dead to 
agony and remorse?” (158). Again the Creature mirrors Victor, however his regret is 
more extensive, he does not seek to shift blame, recognising that while he felt driven 
to act by others, he is ultimately guilty of the acts he has committed.  
Victor equivocates this responsibility or guilt, seeing himself as a victim, 
rather than the root cause of all his losses. Victor suggests his personal losses make 
him martyr-like:  
 
I trembled with excess of agitation as I said this; there was a phrenzy [sic] in 
my manner, and something, I doubt not, of that haughty fierceness, which the 
martyrs of old are said to have possessed. But to a Genevan magistrate, 
whose mind was occupied by far other ideas than those of devotion and 




The idea that Victor is a tragic fallen hero, a victim of circumstance, is reiterated 
when Walton mourns Victor in a Miltonesque way: “What a glorious creature must 
he have been in the days of his prosperity when he is thus noble and godlike in ruin. 
He seems to feel his own worth, and the greatness of his fall” (152). Walton’s 
favourable view of Victor as a victim is also evident in his remonstration of the 
Creature:  
 
“Wretch! ... It is well that you come here to whine over the desolation that 
you have made. You throw a torch into a pile of buildings, and when they are 
consumed you sit among the ruins, and lament the fall. Hypocritical fiend! If 
he whom you mourn still lived, still would he be the object, again would he 
become the prey of your accursed vengeance. It is not pity that you feel; you 
lament only because the victim of your malignity is withdrawn from your 
power”. “Oh, it is not thus-not thus”, interrupted the being. (159) 
 
Walton’s comments are another example of the distorted mirroring that exists 
between the characters. Victor too spends long passages of the novel “whin[ing] over 
the desolation that [he] has made”. Like the Creature, who threw a torch into the 
DeLacey’s home, Victor’s failure to be responsible for his act of creation is a torch 
he throws into his own life, where he then “sits among the ruins” and laments the fall 
of those he loves and his hopes for fame and glory. What both the Creature and 
Victor fail to recognise is that they are both responsible and both guilty of crimes 
against one another.  
Just as Victor equivocates his responsibility, so too the Creature sees himself 
as not entirely to blame, driven to his wicked deeds by the treatment he received at 
the hands of others: 
 
Still I desired love and fellowship, and I was still spurned. Was there no 
injustice in this? Am I to be thought the only criminal, when all human kind 
sinned against me? Why do you not hate Felix, who drove his friend from his 
door with contumely? Why do you not execrate the rustic who sought to 
destroy the saviour of his child? Nay, these are virtuous and immaculate 
beings! I, the miserable and the abandoned, am an abortion, to be spurned at, 
and kicked, and trampled on. Even now my blood boils at the recollection of 
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this injustice. “But it is true that I am a wretch. I have murdered the lovely 
and the helpless; I have strangled the innocent as they slept, and grasped to 
death his throat who never injured me or any other living thing”. (160) 
 
This is in a way another mirroring, as the Creature blames others for his poor 
treatment of Victor but also leaves it to the reader to decide if his argument is 
reasonable. The Creature equivocates his decision to murder those close to Victor, 
saying he was driven to act, against his better nature, as a result of the injustices he 
has suffered. Walton also reflects both the Creature and Victor at the close of the 
novel, as he shares the Creature’s sense of unbearable injustice, that the actions of 
others should compromise his hopes, and he has Victor’s implacable drive to see his 
efforts to fruition: 
 
How all this will terminate, I know not, but I had rather die than return 
shamefully, my purpose unfulfilled. Yet I fear such will be my fate; the men, 
unsupported by ideas of glory and honour, can never willingly continue to 
endure their present hardships…. The die is cast; I have consented to return if 
we are not destroyed. Thus are my hopes blasted by cowardice and 
indecision; I come back ignorant and disappointed. It requires more 
philosophy than I possess to bear this injustice with patience. (155)  
 
While Walton reflects these aspects of the other narrators, he differs in that, while 
infuriated and disappointed, he nonetheless consents to return. This reveals a key 
difference in that Walton acts upon his obligation to others, over his personal 
agenda. 
Shelley’s rendering of the Creature’s desire for connection and Victor’s self-
pitying and dangerous isolation bring into question the monstrosity of being alone. 
Despite being denied community and companionship from inception, the Creature 
seems to be more feeling, more ‘soulful’ than Victor, who has every opportunity to 
develop as a good, moral person. Yet Victor chooses isolation. After the death of 
Justine, consumed with guilt, Victor turns further inward: “I shunned the face of 
man; all sound of joy or complacency was torture to me; solitude was my only 
consolation—deep, dark, death-like solitude” (61). Despite the Creature’s unnatural 
origins, he seems to be imbued with more natural goodness than Victor. This hints at 
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the conception of a soul. The Creature’s actions only become monstrous when he 
abandons his natural inclination to goodness, perhaps suggesting that to abandon the 
natural, right, or just inclinations of the inherent soul is to abandon our obligations to 
mankind, and so too abandon any hope of being in community. This is seen in Victor 
as well, as his soul is ‘blasted’ and he becomes more isolated, he fails his obligations 
and has his right to community taken from him by the Creature.  
 
4.5 THE BOLT: FUSIONS AND FRACTURES 
 
Like many other Romantic authors, landscape and nature are a feature in Shelley’s 
work. Shelley does not often dwell on description of urban or domestic settings, but 
gives a great deal of time to the remote and rugged natural landscapes that inspire 
and influence her characters. This is another distorted mirroring, as different 
characters respond in different ways to the landscapes in which they find themselves. 
Many of the key events in the narrative occur in sublime, remote landscapes, and it is 
often in these moments, immersed in the natural world, that the characters reflect 
upon their human nature (or soul). Shelley fuses imagery of the natural world with 
ideas about what it is to be human, and shows her readers how easily human nature 
can be fractured. Victor captures this idea when he refers to himself as, “a blasted 
tree; the bolt has entered my soul; and I felt then that I should survive to exhibit, 
what I shall soon cease to be—a miserable spectacle of wrecked humanity, pitiable 
to others, and abhorrent to myself” (114-115). This passage brings together a number 
of important elements: the use of natural imagery in Frankenstein and the conception 
of a soul (as a natural phenomenon). 
 The barren Arctic frames the whole novel, as it is here that Victor is rescued 
by Walton from the sea ice and can relate his tale and that of the Creature. For 
Walton, these icy climes carry a “wind of promise” (7) and “present itself to [his] 
imagination as a region of beauty and delight” (7), and the Creature feels at home as 
he does not feel cold as most humans do (147). For Victor, however, the Arctic is a 
wasteland that must be overcome in pursuit of the Creature. Yet he is not unaffected 
by the region’s beauty: 
 
Even broken in spirit as he is, no one can feel more deeply than he does the 
beauties of nature. The starry sky, the sea, and every sight afforded by these 
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wonderful regions seem still to have the power of elevating his soul from 
earth. (17)  
 
Yet Victor contradicts Walton’s praise of his sensitivity when he describes his 
journey across the Arctic as “destructive and endless … across the mountainous ices 
of the ocean,—amidst cold that few of the inhabitants could long endure, and which 
I, the native of a genial and sunny climate, could not hope to survive” (149). Victor 
is also unable to appreciate the beauty of the rugged landscape of Scotland, which 
reminds him of Switzerland: “I could now almost fancy myself among the Swiss 
mountains. The little patches of snow which yet lingered on the northern sides of the 
mountains, the lakes, and the dashing of the rocky streams” (115). Clerval revels in 
this landscape, and in the company he keeps: “‘I could pass my life here’, said he to 
me; ‘and among these mountains I should scarcely regret Switzerland and the 
Rhine’” (115). Instead of staying with his friend and their new acquaintances in this 
setting, Victor retreats to an isolated island to create a mate for the Creature. This 
island is “hardly more than a rock, whose high sides are continually beaten upon by 
the waves. The soil was barren” (117). The juxtaposition of such a barren, lifeless 
landscape being the place where Victor seeks to create life suggests his actions are 
futile. The animals and residents of the island are described as “miserable”, “gaunt 
and scraggly”, and “benumbed” (117). This does not bode well for the life which 
Victor plans to create, and which he ultimately destroys.  
Another key setting is the Valley of Chamonix and the towering Mont Blanc, 
where Victor and the Creature meet upon Mer de Glace. The valley is 
 
wonderful and sublime…The high and snowy mountains were its immediate 
boundaries, but we saw no more ruined castles and fertile fields. Immense 
glaciers approached the road; we heard the rumbling thunder of the falling 
avelanche [sic], and marked the smoke of its passage. Mont Blanc, the 
supreme and magnificent Mont Blanc, raised itself from the surrounding 
aiguilles, and its tremendous dome overlooked the valley. (64-65) 
 
This sublime setting has a positive effect on Victor, affording him “the greatest 
consolation that [he] was capable of receiving. They elevated [him] from all 
littleness of feeling; and although it did not remove [his] grief, they subdued and 
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tranquilised it” (65). As he ascends the mountain, he describes the scene as 
“terrifically desolate” and “sombre” (64). The view from the glacier towards 
Montanvert is one of “awful majesty”, a “wonderful and stupendous scene” (65). As 
a result, Victor’s heart, “which was before sorrowful, now swelled with something 
like joy” (65). The restorative, positive experiences of being immersed in a sublime 
landscape are snatched from Victor when he sees his creature approaching across the 
ice. This juxtaposition of the Creature’s unnatural appearance amongst such natural 
beauty is jarring and Victor is overcome with hatred. Adam Roberts argues that such 
jarring juxtapositions are characteristic of the novel’s account of the extreme 
otherness of the sublime: 
 
The extremities of experience in the novel, the extreme violence, the extreme 
fear, are Gothic attempts at sublimity, at articulating a state of being other 
than the ordinary. The polar landscapes of the novel’s conclusion are the 
apotheosis of this. The narrator encounters both Frankenstein and his 
monstrous creation in an environment as far removed from the sorts of 
environment we are used to as it is possible to find on the surface of this 
planet. (Roberts 58) 
 
Aiden Day reaffirms this idea of sublime landscapes being both elevating and 
alienating.  
 
There is also a connection between Mary Shelley’s representation of 
unregulated imagination and her representation of nature … Shelley invokes 
Romantic treatments of the sublime as that which exceed formulation and 
representation, that which signifies transcendence. And she places 
Frankenstein’s monster—as the grotesque objectification of the self’s own 
sublime potential—within this awesome, typically Romantic landscape. 
Instead of being celebrated, however, the more-than-human, the sublime, is 
here portrayed as inimical to the human, as dangerously inhuman. (Day 146) 
  
The binary of natural/unnatural is another point of fragmentation in the novel. 
The natural world offers a transcendent experience to those like Walton and Clerval 
whose souls are not troubled. Yet while Victor can see and briefly appreciate these 
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sublime scenes, his act of unnatural creation means his troubled soul cannot find 
comfort in nature. This question of soul is particularly poignant for the Creature, as 
unlike all mankind, who are assured of a soul by God, the Creature’s creator might 
have been able to animate his frame, but did he provide a soul? This supports Day’s 
view that in the novel, 
  
 individual subjectivity and nature are, moreover, transcendentalised: they are 
attributed a spiritual dimension that is greater than the merely individual and 
the material. Nature is important insofar as it manifests the same 
transcendental energy as informs the human mind and at the same time 
provides an objective, material barrier that allows the individual subject to 
recognise transcendence without being overwhelmed by it. (40) 
 
For Walton, poetry is another force, like nature, that can lift his soul “to heaven” (8). 
Victor, however, is consumed “heart and soul in one pursuit. It was a most beautiful 
season … but my eyes were insensible to the charms of nature … [and] caused me 
also to forget those friends” (34). In abandoning the right or natural structure of 
community, companionship and the natural world, Victor’s soul is corrupted by his 
single-minded pursuit. The impact upon Victor’s soul is further emphasised with the 
addition of the following in the 1831 edition: “Thus not the tenderness of friendship, 
nor the beauty of earth, nor of heaven, could redeem my soul from woe; the very 
accents of love were ineffectual” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1831] 89). Victor’s soul 
is destroyed by being isolated from all that is good, natural, and right.  
 This mirrors the Creature’s recognition of the impact of being totally 
isolated: “Believe me, Frankenstein, I was benevolent; my soul glowed with love 
and humanity; but am I not alone, miserably alone?” (68). The Creature’s natural 
state is one of love and benevolence, but, isolated, he acts against his nature. In the 
1831 edition, Victor rebuts the Creature’s self-representation as having a soul that is 
inherently good, saying that in the Creature he “had endued with the mockery of a 
soul still more monstrous” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1831] 158). He warns Walton 
that the Creature’s “soul is as hellish as his form, full of treachery and fiend-like 
malice” (150). Yet the Creature’s own narrative rejects this idea that his soul is as 
unnatural as his body. His wonder as he encounters nature, desire for connection, 
kindness to the DeLaceys and rescue of the drowning child all suggest he is 
129 
 
inherently good, but his soul is corrupted by the evils perpetrated against him. The 
Creature here stands in stark contrast to Victor, whose circumstances should have 
fostered a good soul, yet he cuts himself off from all that is natural and good, thereby 
triggering his own downfall.  
Shelley’s other use of natural imagery is that of storms. Roseanne Montillo 
highlights that storms are an important part of Shelley’s own personal story, having 
been born during a storm, the summer Frankenstein was conceived being wracked 
by storms, and after the novel’s publication, losing Percy in a boating accident 
during a storm. In the novel, Victor’s interest in galvanism is sparked by witnessing 
a powerful lightning strike: 
 
When I was about fifteen years old we had retired to our house near Belrive, 
when we witnessed a most violent and terrible thunderstorm. It advanced 
from behind the mountains of Jura, and the thunder burst at once with 
frightful loudness from various quarters of the heavens. I remained, while the 
storm lasted, watching its progress with curiosity and delight. As I stood at 
the door, on a sudden I beheld a stream of fire issue from an old and beautiful 
oak which stood about twenty yards from our house; and so soon as the 
dazzling light vanished, the oak had disappeared, and nothing remained but a 
blasted stump. When we visited it the next morning, we found the tree 
shattered in a singular manner. It was not splintered by the shock, but entirely 
reduced to thin ribbons of wood. I never beheld anything so utterly 
destroyed. (23)  
 
Victor’s problematic curiosity is stirred by witnessing nature’s destructive power. 
The oak that is struck by lightning is not merely “splintered” but “utterly destroyed”. 
This catastrophic fracturing is a stark contrast to the fusion Victor achieves when he 
bestows the “spark of being” upon his creature, which, unlike in many film 
adaptations, is not achieved through a lightning strike, although it is a “dreary night” 
and raining (35). The choice of this “spark” provides a stark link to both the 
scientific study of electricity and also the notion of the divine spark or soul.  
 Nature is again disturbed by storms on the night Victor realises it is the 
Creature who is responsible for William’s death. The storm, which was “beautiful 
yet terrific … elevated [Victor’s] spirits” (50). However, this is short-lived as a flash 
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of lightning reveals the Creature following Victor, and at this same moment Victor is 
struck by the insight that the Creature is “the murderer of my brother? No sooner did 
that idea cross my imagination, than I became convinced of its truth” (50). Nature 
here both reveals the Creature’s presence and his murderous act. Victor suffers 
another loss during a storm; as he and Elizabeth arrive at the inn after their wedding, 
“a heavy storm of rain descended” (140). As Victor patrols the inn, the Creature 
enters their room and kills Elizabeth, then, “with the swiftness of lightning” (141), 
escapes. Victor has disturbed nature in creating the Creature, and it seems that when 
the Creature acts malevolently, nature mirrors his anger. These storms also represent 
the disruption caused in Victor’s life; each one marks another blow to his chances of 
peace and happiness.  
Storms and lightning are nature’s power made manifest, and they occur at 
moments of revelation for Victor. The use of lightning in the novel can be read as a 
metaphor—the “vital fluid” of Galvinist science which descends from the Heavens. 
This fusion of storms as a demonstration of both the power of God’s natural world 
and the potential for man to harness this power for themselves. The secrets of the 
spark of the divine are being uncovered by science. Victor is a “blasted tree”—he is 
struck by the scientific insight to uncover the most divine of mysteries, the secret of 
life, yet he is “blasted”, reduced to “ribbons of wood”, a shattered and ruined thing, 
as a result of his attempts to harness nature’s power. Shelley’s representation of the 
moral and ethical responsibilities that bind a society together is an organic one. Each 
character in her narrative is tied to others by bonds of family, responsibility, or a 
sense of community. How they respond to the pull of these ties varies, and it is these 
competing tensions that cause the distortion or fragmented mirroring in the 
characters’ behaviours. Like lightning that both fuses and fractures, Shelley’s 
Frankenstein brought together ideas from a range of discourses and shaped them into 








Influence, Inspiration, and Innovation 
 
Having considered how Frankenstein creates a new space for moralising by 
presenting the reader with a fractured multiplicity of meaning in the close reading, 
what remains is to demonstrate how the novel does this by drawing upon existing 
discourses inasmuch as they are expressed through other books. In keeping with the 
account of the relationship of culture to society, it is no surprise to find that the 
books to which Shelley is most indebted are those to which she was exposed through 
her familial and social circles. In addition to considering the impact of her parents, 
Percy, and others on Shelley’s thinking, as personal influences, the writings of the 
many authors to whose works she was introduced through these connections helped 
to shape Shelley as a reader and as an author. Dennis R. Perry argues that 
“intertextuality is the very seed of Mary Shelley’s novel. Like Frankenstein, she is an 
adapter, sewing together parts from older texts like the Prometheus myth, Paradise 
Lost, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, Faust and Caleb Williams” (138). Perry also 
follows Jerrold Hogle’s observation that each of the characters in Frankenstein “root 
their stories in previous texts … in a sense, each of these narrators’ lives is an 
intertextual adaptation from the parts of other lives, books and ideas” (138). 
Shelley’s use of intertextuality is clear in her works, and can be traced in the 
extensive reading lists kept by both Shelley and Percy throughout their relationship 
and in the many direct and indirect references she makes. It is also clear in the many 
experiments with form and genre Shelley undertakes, as she hones her craft as an 
author. Yet Shelley was not a passive lump of clay, moulded by others; rather, she 
took up the ideas, arguments and imaginings of her time and created something new. 
Her innovation, I argue, is the discursive space that underpins the genre she is widely 
credited with founding: science fiction.  
 
5.1 A FATHER’S INFLUENCE: CALEB WILLIAMS 
 
The most obvious and earliest influence upon Shelley in her youth was her father, 
William Godwin. Their personal relationship was explored Chapter Two: Place, 
Time and Personality, but Godwin was also an important influence upon Shelley’s 
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writing. Shelley dedicates the novel to her father, “William Godwin, Author of 
Political Justice, Caleb Williams etc” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 4). This 
shows both her esteem for her father, despite their troubled relationship, and also 
links to the political and social ideals explored in Godwin’s work. Some view 
Frankenstein as derivative, both from Godwin’s thinking and the Gothic genre, 
however, as Christopher Small argues,  
 
the real point is less a question of identifying precise derivations—in a work 
bringing together so many diverse threads, at second and first hand, it is 
hardly possible to name any one as pre-eminent or original – than of 
observing parallels and resemblances which must have been apparent to 
Mary herself. It would probably be truer to find in … Mary’s creations, a 
common debt to Godwin and beyond Godwin, to an ‘intellectual climate’ 
impossible to particularise. (99) 
 
The “intellectual climate” of Shelley’s world was one of great diversity and change, 
as new ideas rose and fell in popularity. As was discussed in full in the contextual 
biography in Chapter Two, one persistent thread was a greater concern for individual 
rights and an interest in political reform. These were topics both Godwin and Mary 
Wollstonecraft explored in their philosophical writing and, for Godwin, in his 
fiction. These were topics of interest to Shelley and are manifest in her own writing. 
She explored her views not only in Frankenstein but in her later works, most 
notably, The Last Man.  
Godwin’s 1794 novel Caleb Williams has several points of ideological and 
narrative similarity to Frankenstein. The most obvious of these is the motivation of 
the protagonists: both Victor and Caleb are driven by the pursuit of knowledge above 
all else. Caleb states,  
 
The spring of action which, perhaps more than any other, characterised the 
whole train of my life, was curiosity. It was this that gave me my mechanical 
turn; I was desirous of tracing the variety of effects which might be produced 
from given causes. It was this that made me a sort of natural philosopher; I 
could not rest till I had acquainted myself with the solutions that had been 




Shelley’s Victor shares this same “curiosity” to explore the “phenomena of the 
universe”. His aim is not wealth “but what glory would attend the discovery, if I 
could banish disease from the human frame, and render man invulnerable to any but 
a violent death!” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 23). His lofty goal is driven by a 
desire to discover the secrets of life and death itself. This is further reinforced by the 
character of Walton who, like Caleb, aims to “satiate my ardent curiosity with the 
sight of a part of the world never before visited, and may tread a land never before 
imprinted by the foot of man. These are my enticements, and they are sufficient to 
conquer all fear of danger or death” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 7). While 
Caleb’s pursuits are not as scientific as Victor’s or Walton’s, it is clear that both 
Godwin and Shelley recognise the human impulse to know, which was being played 
out in the new sciences of the Enlightenment and Romantic eras, and both explore 
the dangers of this in their narratives. For Caleb, sharing his knowledge of 
Falkland’s crime leaves him feeling remorse. Victor’s knowledge results in the death 
of everyone he loves. Walton abandons his quest, but with great reluctance and 
regret. In all instances, it is the goal and glory that drive these characters, and none 
of them (except perhaps Walton) give deep or reflective though to the consequences 
their pursuit of knowledge and truth may entail. Caleb believed in exposing Falkland 
his life would return to normal, but he is instead devastated. Victor attains his goal of 
bestowing life but then does not take the appropriate degree of responsibility for his 
creature, resulting in tragedy. Walton, although bitterly disappointed, does recognise 
the danger he has put his crew in when they threaten mutiny, and abandons his quest. 
In these characters, it is clear both Godwin and Shelley suggest that the pursuit of 
knowledge, discovery and glory can be fraught with unseen consequences and the 
price of the wrong decision can be incredibly high.  
 Protagonist motivation is not the only shared feature of Godwin and 
Shelley’s novels. In accordance with the popular thinking of the time, physical 
characteristics were often linked to personality. This pseudoscience of physiognomy 
was popular throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and Godwin was 
initially an adherent. He was interested in the associated practice of phrenology, 
where personality is predicted based on facial features and head shape. He had the 
infant Shelley read by William Nicholson at three weeks of age (Seymour 31), and 
he had a reading himself in 1820 (Bennett 10). The relationship between physical 
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characteristics and personality was also explored in Godwin’s fiction. In Caleb 
Williams the character of Grimes is described thus: “His complexion was scarcely 
human; his features were coarse, and strangely discordant and disjointed from each 
other. His lips were thick, and the tone of his voice broad unmodulated. His legs 
were of equal size from one end to the other and his feet misshapen and clumsy” 
(Godwin, Caleb Williams 50). This unappealing physical appearance is paired with a 
personality that is “in an inconceivable degree boorish and uncouth … He had 
nothing spiteful or vicious in his disposition, but he was a total stranger to 
tenderness; he could not feel for those refinements in others, of which he had no 
experience in himself” (Godwin, Caleb Williams 50). Grimes’s “scarcely human” 
physical appearance is akin to Shelley’s misshapen Creature:  
 
His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; 
his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; 
but these luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery 
eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour as the dun white sockets in 
which they were set, his shrivelled complexion, and straight black lips. (M. 
Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 35) 
 
In terms of personality, however, Shelley reverses the thinking of her father. 
Godwin’s portrayal of Grimes suggests his coarse appearance is a result of his coarse 
personality, in line with the tenets of physiognomy. In contrast to this, Shelley’s 
Creature is initially innocent, finding pleasure in the natural world and in helping 
others. Having fled Frankenstein’s laboratory, he finds shelter in the woods, eating 
berries and roots and discovering the benefits of fire (M. Shelley, Frankenstein 
[1818] 72). After being attacked by villagers, the Creature seeks refuge at the 
DeLacey farm, and here receives an education and masters language. He observes 
their manners and society and desires to join their community. The Creature aids the 
family by collecting firewood and doing chores throughout the night and recounts, “I 
afterwards found that these labours, performed by an invisible hand, greatly 
astonished them; and once or twice I heard them, on these occasions, utter the words 
good spirit, wonderful; but I did not then understand the signification of these terms” 
(M. Shelley Frankenstein [1818],79; emphasis added). All of this suggests that the 
Creature’s nature is fundamentally good; he takes pleasure in nature, seeks to aid 
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others and desires to belong to a loving family. His physical form does not reflect his 
personality, as is the case in Godwin’s work.  
 Having been set upon by people during his journey, the Creature is aware he 
is terrifying to behold. With this in mind, he formulates a plan to reveal himself to 
the elder, blind DeLacey and win his affections before revealing himself to the other 
cottagers. The old man responds positively to the Creature as he can perceive only 
his nature, not his outward appearance. However, upon being seen on the younger 
DeLacey’s return, violence erupts and this brings an end to the Creature’s rural idyll: 
the final lesson he learns from the DeLacey’s is one of cruelty, terror, and rejection. 
Having learned the family has fled his presence, the Creature burns down the 
cottage. It is here that Shelley’s viewpoint is evident: it is not one’s appearance that 
drives them to violence and crime, but how they are treated by others (perhaps as a 
result of their appearance). Shelley seems to suggest that people are fundamentally 
good in their “natural” state, as reflected by the Creature’s initial development in the 
wilds of nature and his education in rural innocence. It is the treatment one receives 
at the hands of others that changes behaviour. The Creature eloquently expresses 
this: “I am malicious because I am miserable; am I not shunned and hated by all 
mankind?” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 102). He hurts others because he has 
been so hurt by their rejection.  
 This goes to a deeper argument about the rights of men and if the common 
man could be trusted with greater social responsibility. Shelley’s portrayal of the 
Creature’s development and the DeLaceys’ simple but wholesome lifestyle suggests 
that she sees a rural life, while lacking culture and refinement, as a fundamental 
good. Care of family takes primacy and life is free of the artifice and complexity of 
the urban environment. Godwin, too, advocates for the benefits of the rural lifestyle, 
with a similar outcome. Fleeing from Falkland’s relentless pursuit, Caleb finds, for a 
time, a happy retreat in a small village: 
  
therefore decided in favour of the project which had formerly proved 
amusing to my imagination, of withdrawing to some distant rural scene, a 
scene of calmness and obscurity, where for a few years at least, perhaps 
during the life of Mr Falkland, I might be hidden from the world, recover the 
wounds my mind had received in this fatal connection, methodise and 
improve the experience which had been accumulated, cultivate the faculties I 
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in any degree possessed, and employ the intervals of these occupations in 
simple industry and the intercourse of guileless, uneducated, kind-intentioned 
minds. (Godwin, Caleb Williams 298)  
 
This rural setting offers a chance for rejuvenation and, more clearly than Shelley, 
associates the “guileless, uneducated, kind-intentioned minds” of rural people with a 
fundamental goodness in their mode of living. However, just as the Creature is 
driven from his retreat, Caleb’s pursuers find him and turn the villagers against him, 
forcing him to flee again. Here, the representatives of Falkland’s educated, 
cosmopolitan high society intrude upon and destroy the peace of the rural 
environment. In both narratives, Godwin and Shelley seem to allude to the 
encroaching urban/industrial environment on the previously idyllic and natural mode 
of rural living. This suggests that the rural is no longer available or as innocent as it 
once was—its natural benefits cannot stand before the power and encroachment of 
urban/high/scientific culture. While neither text has the critical and explicit 
commentary of, for example, a Dickensian social critique, both novels clearly allude 
to the wider concern of the period about urbanisation and the loss of rural innocence. 
The power of nature is also explored in many of the settings of Frankenstein, as 
discussed previously.  
 While Godwin is clearly an influence upon Shelley’s writing, she has not 
merely dressed Victor in Caleb’s robes. In fact, Caleb is ultimately more akin to the 
Creature than Victor; relentlessly pursued by the person responsible for their fall 
from grace. Falkland’s accusations drive Caleb from all society. The concept of the 
fall is more explicitly addressed by Shelley in Frankenstein than in Caleb Williams: 
her Creature refers to his fall, linking himself repeatedly throughout the text to Adam 
and Satan from Milton’s Paradise Lost. Shelley establishes this relationship from the 
outset of the novel, with the inscription on the title page, from Paradise Lost: “Did I 
request thee, Maker, from my clay/ To mould be Man? Did I solicit thee/ From 
darkness promote me?” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 4). The fall that both 
characters suffer is a fall away from society. Caleb laments having being driven from 
society, “pursued by a train of ill fortune, I could no longer consider myself as a 
member of society. I was a solitary being, cut off from the expectation of sympathy, 
kindness, and the good-will of mankind” (Godwin, Caleb Williams 256). The 
Creature in the same way mourns the lack of opportunity to connect with others: 
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“When I looked around, I saw and heard of none like me. Was I then a monster, a 
blot upon the earth, from which all fled, and whom all men disowned?” (M. Shelley, 
Frankenstein [1818] 83). Their fallen, isolated and pursued state make Caleb and the 
Creature more akin than Caleb and Frankenstein in their shared curiosity. They are 
united in their isolation.  
Both Godwin and Shelley clearly argue that man requires society, even if it is 
the simple rural communities in which their characters find refuge for a time, to 
function well. Total disconnection and rejection result only in dejection and anger. 
Caleb condemns the society that have rejected him: 
 
Here I am, an outcast, destined to perish with hunger and cold. All men 
desert me. All men hate me. I am driven with mortal threats from the sources 
of comfort and existence. Accursed world! That hates without a cause, that 
overwhelms innocence with calamities which ought to be spared even to 
guilt! Accursed world! Dead to every manly sympathy; with eyes of horn, 
and hearts of steel! Why do I consent to live any longer? Why do I seek to 
drag on an existence which, if protracted, must be protracted amidst the lairs 
of these human tigers? (Godwin, Caleb Williams 260).  
 
Caleb’s fall is all the greater because his only crime has been curiosity; he has done 
no wrong under the law. The Creature goes a step further: rather than merely 
questioning if he should continue to live, once his nemesis/creator dies, he plans his 
suicide (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 160), as he sees no hope for redemption 
and no place for him in the society that has rejected him so utterly. Just as with 
knowledge, Shelley and Godwin highlight the human need for society and 
acceptance. Both works then go on to consider the outcome of these needs being 
thwarted.  
Both Caleb and the Creature are unable to exercise their will – they remain at 
the mercy of the more powerful, more respected men who created and perpetuate 
their circumstance. Here again there exists a parallel between Godwin and Shelley’s 
narratives. Harking back to Paradise Lost, Falkland took Caleb in and educated him, 
and so “promoted him from darkness”. Much more literally, Frankenstein moulded 
man. Both Falkland and Victor abuse their creations. Falkland works to destroy 
Caleb when he discovers his secret, despite the fact the Caleb is willing to keep the 
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secret closely. Victor also denies his responsibility to his creature. Despite the 
Creature’s appeal that, “I ought to be thy Adam” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 
68), and his challenge to Victor—”How dare you sport thus with life? Do your duty 
towards me, and I will do mine towards you and the rest of mankind” (M. Shelley, 
Frankenstein [1818] 68)—Frankenstein disregards the responsibility he clearly owes 
the Creature, claiming his duty to wider Mankind is more significant:  
 
I created a rational creature, and was bound towards him, to assure, as far as 
was in my power, his happiness and well-being. This was my duty; but there 
was another still paramount to that. My duties towards my fellow-creatures 
had greater claims to my attention, because they included a greater proportion 
of happiness or misery. Urged by this view, I refused, and I did right in 
refusing to create a companion for the first creature. (M. Shelley, 
Frankenstein [1818] 156; emphasis added)  
 
Falkland too lays claim to a greater benefit to society—his reputation and service to 
wider society are more important than Caleb’s happiness and reputation. Caleb 
attacks Falkland’s assumption of superiority, just as the Creature attacks Victor’s 
reasoning, asking “What is it that you require of me? That I should sign away my 
own reputation for the better maintaining of yours. Where is the equality of that?” 
(Godwin, Caleb Williams). In this way, Godwin poses questions about Falkland’s 
assumption of his own importance, with the close of the novel seeing Caleb bring 
Falkland to justice but then bemoan his mistake. Falkland is too virtuous, too good, 
to have his crime revealed and Caleb spends the remainder of the narrative berating 
himself for his mistake.  
In both Shelley and Godwin’s narratives, the power of the creator outweighs 
the rights and freedoms of the individual, despite them either initially having done 
no wrong. Godwin’s work has overt political overtones, while Shelley’s references 
are more allusions than direct, didactic positions. Her message is a more moral rather 
than political one—she is less interested in Frankenstein’s abuse of social power and 
privilege rather than the devastating personal impact it has upon the initially good 
Creature, driving him to murder. It is the actions of Frankenstein that lead to the 
murder of his family, as the Creature states, he is dependent upon his creator for 
happiness: “I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. Make me happy, 
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and I shall again be virtuous” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 68). Neither 
Falkland nor Victor can meet this need in their creations. Victor refuses to make 
another creature and the revelation of Falkland’s crimes only add to Caleb’s misery. 
And so it is their failing that causes the tragedies of the novels and provides both 
political and moral commentary on the responsibility of those who have power to 
honour these responsibilities, even if that requires admitting their personal failings 
and wrongdoings. It suggests a moral imperative that a both a political and 
individual level, the responsibilities that exist for those in power must be met, to 
ensure that all can participate fully in society, which is a fundamental need for 
people to be good.  
It is evident that Shelley took inspiration from her father’s ideas and works, 
but it would not do Frankenstein justice to label this as derivation. Shelley does not 
transpose characters from Godwin’s narrative to hers, but rather draws on the deeper 
ideas of human drive, the boundaries of knowledge, the power of one individual over 
another, and just as her father aimed, “to expose the evils which arise out of the 
present system of civilised society, to disengage the minds of men from 
presupposition, and launch them upon the sea of moral and political enquiry” 
(Godwin, Caleb Williams xi). Setting readers upon the same “sea of moral enquiry” 
is one of the key features and most powerful narrative elements in Shelley’s work.  
 
5.2 A ROMANTIC INSPIRATION 
 
The other significant influence in Shelley’s personal and professional life was her 
husband, Percy Bysshe Shelley. While Godwin’s thinking was of a definitively 
Enlightenment caste, Percy was a famed Romantic poet. Both modes of thought are 
evident in Shelley’s work. Aiden Day recognises Godwin as an important 
Enlightenment figure and describes Enlightenment thinking as,  
 
exalting reason and the scientific method—which had its roots in 
seventeenth-century intellectual achievements such as the scientific 
discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton, the rationalism of Descartes and the 
empiricism of Francis Bacon and John Locke. It is often of reason human 
beings could clear away the darkness of ignorance, intolerance and prejudice, 
and move towards a juster and better life. It opposed reliance on tradition for 
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tradition’s sake and sought to found its vision of progress towards an ideal 
state on universal principles. In Britain the line of descent ran from Bacon 
through Locke to later eighteenth-century figures such as William Godwin. 
(Day 57) 
 
These ideas are clearly explored in both Caleb Williams and Godwin’s political 
treatise, Political Justice, as well as in Shelley’s novels. Yet, as a close reading of 
Frankenstein reveals, this is not the only source for Shelley’s world view. Her works 
also have a distinctly Romantic bent, which can be linked to her time and place, her 
milieu and, most importantly, her husband. While the Shelleys’ marriage suffered its 
trials and tragedies, Percy was also a significant presence in Shelley’s life as an 
author. He edited the draft of Frankenstein, wrote the “Introduction” to the 1818 
edition and many readers initially believed him to have written the novel. Percy 
offered his most direct and eloquent statement of his Romantic ideals in his prose 
work, A Defence of Poetry. While this latter text was written after the publication of 
Frankenstein, Percy’s and Shelley’s thinking in their two texts do reflect their 
common values.  
  Both Godwin and Percy espoused the importance of social connections and 
one’s obligation to their fellow man. This idea is one that Shelley takes up in both 
Frankenstein and The Last Man, as well as her other works. In A Defence of Poetry, 
Percy states, 
 
The social sympathies, or those laws from which, as from its elements, 
society results, begin to develop themselves from the moment that two 
human beings coexist; the future is contained within the present as the plant 
within the seed; and equality, diversity, unity, contrast, mutual dependence, 
become the principles alone capable of affording the motives according to 
which the will of a social being is determined to action, inasmuch as he is 
social; and constitute pleasure in sensation, virtue in sentiment, beauty in art, 
truth in reasoning, and love in the intercourse of kind. (P. B. Shelley 28) 
 
Shelley’s understanding of this idea is evident in the treatment of the Creature, who 
should experience “social sympathies … from the moment that two human beings 
coexist” (P. B. Shelley 28). Instead, Victor does not afford his creation these 
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sympathies, and he is left to literally wander in the wilderness, where he develops an 
understanding of intolerance and cruelty, as no one will show him “love in the 
intercourse of kind”, as they view him as non-human, as “Other”. Botting 
summarises why the Creature as Other is so problematic for readers:  
 
The adaptability of the monster, its plural and constantly changing 
significance, stems from its construction as other. Even though such 
otherness is problematized in the novel—the monster speaks, its alterity, 
more specifically its alterity to humanity, seems to be what engages the 
reader’s or viewer’s fascination. The monster remains our, human and 
universal, antithesis, intimately and inextricably bound up in the complex 
processes in which our human values of individuality, self-possession, 
freedom and liberalism are constructed, reproduced and transformed, a 
process which, in order to define itself as unified, always excludes the other 
whose proximity we cannot tolerate: it shadows our destiny. Doubles our 
identity for, as it threatens our sacred limits and timeless values, the other 
precisely delineates what we can and cannot be. (192) 
 
This conception of non-human is particularly important in the Romantic era as the 
debate about the practice of slavery continued. Even the Shelleys’ personal physician 
and eminent member of the Royal College of Surgeons, Dr William Lawrence, 
engaged in debate about if Africans were closer to monkeys than European man 
(Seymour 137). Some scholars read Frankenstein as a critique of slavery, viewing 
the Creature as a representation of the dangers of neglecting those that are labelled 
“Other” as a means of justifying their mistreatment or exploitation. Shelley’s 
Creature poses questions about what it is to be human and also reflects both her 
personal concern (Seymour 162) and the broader social debate about the continued 
practice of slavery. Another interpretation of the “Other” is viewing the Creature as a 
representation of the working classes (Tenniel). Seeing the Creature as a 
representation of “Other” demonstrates not only Shelley’s Enlightenment concern 
for the rights of the third estate in European culture but also a wider view of what 
“man” encompasses, reflecting the Romantic concern for the enslaved races. Both 
Shelley and Percy reflect the Romantic conception of Godwinian ideals regarding 
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the rights of the individual and apply this to their contemporary debate about the 
rights of all men, including those not just of other classes but other races.  
 Shelley’s novel opens with an epitaph from Milton’s Paradise Lost. Both 
Shelley and Percy were inspired by Milton, with Percy penning Prometheus 
Unbound shortly after Frankenstein. Percy felt that,  
 
this bold neglect of a direct moral purpose is the most decisive proof of the 
supremacy of Milton’s genius. He mingled as it were the elements of human 
nature as colours upon a single pallet, and arranged them in the composition 
of his great picture according to the laws of epic truth; that is, according to 
the laws of that principle by which a series of actions of the external universe 
and of intelligent and ethical beings is calculated to excite the sympathy of 
succeeding generations of mankind. (P. B. Shelley 70) 
 
Shelley’s own work also shows a “bold neglect of a direct moral purpose”, although 
none of her contemporaries considered her a genius of the same calibre as Milton. 
This lack of moral didacticism empowers the reader to draw their own conclusions 
and boundaries. The impact of the ambiguous ending of Frankenstein is pivotal, in 
fact, to my reading of the novel as a vehicle through which Shelley was able to make 
an impact of the order of the founding of a discourse. Shelley establishes the moral 
frame of the novel at the very outset, asking “Did I request thee, Maker, from my 
clay / To mould me? Did I solicit thee / From darkness promote me?” (Milton’s 
Paradise Lost). This serves two purposes: the implicitly moral nature of these 
questions suggests the novel will have an answer or lesson for the reader, yet the 
novel ends ambiguously, leaving it to the reader to draw their own conclusions; and 
from the outset, the Creature, as the assumed voice of this statement, is portrayed in 
a sympathetic light, just as both Milton’s Satan and Adam are given a degree of 
sympathy or empathy. Immediately, we see the Creature as more than a mere 
monster, but a rational thinking and feeling figure.  
The use of Adam’s questioning of God’s right to “mould” him seems to 
immediately align the Creature with the character who is spurned and cast out by his 
creator. However, it was not only Adam who had this experience. Shelley draws 
upon Milton’s device of having both Adam and Satan mirror aspects of one another. 
Considering the motivations of Milton’s characters, rather than just the outcomes of 
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their actions, offers some useful insight into Shelley’s characters. Satan is motivated 
to rebel against God because he is jealous of the special treatment the Son receives. 
He resents his creator favouring someone else over his wants and needs, which he 
sees as owed to him. In this way, Satan is more akin to the Creature, who desires to 
connect with his creator Victor, and have the obligations owed to him met. He, like 
Satan, only turns to evil when his creator cannot fulfil this perceived obligation. It is 
possible to argue that Victor should be the character who is a mirror of Milton’s 
Satan, as he defies God by seizing the power of creation for himself. However, 
Victor is also motivated by a desire for knowledge, just as Adam was when he took 
the forbidden fruit. In one of Walton’s first descriptions of Victor, he uses language 
that suggests Victor has fallen from a once-noble state: “He must have been a noble 
creature in his better days, being even now in wreck so attractive and amiable … I 
have found a man who, before his spirit had been broken by misery” (M. Shelley, 
Frankenstein [1818] 16). While Walton sees Victor this way, Shelley provides her 
readers ample opportunity to form a different, less noble view of Victor. Just as 
Satan rails against the injustice of being cast out from Heaven, so too Victor 
equivocates his responsibility for his actions: “nor do I find it blameable” (M. 
Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 156).  
Science fiction scholar Adam Roberts sees the origin of the science fiction 
genre in Paradise Lost, claiming that “Milton’s Satan is the original bug-eyed 
monster” (Roberts 56) because he is so radically “Other”; just as the Creature is, 
Satan is cast out from his creator’s presence. Roberts also notes the moral ambiguity 
in Milton, which Shelley adopted: 
 
because Milton’s conception of Satan is so beguiling, because, intentionally 
or otherwise, Milton did not simply represent Satan as an incarnation of 
wickedness to be easily dismissed, that Paradise Lost works so powerfully. 
And it is this aspect of the poem, this way of reading it as being about the 
tragic career of an overreacher, rather than being about the pious articulation 
of a religious ideology as well as its imaginative recreation of Otherness in 
character and setting, and its mind-grabbing sense of the Sublime, that drew 




Perhaps it is not just the interest in the “Other” of Milton, Shelley and Percy’s works 
that make them canonical, but the fact that they all possess a moral greyness that 
challenges the reader to reach their own conclusions. Another important role that 
Percy attributes to poets, and can be extrapolated to apply to all literary writers, is 
the assertion that poets are both,   
 
legislators, or prophets: a poet essentially comprises and unites both these 
characters. For he not only beholds intensely the present as it is, and 
discovers those laws according to which present things ought to be ordered, 
but he beholds the future in the present, and his thoughts are the germs of the 
flower and the fruit of latest time. (P. B. Shelley 31) 
 
Shelley’s work “beholds intensely the present” by considering the science of the day 
and also “beholds the future in the present” as she explores and provides a space for 
moral consideration of her readers of the future of this new science. Should science 
be allowed to progress unimpeded by ethical or moral consideration in an 
unadulterated application of the scientific method of experiment and application? 
Shelley leaves this question without a definitive answer or moral imperative, but in 
so doing plants the seed in the reader’s mind that allows them to draw their own 
conclusion.  
Milton was not the only author to be cited in the writing of Frankenstein. 
Shelley also quotes Coleridge’s The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, usually in 
association with Walton. The poem’s narrative of a sailor who tampers with nature 
by killing an albatross and so draws the wrath of the spirits down on himself and his 
crew are mirrored in both Walton’s desire to find the secret of the North-West 
Passage and in Victor’s violation of nature in the creation of the Creature. Unlike the 
mariner, Walton avoids the condemnation of his crew by abandoning his quest when 
the ice proves insurmountable. Walton’s statement that “I shall kill no albatross” (M. 
Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 12) separates him from the mariner to which he refers. 
He came to the brink of nature’s secrets and turned back. Victor however has killed 
his albatross, violating nature’s secret realms, and is tormented by the very spirit 
which he created. Just like the mariner, he is condemned to wander the earth in 
pursuit of the Creature. This juxtaposition of Walton and Victor, as literal and 
figurative mariners on the sea of knowledge, serves to make Coleridge’s work 
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integral to the meaning of Frankenstein and again demonstrates the influence of 
Romantic thinking on the text.  
Perhaps Percy’s most significant contribution to the writing of Frankenstein 
was his encouragement to persist in developing it into a full length novel. He had a 
sincere belief in the power of literature to shape the minds of readers and obviously 
saw merit in Shelley’s original idea. His words about the significance of poetry could 
equally be applied to an imaginative work such as Frankenstein: 
 
The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry 
administers to the effect by acting upon the cause. Poetry enlarges the 
circumference of the imagination by replenishing it with thoughts of ever 
new delight, which have the power of attracting and assimilating to their own 
nature all other thoughts, and which form new intervals and interstices whose 
void for ever craves fresh food. Poetry strengthens that faculty which is the 
organ of the moral nature of man, in the same manner as exercise strengthens 
a limb. (P. B. Shelley 40-41) 
 
Using Gothic tropes such as Walton’s letters as the framework for the narrative, the 
garret/laboratory, the stormy weather at the moment of creation, and the isolated and 
barren retreat of the Orkneys creates the atmosphere of the novel. This is further 
enhanced with the addition of Romantic sublime landscapes. The confrontation 
amongst the peaks and ice of Mer de Glace intensifies the imaginative force of the 
scene. The impact of sublime scenes upon Victor, sometimes restoring and 
sometimes crushing his hope of being rid of the Creature are also classically 
Romantic in their appreciation of the power of nature over the spirit of man. By 
creating scenes filled with imagery to fire the reader’s imagination the work becomes 
a vivid representation of the ideas within, and thus allow the reader to, “form new 
intervals and interstices” in their thinking about these issues. Percy’s words can be 
appropriated to describe the imaginative power of Frankenstein: “it is impossible to 
read the compositions of the most celebrated writers of the present day without being 
startled by the electric life that burns within their words” (P. B. Shelley 79-80; 
emphasis added).  
Shelley also draws on later Romantic poets, including her husband. Percy’s 
Mutability is cited as Victor climbs towards Mer de Glace and his impending 
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meeting with the Creature (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 66-67). While this may 
have been an exercise in promoting her husband’s work (which would become 
Shelley’s main focus after his death), she uses the passage to emphasise the power 
the sublime setting has on Victor’s thinking. Another influence was the work of 
Gothic writers. Shelley read “the monk (sic)” (M. Shelley, Journals 28)—Matthew 
“Monk” Lewis’s popular Gothic novel, which included themes of “lust, murder, 
incest and every atrocity that can disgrace human nature” (McEvoy vii). As Emma 
McEvoy explains, Lewis’s novel caused widespread outrage, with uproar over the 
questionable content employed in it and the dubious morals it seemed to convey. It is 
hard to know whether Shelley might have been equally shocked by some of the 
graphic material in The Monk, and it cannot be said that her own novel replicated any 
of Lewis’s most shocking content, but any work that appeared to be cast from the 
same mould as Lewis’s was bound after its publication in 1796 to attract scorn. 
While Shelley replaces the supernatural elements of Lewis’s work with the wonders 
of the new science, his influence on her thinking about the impact of the objective 
world on the morals and thoughts of her protagonists is clear, and the conjunction of 
science and gothic horror is a defining feature of Frankenstein. By the end of 
November 1814, Mary was reading The Italian, by famed Gothic author Ann 
Radcliffe (M. Shelley, Journals 48). The impact of the Gothic genre upon Shelley’s 
work is very clear, so much so that some view the work as best categorised as a 
Gothic novel.  
It is not possible to easily define Frankenstein as belonging to a particular 
genre or ideology. Shelley clearly drew heavily upon a range of ideas and modes of 
writing in her construction. The text draws on many Gothic tropes in its narrative 
structure, but is not a truly Gothic story, lacking the supernatural element. It reflects 
many Enlightenment ideals, and is dedicated to a famed Enlightenment thinker, 
Godwin, however is not merely a social critique. It explores Romantic concerns of 
slavery, social obligation and man’s relationship with nature, particularly as science 
begins to reveal its secrets, but cannot be called a definitively Romantic novel. How 
then can Shelley’s debut work be labelled? The most fitting appellation is not 
Enlightenment, Gothic, or Romantic but rather, as an amalgam or synthesis of these 







5.3 AN AUTHOR’S INNOVATION: FOUNDATIONS OF GENRE 
 
As science fiction and Shelley scholar Fred Botting explains, the Gothic and science 
fiction genres “are complex and contradictory effects of modernity, bound up in the 
metaphors and practices with which it transforms the world” (114). The common 
ancestry of these genres is further described by Anne Cranny-Francis, although the 
emergence of science fiction out of the Gothic was signalled by the desire to explain 
that which the earlier genre would have had unexplained in order to heighten the 
affect, but science fiction retained the Gothic writers’ radical motive to critique both 
religious orthodoxy and Enlightenment idealism: 
 
Bourgeois science and technology challenged the divine by assigning rational 
explanations to previously inexplicable phenomena and so caused great crises 
in faith for many people. It also enabled the development of new kinds of 
machines which not only revolutionised the domestic environment of the 
country, but also transformed England into an imperialistic world power. The 
nature of knowledge, of belief and of the everyday real were under challenge 
and this new genre evolved to meet that challenge: as both interrogator and 
apologist. The “science” in this earliest science fiction was a focus or 
reference point for the social critique. (65) 
 
This idea of science fiction as a form of social critique is clear in the many readings 
of Shelley’s Creature as “Other” as discussed earlier, and in the way Victor 
Frankenstein was subsequently demonised as the ‘mad scientist’ that would become 
a trope of the science fiction genre. As Isaac Asimov has argued, Shelley’s novel 
contributed to the rise of “socially-oriented” science fiction, based on which, Phillip 
Pecorino adds, “the real cultural and philosophical importance of science fiction 
emerges. These science-fiction works focus on the implications of technological 
progress for society” (4). 
Darko Suvin’s conception of the “novum”, referring to the scientifically 
plausible technology on which science fiction narratives are often based, functions 
within the genre in the same way that an apparition or demon might in a Gothic 
148 
 
horror, focusing the reader on an object of estrangement or novelty, but as Adam 
Roberts explains, the novum also brings the reader back to their own world through 
the plausibility of the object: science fiction as “a symbolist genre, one where the 
novum acts as a symbolic manifestation of something that connects it specifically 
with the world we live in” (Roberts, Science Fiction 16). This connection to reality 
and social reflection aligns with Brian Aldiss’s description of the core elements of 
science fiction, which he outlines in relation to the work of H.G. Wells: 
 
Firstly, he begins by drawing a recognisable picture of his own times, “the 
present day”… Secondly, he uses the newer scientific principles of his times 
… as a hinge for the story. Thirdly, he allows a criticism of his society, and 
possibly of mankind in general, to emerge from the narrative. This remains a 
classic ground plan for an SF novel. Veracity, capacity, universality. (122) 
 
Shelley herself acknowledged the “veracity” and “capacity” of the science on which 
she based her work—in the opening lines of the Preface to the novel she asserts a 
validity or truthfulness to the narrative while acknowledging its fictionality: “The 
event on which this fiction is founded has been supposed, by Dr Darwin, and some 
of the physiological writers of Germany as not of impossible occurrence. I shall not 
be supposed as according the remotest degree of serious faith to such an imagination; 
yet, in assuming it as the basis of a work of fancy” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 
5). This could be seen as the first articulation of the genre of science fiction, with a 
real scientific possibility taken as the hinge for a patently fictional work, which 
nonetheless resonates closely enough to reality to allow for moral reflection.  
This encounter with some form of “Otherness” in a realist setting is “the 
strength of the science-fictional mode” (Roberts 180). Shelley herself supports this 
and in so doing completes Aldiss’s final component of “universality”: “However 
impossible as a physical fact, affords a point of view to the imagination for the 
delineating of human passions more comprehensive and commanding than any 
which the ordinary relations of existing events can yield” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein 
[1818] 5). Botting explains how this space for imagining and “delineating” (or 
drawing boundaries) functioned within both the Gothic and science fiction genres. 




engage with the effects of economic, political, and scientific change on 
individual, familial, and social structures. Enmeshed in the uneven 
development of modernity, in economic shifts to commerce, industrial 
production, and imperial expansion, in political calls for reform and 
democracy, in aesthetic notions of free, imaginative individuals, and in 
scientific innovations rapidly and visibly transforming the conditions of 
human existence, the novels identify monstrosities in the new: revolutionary 
mobs are many-headed monsters, industrial workers are hulking brutes, new 
economic and political structures reduce humanity to slaves or automata. 
(Botting 114) 
 
Botting’s recognition of the common elements of the two genres is helpful in moving 
towards a categorisation of Frankenstein. My earlier discussions of the Gothic have 
explored the impact of the genre upon Shelley’s writing and identified some of the 
Gothic tropes present in Frankenstein. These commonalities are unsurprising given 
her own interest in the genre and its widespread popularity. Yet Frankenstein is not 
only a Gothic work. As Susan Lederer and Richard Rattan observe, the novel is “a 
convergence of several literary genres—the romance, the epistolary novel, the 
Gothic, travel stories into which Shelley wove ideas from contemporary scientific 
workers and developments in physics, chemistry and medicine” (455). They add that 
there is debate about whether Shelley’s novel should be considered primarily as one 
of these existing literary genres, or whether it constitutes “the ur-text of science 
fiction”, but they are certain “no one disputes that Frankenstein represented a 
significant moment in the historical development of the genre”. I argue that 
Frankenstein can be called the first science fiction, as it establishes the discursive 
space in which the genre operates, albeit a text with strong Gothic heritage.  
In contrast, Markus Oppolzer stands firm in his reading of Frankenstein as “a 
classic of Gothic fiction” (93). He argues that Victor Frankenstein is not a scientist 
and the modern conception of him as such is more a result of later adaptations of the 
novel. Oppolzer does concede a hybridity of genre: 
 
the basic premises that underlie Frankenstein’s integration into the canon of 
science fiction literature are hardly tenable. There is enough evidence to 
identify it as a forerunner or hybrid narrative, but many of the attempt to 
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sever the novel from its Gothic roots and recontextualise it as a meditation of 
bioethics avant la lettre seem more indebted to the countless pop-cultural 
adaptations of the novel than the text itself. (Oppolzer 92) 
 
This disavowal of Frankenstein as science fiction is not particularly constructive, but 
the recognition of the strong Gothic forces at work, such as “autodidactism, 
blindness and manipulativity” (Oppolzer 79) do highlight the generic hybridity of the 
work. Shelley in fact distanced herself from the Gothic, stating, “I have not 
considered myself as merely weaving a series of supernatural terrors. The event on 
which the interest of the story depends is exempt from the disadvantages of a mere 
tale of spectres or enchantment” (M. Shelley, Frankenstein [1818] 5). Sir Walter 
Scott also notes the lack of the supernatural, and importantly, the impact this has 
upon readers: 
 
A more philosophical and refined use of the supernatural in works of fiction, 
is proper to that class in which the laws of nature are presented as altered, not 
for the purpose of pampering the imagination with wonders, but in order to 
show the probable effect which the supposed miracles would produce on 
those who witnessed them. In this case, the pleasure ordinarily derived from 
the marvellous incidents is secondary to that which we extract from 
observing how mortals like ourselves would be affected. (Scott 220) 
 
Scott here considers the impact upon readers, alluding to the moral potential of 
Shelley’s work. Adam Roberts supports Shelley’s assertion that she has not merely 
created a tale of supernatural terror, claiming that “the premise of an SF novel 
requires material, physical rationalisation, rather than a supernatural or arbitrary one” 
(Roberts 5). Chris Baldick sees this as the novel “observ[ing] (perhaps even 
invent[ing]) the rules of what we now call science fiction, tracing a change of 
probable from a single implausible premise without resort to magical interventions” 
(181).  
It is more constructive, I contend, to recognise the Gothic origins of a number 
of elements in Frankenstein without consigning it irretrievably to that genre. Cranny-
Francis notes that from the Gothic form, “Frankenstein retains the frame narrative, 
the story-within-the-story technique which is used to distance the reader and induce a 
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critical perspective. From the Gothic also are the exotic European setting of the tale 
and its references to alchemy and magic” (64). Whereas Gothic writers used such 
distancing features to interrogate their world while also heightening social and 
individual anxieties, Cranny-Francis argues further that “Shelley’s genius was to 
direct this interrogative genre to a new and different area of contemporary interest 
and concern, science and technology which she embodies in the creature and his 
maker” (64-65). Christa Knellwolf suggests that Shelley goes so far in extending this 
“interrogative genre” as to interrogate the very anxieties that Gothic fiction sought to 
stir up, adopting Gothic tropes merely as a sleight of hand: 
 
While it contains the necessary ingredients for a horror story, the novel is not 
satisfied with simply eliciting emotional turmoil, but also explores the nature 
of these emotional responses. In particular, it investigates the cultural context 
of fear, contrasting physiological causes with the cultural gatekeeping 
mechanisms of a conventional world view. This explains why Frankenstein 
does not demonstrate an easy fit with the Gothic, the genre called into 
existence in order to satisfy the Romantic taste for a portrayal of emotion and 
passion.… At the same time, the Gothic is just a façade that detracts from the 
real interests of the novel concerning the limits of ambition, passion, 
curiosity and knowledge. (54) 
 
Shelley’s ambiguous morality, about which I have said much already, leaves it to the 
reader to decide where to situate these limits of “ambition, passion, curiosity and 
knowledge” that Knellwolf identifies. Not knowing or being able to see these 
boundaries is a fear-inducing prospect. Cranny-Francis corroborates Knellwolf’s 
position, noting that it is not the science per se that motivates the narrative; rather, 
the chief concern is with “the social consequence of that science, signified by the 
production of a being who is rejected by his creator, who is monstrous in the eyes of 
those he encounters, and who eventually turns to violence as a result of his personal 
and social rejection. He is an embodiment of social pathology” (Cranny-Francis 65). 
This concern about the perceived lack of boundaries around scientific potential and 
its possible outcomes is a key feature of the genre of science fiction.  
Lobke Minter identifies that the Gothic, of which there are recognisable 
features in Shelley’s work, was concerned with borders between the protagonist and 
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the exterior world: “Gothic texts are fundamentally concerned with the anxiety about 
boundaries … those that separate the individual self from something that is other”. 
This fear or anxiety stems from the untold possibilities presented by new science. 
What Shelley does in Frankenstein is offer one scenario, making a tangible way (and 
manageable in scope) for readers to think about new science in a hypothetical way. 
Minter continues, “this concern about what it means to be human, or what it means 
to be ‘me’ in a modern world, is one that is constantly asked by Science Fiction”. As 
a genre, science fiction builds upon this to consider, in a world where science can 
now intervene upon the individual body in unprecedented ways, the border at which 
we may cede our humanity. Shelley was writing at a pivotal moment in time. At this 
critical intersection, it became possible to talk about religion, creation, and what it is 
to be human in a new way, and Shelley laid the foundations for the genre and 
established the discursive space to do this.  
Scott’s 1818 review of Frankenstein takes note of the way in which the text 
functions as a space for critical thinking about the outcomes of science: “The 
author’s principal object, … is less to produce an effect by means of the marvels of 
the narrations, than to open new trains and channels of thought, by placing men in 
supposed situations of an extraordinary and preternatural character, and then 
describing the mode of feeling and conduct which they are most likely to adopt” 
(Scott). Though Scott would have been unaware at the time, the “supposed 
situations” he describes would become the “what if…?” scenarios that are the 
premise of all science fiction narratives. Not only does he identify this key feature of 
genre, but he also alludes to the way in which Shelley’s new discourse functions. In 
an uncanny parallel to the geographic language Foucault uses, Scott’s “channels of 
thought” can be reframed as discourses, as in opening these new spaces, Shelley is 
providing a new way for her readers to think about the world in which they live. Not 
only does Scott identify the discursive space Shelley has opened, he also alludes to 
the way this functions as a moral space. Shelley does describe “the mode of feeling 
… they [her characters] are most likely to adopt”, yet does not dictate to the reader 
which character they should most feel for, nor turn to a religion to condemn her 
characters. 
Allan K. Hunter reinforces that this thinking is freed from a religious 
framework: “These ‘supposed situations’ include the implications of scientific 
revelations concerning the function of a natural law which suggested a significantly 
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different worldview than the one based in traditional religious doctrine” (138). It is 
this new perspective or way of thinking about science that Shelley offers her readers 
that marks her work out as distinctly different from the Gothic genre. This is where 
we can begin to see how science fiction as a genre serves as a manifestation of the 
discursive space Shelley established, which allows for thought and boundary making 
on the part of the reader, rather than applying a strict moral framework. Hunter 
summarises this ambiguity or indeterminacy that is left to the reader to fill: 
 
By incorporating and extrapolating current in scientific thought, Shelley 
articulates the fears of a populace faced with the prospect that they are not the 
end result in a progressivist drive to perfection. While Victor and his hideous 
progeny do not survive, the reader is left with the knowledge that the 
possibility of man engineering his own obsolescence did not perish in the 
Artic wasteland. It merely lies dormant within our species. (147) 
 
The reader’s consideration of the dormant potential of people to create their own 
demise is a core premise of the discourse Shelley established. While asking “what 
if…?” can produce fear and anxiety, it is also a remedy to these to a degree, in that 
the reader has the opportunity to prepare their response through reacting to the 
fiction. What Shelley achieved in Frankenstein goes beyond the establishment of the 
tropes of a genre, and a study of “science fiction” reveals the genre is in fact the way 
in which the discourse which Shelley founded is made manifest in our culture.  
Hunter gives additional consideration to why science fiction took the form it 
did. Hunter outlines Robert Scholes’s contention that “this period’s scientific 
discoveries led to the first point where man was able to think of himself historically 
and conceive of a future that would not resemble the present” (145). Simultaneously, 
“there was a confluence of public interest, gentlemen scholarship and political 
concern that culminated in an unprecedented effort to make available the tools of 
science and demonstrate their utility” (Hunter 145). This combination of interest in 
the sciences and an understanding that the future would not resemble the present 
supports the emergence of the science fiction genre at this time. Fiction was a new 
vehicle for the discourse of science, and it allowed for imagined futures. This 
imagining provided a “safe” space for consideration of science and its potential 
outcomes. This further reinforces Knellwolf and Minter’s observations about the 
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cultural context of fear and anxiety. Hunter sees Shelley’s establishment of the genre 
of science fiction as allowing “the reader to enjoy a fictive experience and form 
reactions to situations that only exist in the realm of possibility” (138). The offset of 
this fear of the potentially negative outcomes of scientific curiosity is the safety of 
knowing that it is fictional.  
Hunter goes on to link both Shelley’s use of fiction and her impact upon 
discourse, because her novel’s portrayal of the unpredictability of new science 
responded to the very real fears throughout contemporary society about 
revolutionary change, and this response reached beyond fiction as it “entered the 
public discourse over progress science’s problematic implications for the human 
species” (133). Shelley’s impact on literature was not so rapid, but her story quickly 
furnished the public with a language through which to question the morality of the 
new sciences while still gazing with awe at the advances it offered. It was not until 
late in the same century that science fiction finally fulfilled the literary potential that 
Shelley’s novel once promised. As Cranny-Francis concludes, it was not until the 
end of the nineteenth century that the “new genre” of science fiction “was 
characterised as a fiction which 1) referred the reader to specific scientific theories 
and/or technologies; and, 2) in so doing, articulated contemporary hopes and fears 
about the impact on everyday life of science and technology, about the kinds of 
society they produced and about its consequences for the individual subject” (68). 
Yet she is also in no doubt that Shelley anticipated these features so perceptively as 
to signal “contemporary awareness of the radical change to the industrial base of 
nineteenth-century society, figured in the science and technology described in the 
text” (68), and this brings her to the firm decision that it is science fiction rather than 
Gothic.  
While Frankenstein has Gothic features, then, it is also distinctly something 
else, and the “what if…?” question applied to the new sciences does mark in the text 
what I think is the establishment of the nascent science fiction genre. Shelley 
responds to the fear and anxiety about the implications of the new sciences with a 
new narrative form. Yet it is also more than this, and its impact was clearly felt like a 
wave throughout society in the years immediately after its publication. The genre it 
founded took time to manifest more fully within the staid practices of the literary 
elite, but to the lay reader it established a way and a space for culture to respond in 
moral terms to scientific advancement free of religious orthodoxy. I would take 
155 
 
Hunter’s final point one step further and argue that Frankenstein did not just “enter 
public discourse” but in fact established an entirely new discursive space, the effects 
of which can still be seen in our culture today. Their impact, however, can be traced 
more precisely in the size of the ripples her work created throughout her culture—





In Shelley’s Wake: Measuring the Impact of Frankenstein 
 
In the previous chapter, Shelley was identified as an innovator in the nascent genre 
of science fiction, but the innovation took some time to make a significant impact 
through the rise of the new genre in the latter part of the same century. Yet as 
Shelley’s innovation was to rework a number of influences and intertexts, my focus 
has shifted from the internal workings of the novel (while not forgetting the 
importance of close attention to the text) to examining how it grew out of and wrote 
back to the cultural pool of Shelley’s time. As Roseanne Montillo has explained, 
Shelley’s novel addressed major concerns and anxieties about new science, which 
provided a point of focus for the novel’s immediate reception: 
 
Perhaps, some critics felt, the author had a great understanding of the 
philosophical debates and moral implications that arose from discussions 
about nature, the quest for knowledge and power, Man versus God, and 
man’s ability to create another entity without God’s help. After all, at its most 
basic level, the book also spoke to society’s fear that scientists were delving 
into regions unknown … the book was, some realised, a scathing critique of 
society, science and religion. (Montillo 201) 
 
While some readers may have seen the novel’s reflections on such questions through 
the figure of the compromised scientist as a “scathing critique”, I argue instead that 
the moral ambiguity of Shelley’s novel is precisely why her consideration of these 
big questions about science has resonated within culture for the last two centuries. 
With that in mind, this final chapter will utilise research tools that allow for a 
quantitative analysis of the impact of Shelley’s works, to plot the evidence for 
cultural impact from the year of its publication rather than to rely on an account of its 
literary impact that tends to collapse the interval from publication to the rise of the 
new genre, some six or seven decades afterwards. By using this approach, I aim to 
demonstrate the widespread discursive impact of Shelley’s work. The broad 
discursive reach of her novel may, ironically, have been a factor in the delay of its 
literary impact, as it would have made it easy for the initial, negative critical 
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reception to remain relatively unchallenged by viewing the work as merely a popular 
oddity. 
Of course, the numbers our quantitative tools generate allow for the 
measurement of the size or scale of a phenomenon, but do not always readily 
account for the form that it takes. Returning to the metaphor of culture as a pool, 
bounded by socio-cultural practices, we can assure ourselves that this quantitative 
lens need not be adopted independent of the point of view that has been brought to 
bear on the material so far. Contextual biography is the methodology that has 
allowed me to map this landscape (pool and boundary), and place the author-subject 
and her work within this fluid multi-dimensional context. The close reading I have 
offered might be described here as an explanation of the weight or mass of the stone 
Shelley cast into the cultural pool, to understand its contours and the likelihood that 
it would have made the kind of impact I now expect to be able to trace. The study of 
the broader cultural influences on which the novel drew creates an immersive view 
from that point of impact within the pool, tracing the ripples with which the novel 
already intersected or which its arrival amplified. The quantitative lens means 
adopting an aerial view, so to speak, from which the trajectory of the ripples created 
by the work can be plotted, tracing its popularity and reception as its ripples react 
and rebound amongst other discourses. This may be achieved through studies of 
sales, numbers of early adaptations, and direct references to the work. Some 
examples of such an approach have been offered previously in this thesis, and I will 
begin what follows with further details.  
Yet I suggest that this can be taken much further, by shifting our lens to a 
position from which we can see the further reach of these ripples as they rise as 
waves upon the shore—from this perspective, we can chart the impact of the ripples 
created by the work, even though we may lose sight of the work itself. This is the act 
of tracing the influence of the work in more tangential ways, understanding how 
imagery, ideas and practices reshape the cultural pool of which they are a part. The 
focus of this chapter will be on tracing the influence Shelley’s writing has had both 
as a literary work and as an agent of discursive change. As Christa Knellwolf and 
Jane Goodall observe in their discussion of Hollywood’s adoption of Frankenstein’s 
creature, “Once embodied in the cultural imagination, the myth and the monster 
could propagate even more broadly, infusing popular culture as well as the literate” 
(“Introduction” 9). The way Frankenstein has entered our cultural imagination can 
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be explored by using relatively new research tools that allow us to trace the size of 
the ripples, and to ascertain their broad discursive reach. This final chapter closes 
with consideration of how the discursive space that Shelley founded continues to be 
an important imaginative, moralising space in our culture today.  
 
6.1 FROM WHERE THE STONE LANDS: SHELLEY’S IMPACT 
 
By Shelley’s death in 1851, 7000 copies of Frankenstein had been sold, there were 
seven editions, a French translation, and two American editions released, and fifteen 
different stage adaptations had been produced (Hitchcock 101). In the bicentennial 
year, Frankenstein’s sales figures are impossible to accurately estimate—there are 
currently 84 versions of the novel available on Amazon alone. Frankenstein is also 
in the public domain as it is no longer bound by copyright, so is available freely to 
readers online. The Project Gutenberg edition of the novel has had 13249 downloads 
in the last 30 days, according to a bibliographic record count (12 June 2018). While 
not firm data, this proliferation is evidence of the popularity of the work and begins 
to reveal a sense of a way in which we can trace the work’s impact. Mark Davies’s 
Google Books (Advanced) Interface operates in a similar way to Google’s NGram 
tool, tracking word frequency across time in digitised copies of books in the Google 
Books repository. Davies’s Advanced Interface displays a count of occurrences per 
decade in the “List” view, providing valuable quantitative data allowing us to track 
frequency of use of key words. The most obvious key term to use to track the 
cultural reach of Shelley’s novel is “Frankenstein,” analysis of which reveals a 
significant upward trend over time but also some telling periods in which this trend 
was bolstered by rapid increases (see Figures 7 and 8).  
Unsurprisingly, the trend is not universally upward, but this in itself may 
speak to how resilient the term has been at times when it might well have faded into 
complete obscurity. We may note, for example, the relatively small number of 
references in the remaining years of the 1810s following its publication and 
throughout the next decade, although I would argue in any case that the 114 
references in just over the first decade after the novel was first released reveals a 
high level of interest in the story. Yet the figure from the 1820s almost quadruples in 
the decade following the publication of the 1831 edition, suggesting that “interest” in 
the story is by this time no longer in any doubt, and it might be that this is an index 
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of true impact. A gradual rise continues throughout the following four decades 
before a second sharp increase in the 1880s. This figure of 841 declines slowly into 
the first decade of the twentieth century, but this is followed by a sharp decline to a 
low of 312 in the 1910s. As this is the decade in which Europe was plunged into war 
and depression, a significant drop in any cultural activity is to be anticipated—even 
then, a figure of 312 sees the frequency of references to “Frankenstein” on a par with 
the boom figures following the publication of the 1831 edition. Usage of the term 
does not return to 1890s levels again until the 1950s. What then follows is an almost 
exponential growth, with usage almost doubling each decade since, with well over 
11,000 references to “Frankenstein” in the 2000s (Davies). 
We must of course be cautious in our reading of this numerical data, as both 
Ngram and the Advanced Interface are drawing upon digitised books, so some 
caveats are required about the capacity of these tools to cover all published (or even 
unpublished) usage. The other factor to consider is the growth of publishing and the 
use of the internet: with more texts being published digitally this century, it is 
unsurprising that the search results show the greatest preponderance of usage in the 
2000s, as the search tool would have greater access to these. Like Google’s Ngram 
tool, the Advanced Interface’s more detailed “Chart” view also displays the data 
visually, which further reinforces the sense of steady growth in the usage of 
“Frankenstein”. The significant benefit of the Davies’s Advanced Interface over the 
Google Ngram tool is the ability to then see the Google Books entries from which 
the data is being drawn. This makes the Advanced Interface a more useful research 
tool, as researchers can see not only word frequency, but also go on to analyse the 
different ways in which the word is used. Unsurprisingly, in the first decade (1810—
1819) the references are largely to reviews of Shelley’s book following its 
publication in 1818. The following decade is characterised by reviews and 
advertising for the theatrical adaptations and reviews of Shelley’s later works, 
including The Last Man, billed as “by the author of Frankenstein”. The almost 
continuous upward trend can be attributed in large part to new editions, then stage 
adaptation, and in latter years to film adaptations. The sharp rise in the late 1970s 
into the 1980s is indicative of the renewed academic interest in Shelley and her 
works, as outlined in previous discussion of scholarship surrounding Shelley. 
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Despite these caveats around the sources available to the tools, they are 
nonetheless useful in discerning a pattern of increasing usage of the term 
“Frankenstein” over time, which supports Susan Tyler Hitchcock’s assertion that 
“Frankenstein and his monster had entered the vernacular” (106). This serves as 
evidence in part of Shelley’s work functioning long-term as foundational to a new 
way of thinking and speaking about science—”Frankenstein” is frequently invoked 
as symbol, rather than just as direct textual reference (Hitchcock 106). 
“Frankenstein” has become a cultural touchstone, freed from the pages of the novel 
itself. What the Ngram and Advanced Interface tools reveal is the continuous interest 
in and invocation of Frankenstein over the last two centuries. Ngram and the 
Advance Interface tool make possible large scale trend analysis as a starting point for 
more detailed research. With the number of texts now available on Shelley and 
Frankenstein, this kind of analysis would be impossible without a digital search tool. 
While these tools allow us to see that “Frankenstein” was popular, we must consider 
how the term was used. To frame it another way, the tools allow us to see the size of 
the ripples caused by the novel. A study of the way in which “Frankenstein” is used, 
reveals the shape of the ideas carried within the ripples. 
 
6.2 DISCERNING THE SHAPE OF THE WAVES 
 
Perhaps the best evidence of the cultural impact of Shelley’s new way of speaking 
about science is found in a longitudinal study of the uptake of the core imagery of 
the novel—Frankenstein’s creature. The Creature is often misnamed as Frankenstein 
himself, however, this error does not change the invocation of the name Frankenstein 
to mean either something made from disparate parts, or someone who is pushing 
scientific and moral boundaries. As Marilyn Butler puts it, we “take the very word 
Frankenstein to convey an awful warning: don’t usurp God’s prerogative in the 
Creation-game, or don’t get too clever with technology” (Butler 404). Frankenstein’s 
creature was rapidly absorbed into the zeitgeist; “the story was alive in the nations 
memory” (St Clair, “The Impact of Frankenstein” 261). Hitchcock’s excellent 
Frankenstein: A Cultural History provides a detailed and very thorough survey of 
how Frankenstein and his creature have entered popular consciousness. It is well 
established that popular culture has misappropriated the name of the creator and 
given it to his creation. However, Hitchcock shows that this misappropriation is not 
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the work of Hollywood, as is often assumed, but can be traced back to as early as 
1819, only one year after the novel’s original publication. Hitchcock cites Colburn, 
the publisher of Polidori’s Vampyre as having named the Creature, the “wretch 
abhorred”, as Frankenstein (Hitchcock 79). From this moment on, representations of 
the novel and its protagonists began to drift further and further from Shelley’s novel 
itself: 
  
by the middle of the nineteenth century, propelled as much by adaptations as 
by the novel itself, the myth of Frankenstein and his monster had entered the 
vernacular. The name “Frankenstein” had become a code word form 
misguided ambition, for new ideas conjured up with good intentions but 
destined to grow and change beyond all reckoning, ultimately overwhelming 
those who conceived them. (Hitchcock 106) 
 
From this moment on, representations of the novel and its protagonists began to drift 
further and further from Shelley’s novel itself.  
In 1824, in a Parliamentary debate, Tory politician George Canning cited 
Frankenstein’s creature as a warning against the dangers of ending slavery too 
rapidly, as “to turn [the ‘Negro’] loose in the manhood of his physical strength, in 
the maturity of his physical passions, but in the infancy of his uninstructed reason, 
would be to raise up a creature resembling the splendid fiction of a recent romance” 
(UK Parliament). This was not the only meaning assigned to “Frankenstein”. The 
invocation of Frankenstein’s creature was used as a warning against the dangers of 
granting the vote to the working class in political cartoons such as “The Brummagem 
Frankenstein” (Tenniel – see Figure 8). Frankenstein was also adopted as a symbol 
of the monstrous power of the first corporations in “The American Frankenstein” 
(Bellew – see Figure 9). In this image, the power of the railway monopolies to 
further ruin the lives of the working class is depicted as a large monster made of 
train-parts. These serve as examples of the widespread adoption of “Frankenstein” as 
a symbol invoked as a warning against “monstrosity” of all shapes, particularly the 
dangers of racial or social groups perceived as Other, even as these references drift 




Figure 8: Tenniel’s “The Brummagem Frankenstein”, 1866 
 
 




Hitchcock echoes Foucault’s observation about the social upheaval that gave 
rise to Shelley’s novel: “It emerged at a turning point in Western history, when the 
moral universe was shifting and when some dared to believe that advances in 
scientific knowledge promised humans dominion over that which for centuries had 
been God’s alone. The story of Frankenstein’s monster is a myth of claiming long-
forbidden knowledge and facing the consequences” (Hitchcock 4). Hitchcock goes 
on to consider the mythic archetypes that underpin the novel—those who like 
Odysseus break boundaries yet receive great rewards, or those like Prometheus who 
transgress and are punished: “In this moral universe, life presents a perpetual 
temptation. There is always further to go, but the reward of a long and serene life 
comes to those who hang back and toe the line” (Hitchcock 4). However, as she 
observes further, unlike Prometheus and Odysseus, Frankenstein has no god: “To the 
centrally human quandary between risk and obedience, Frankenstein adds one more 
crucial, haunting, modern twist. What if there is no divine source for the rules, no 
final moral answer, no divine authority to judge, punish, or reward, to create, destroy 
or control? In short, what if there is no God?” (6). What Hitchcock observes here is 
the key feature of Frankenstein that makes it a potentially foundational text for 
discourse. It is not just that this is a ‘what if?’ question (a fundamental element of the 
genre of science fiction), but that it is this question, the question of fundamental 
socio-religious significance, that underpins how this discourse operates in creating a 
space for readers to draw their own boundaries. As Phillip A. Pecorino states, 
“Science fiction in these works becomes a vehicle for the exploration of values well 
as an exposition of possible alternatives for the future” (7).  
Hitchcock’s work is particularly useful in tracing how differing periods 
responded to the moral spaces opened up by Shelley’s novel. In a way, she is 
conducting a contextual biography of the Creature’s life in popular culture. 
Frankenstein had been adapted for the stage almost immediately after publication, 
and the new medium of film brought the Creature to life again exactly 100 years 
after Shelley’s 1831 edition. James Whale’s 1931 Frankenstein, starring Boris 
Karloff, “shimmered in a zone of moral uncertainty, which is part of its lasting 
power. Without the added final scene—the cheery toast to the house of 
Frankenstein—the film would have ended in even more of a moral limbo, with 
creature and creator hovering between life and death against the background of the 
flaming windmill” (Hitchcock 164). Whale’s adaptation recognised and wrote into 
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the discursive space Shelley had established, casting doubt over the culpability of 
both the creator and his creature. Yet the moral ambiguity that is so essential to the 
novel and the 1931 film was subsequently lost as representations of Frankenstein and 
his creature moved further away from the original in later productions. Hitchcock 
outlines how this occurred midway through the twentieth century: 
 
Just as a metaphor can die from overuse, so too, after numerous retellings, a 
myth can lose vitality. The story becomes an empty shell, an externalisation 
without inner meaning. Complicated moral questions—the kind that cannot 
be answered simply by saying yes or no, good or evil—drop out altogether. 
In the middle of the twentieth century the Frankenstein monster was facing 
such a demise. (Hitchcock 210) 
 
This change from moral ambiguity to a more didactic, definitive message would be 
the result of the many cultural and social forces that shaped responses to the novel 
and films. It is not the work of this thesis to focus on this specific period’s turn away 
from moral ambiguity, but the most logical reason would be that these productions 
during the 1940s and 1950s were concurrent with the Second World War and its 
aftermath, which held enough moral questions of its own. Audiences were looking to 
escape and be entertained, not have the waters of their morality muddied further.  
It is also worth reminding ourselves here that the lowest ebb in the frequency 
of usage of the term “Frankenstein” was during the preceding war to end all wars, 
and that this number was returning to a level approximating the 1890s levels during 
the 1950s. If, as Hitchcock observes, the myth of Frankenstein was losing its vitality, 
it continued to be wheeled out even if only as a cliché with the same regularity in the 
middle of the twentieth century as it had been when its vitality must have seemed to 
be at its most urgent: during the rise of science fiction as a literary genre in the 1880s 
and 1890s. The return of this vitality is attributed by Hitchcock to a form that has 
only recently begun for its own part to gain critical attention. It was in the comics of 
the 1960s (and the popular works of the Golden Age of science fiction) that new 
cultural forms “managed to recapture the essential ambiguity of Mary Shelley’s 
story” (Hitchcock 226). The space Shelley had opened was now being flooded with 
texts that function in the same way, although they differed in form. As my review of 
critical attention to Shelley and her works in Chapter One also reveals, this 
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resurgence was only magnified by the spotlight of the academy, and the multiplicity 
of responses to her works further added to the discourse she had created. What 
Hitchcock’s discussion reveals is the way in which Frankenstein has permeated 
popular culture—evidence, I contend, of its continuing force and of the extent to 
which its initial impact is still felt. Its ripples within the pool of culture are still 
visible today, even as the source text recedes imperceptibly from view in the case of 
the vast majority of texts on the outer reach of this wave.  
 
6.3 THE QUESTION OF SCIENCE FICTION 
 
Shelley has been credited with establishing the science fiction genre (Aldiss; 
Stableford). I would argue that she popularised a certain approach to thinking about 
science through a fictive lens and so to a degree shaped “the rock” of genre that 
others would emulate. What she really established was a discursive space for 
thinking about science, the most frequent “way of speaking” or boundaries of the 
discourse are manifest in, but not limited to, the tropes of the science fiction genre. 
Searching the British corpus in the Advanced Interface, the first appearance of the 
term “science fiction” occurs in the 1890s, with 17 texts using the term in that 
decade (Davies, see Figure 6). However, the American corpus reveals a statistical 
outlier, with one text using the term in 1851. “Science fiction” is not cited again until 
the 1870s (Davies). This may seem to undermine the assertion that Shelley’s 
Frankenstein was foundational to the genre, however, the first search result in 1850, 
while appearing in the American corpora, is in fact published in London.  
This 1851 reference comes from William Wilson, who uses the term “science 
fiction” in his discussion of a poem that recounts the perspectives of seven different 
small insects and animals of the one object:  
 
Fiction has lately been chosen as a means of familiarising science in one 
single case only, but with great success, it is by the celebrated dramatic poet, 
R. H. Horne, and is entitled “The Poor Artist; or, Seven Eye-sights and One 
Object.” We hope it will not be long before we may have their works of 
Science-Fiction, as we believe such books likely to fulfil a good purpose, and 




As Wilson observes, the purpose of the poem is to familiarise science through 
fiction. Shelley’s goal is not quite so direct—Frankenstein does not take interest in 
the science directly; rather, it focuses on the potential consequences of radical new 
science. Importantly, Wilson notes, “such books [are] likely to fulfil a good purpose, 
and create an interest, where, unhappily, science might fail” (137). This shows a 
recognition of the ability of the discursive interaction between science and fictional 
literature that Shelley established to allow science to be spoken about or considered 
in cultural spaces in which the discourse of science does not operate alone. 
Essentially, Wilson is arguing that fiction allows science to broaden its reach. 
Although it is impossible to know what “good purpose” Wilson had in mind, the 
obvious moral connotations are unavoidable. Wilson’s more direct definition of 
science fiction can be summarised as fiction that conveys scientific fact: “Science-
Fiction, in which the revealed truths of science may be given, interwoven with a 
pleasing story which may itself be poetical and true—this circulating a knowledge of 
the Poetry of Science, clothed in the garb of the Poetry of life. The influences of 
science inter-penetrate the whole Earth” (139-140). His closing observation is just 
one example of the perceived importance and pervasiveness of the discourse of 
science. I would argue what Wilson is really observing is the interaction between the 
discourses of science and the as yet undefined discourse of secular morals, with 
literature as the vehicle that allows scientific ideas to be considered through a 
different lens.  
Allan K. Hunter highlights the complex and changing relationship between 
discourses at the time Shelley was writing. He describes Frankenstein as: 
 
an examination of the tensions between various kinds of science and political 
reform associated with their appeal to scientific laws of development. The 
renewal of conservatism in England led to a condemnation of both 
revolutionary political thought as well as the scientific inquiry that flourished 
under its aegis. Shelley personified this conflation in a creature that was a 
product of Enlightenment materialism, without the morality formed from 
familial connection or regulating religious philosophy. The resulting fear 
applied equally to evolution’s seeming dismissal of the need for the divine, as 
well as the possibility of the underclass gaining power that it lacked the 




Hunter picks up on a number of important themes in the readings of Shelley and her 
discursive context. Broadly speaking, these are centred on scientific development, 
political reform (both in revolutionary politics and the unknown threat of a more 
politically aware lower class), and the absence of divinity. It is unsurprising that a 
sense of fear or trepidation about the future was prevalent in this rapidly changing 
landscape and it is this fear that Shelley allows her readers to consider from the 
safety of fiction. 
Christa Knellwolf reaffirms Hunter’s observation that there was a lack of 
“virtue” in the use of power (both scientific and political) at the time Shelley wrote: 
 
In the early nineteenth century, curiosity could no longer be indicted as a 
dangerous pursuit. The age of Enlightenment had already defined curiosity as 
a healthy, or indeed vital, element in the overthrow of a superstitious and 
narrow-minded world view. But little attention was devoted to the question 
of how the age could cope with the experience of seeing the fall of long-
established myths. The novel, therefore, reminds us that the process of 
expanding geographic and intellectual boundaries needs to be embedded in a 
context of care, responsibility and respect. (Geographic Boundaries, 64) 
 
Joan Kirkby agrees that human curiosity, the will of man, could not be stopped. As 
Victor dies, Kirby argues that “he is troubled that the demon should live after him, 
but of course their fate is intertwined. Frankenstein’s death spells the death of his 
creature, although the fact that we do not witness the Creature’s immolation suggests 
Schopenhauer’s idea that the will of man—and Schopenhauer’s will is the blind, 
eternal drive of the Freudian id—does indeed live after death” (113). This, Knellwolf 
argues, has become a defining feature of our modern world: 
 
Most Romantic philosophers and writers might have insisted on the 
unrestricted exertion of genius in response to their tacit understanding that 
the highest form of intellectual activity would necessarily benefit human 
justice and prosperity. The idea that no limits should be put to intellectual 
creativity has established itself as a core value, with only very minor 




If then curiosity is a given, I would argue that Knellwolf’s assertion that boundary 
making needs to be done with “care, responsibility and respect” is exactly the lesson 
of Shelley’s novel. She does not didactically impose a boundary, but gives the reader 
the space to draw their own.  
This space for boundary-making is established in the way both Victor and his 
creature are given a voice as the novel closes. On his death bed, Frankenstein offers 
a self-assessment of his conduct: 
 
During these last days I have been occupied in examining my past conduct; 
nor do I find it blameable.… My duties towards my fellow-creatures had 
greater claims to my attention, because they included a greater proportion of 
happiness or misery. Urged by this view, I refused, and I did right in 
refusing, to create a companion for the first creature. (M. Shelley, 
Frankenstein [1818], 156) 
 
Frankenstein believes he is not “blameable” and he “did right”. Yet this is contrasted 
to the Creature’s lament, which calls into question Victor’s confident assertion of 
having no responsibility to his creation: “Still I desired love and fellowship, and I 
was still spurned. Was there no injustice in this? Am I to be thought the only 
criminal, when all humankind sinned against me?” (Shelley, Frankenstein [1818], 
160). In presenting both the creator’s and the creation’s perspectives, without 
favouring one over the other, Shelley’s closing opens a space for the reader to decide 
if in fact the Creature is “the only criminal” in the narrative. Unsurprisingly, as a 
result of this ambiguous ending, different readers will take differing positions.  
Melinda Cooper reads Frankenstein as a lesson for figures like Victor, 
arguing that Shelley’s audience is the scientist himself and the novel is: 
 
at times critical reflection on the scientific approach to monstrosity. In no 
sense does Shelley propose a simple moral condemnation of the scientific 
manipulation of life—but neither does she simply endorse the progressivist 
optimism of a materialist such as Lawrence. Instead, Shelley is concerned 
with exploring the ethical and relational dimension of the scientist’s 




This suggests a more didactic lesson—scientists must be cautious and responsible. 
However, it is the broader social boundaries that would dictate a scientist’s 
behaviour, and the work of this cultural boundary making is done by all participants, 
not merely the scientists themselves. Cooper continues with this idea of 
responsibility: “The supreme irony of Shelley’s Frankenstein is that the teratological 
creature grows up to offer an extremely articulate philosophical and political 
challenge to his creator’s pretensions. What he demands of his creator is no less than 
a new understanding of justice—one that would embrace the rights of the ‘monster’ 
along with the newfound rights of universal man” (96). Clearly, a number of critics 
agree that it is not a question of right or wrong, but more importantly taking 
responsibility for the results of your curiosity. This is the responsibility not only of 
the individual, but of the culture that gave curiosity free reign. As Frankenstein 
advises Walton, “Seek happiness in tranquillity and avoid ambition, even if it be 
only the apparently innocent one of distinguishing yourself in science and 
discoveries. Yet why do I say this? I have myself been blasted in these hopes, yet 
another may succeed” (Shelley, Frankenstein [1818], 157). The curiosity that fuels 
scientific inquiry is unlikely to be dulled by an admonishment to “avoid ambition”. 
In giving this reminder to the reader that while Frankenstein’s project failed, 
another’s “may succeed”, Shelley broadens the scope of potential meaning, opening 
a space for readers to reflect upon the possibility of other projects, real or imagined, 
coming to fruition and the moral boundaries they would draw in these circumstances. 
Knellwolf adds a crucial caveat to this discussion of the relationship between 
curiosity and responsibility, arguing that it lacks an understanding of what is needed 
after curiosity is satisfied: 
 
Its warning about the dangerous consequences of scientific curiosity, 
however, does not instruct us to desist from the desire to know but urges us 
to build the context for an understanding of self and world that benefits each 
and every one. Therefore, it suggests that the first cause of all misfortunes is 
not unreasonable curiosity but insufficient knowledge about the qualities and 




 Shelley does not condemn Victor for his curiosity, pursuit of knowledge or violation 
of religious boundaries in his attempt to create life like God. As Alexandra Aldrid 
argues, “Shelley was not condemning scientific research as forbidden knowledge … 
instead … she alerted them [her contemporaries] to the social dangers contained in a 
newly forming mythos” (17). Victor’s greatest flaw is not his use of science, but his 
failure to care for his creature that results. Shelley has Victor acknowledge this: “In a 
fit of enthusiastic madness I created a rational creature, and was bound towards him 
to assure, as far as was in my power, his happiness and well-being” (Shelley, 
Frankenstein [1818], 156). However, Victor decides his responsibility to mankind as 
a whole supersedes his obligation to his creation. It is not curiosity that Shelley 
condemns, but the fact that in this headlong rush to know and to find the answer, 
little consideration is given to the most important “what if?” of all: what if this 
works? What if this goes wrong? Knellwolf continues with this idea: 
 
Frankenstein, by contrast, deplores most scientists’ sad lack of reflective 
consideration of what they are doing. The novel draws attention to the fact 
that a precarious lack of responsible foresight characterises our culture’s 
valorisation of progress. It clearly advocates certain boundaries to the 
application of scientific discoveries but it is far from suggesting that curiosity 
should be restrained. (Geographic Boundaries 62)  
 
Or more simply, as Jeff Goldblum’s Dr Ian Malcom so aptly states in another 
modern tale of science applied without responsibility or forethought, Jurassic Park, 
“Your scientists were so preoccupied with whether or not they could, they didn’t 
stop to think if they should” (1993). It is this idea that is the real crux of the novel, 
and the real “what if?” question that drives the discourse Shelley founded—not 
“what if scientific endeavour resulted in x?” but, “how would I respond if x 
occurred? Where are my personal boundaries?” This is a question that is not only the 
responsibility of the scientist to consider, but one of society as a whole.  
This intersection between science and literature was not formally labelled as 
the genre of science fiction until some 70 years after the publication of Frankenstein. 
This presents a challenge in categorising Shelley’s work, as modern critical tradition 
seeks to situate the novel retroactively as either a Gothic text or as a science fiction 
one. Unlike the Gothic, whose tropes were established prior to Shelley’s writing, 
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science fiction was yet to develop clearly defined tropes, as the genre had not yet 
gained sufficient recognition to be labelled. I argue that what we see in Frankenstein 
is the first manifestation of some of the tropes that would ultimately come to be 
recognised as part of the science fiction genre and a new way of thinking about 
science through fiction, through which it achieved its initial cultural and social 
impact, paving the way for its literary influence to come into effect. 
 
6.4 RIPPLES AND REBOUNDS: THE REACH OF DISCOURSE  
 
This study of impact, both from a textual perspective and a cultural perspective 
reveals much. Having mapped the landscape of Shelley’s time and her place within it 
through contextual biography, we can use tools such as Google Ngram and Davies’s 
Advanced Interface to not only see the size of the ripples caused by texts, but also 
delve into the form these ripples took, as responses, criticisms, or tangential 
references that reveal the vast reach of Frankenstein as a symbol. Criticism most 
often takes a textual perspective, placing themselves at the point of impact in the 
cultural pool, and tracing the ripples caused by the text as they race outward, perhaps 
intersecting with other discursive ripples. Having built a rich, multidimensional 
image, we are only then able to view the impact of the author-subject’s work in a 
new way, to position ourselves on the shore—where we may lose sight of the 
original text itself, but can see its influence as the surface of culture shifts and 
reforms under the work’s influence, and perhaps even see the most powerful of 
ripples reach the shore, reshaping society itself.  
Hunter, Knellwolf and others identify that curiosity, or wanting to discover 
the unknown, is a key driver of Shelley’s novel and its readership. The final question 
to consider is this: how does this discourse of moral curiosity continue to operate 
today? To get to this point, we should not leap headlong into the present—a final 
summary of how the discursive space opened out during Shelley’s own time will be 
undertaken. Tod Chambers argues that “fiction does not simply reflect the world … 
but, by engaging the reading in a particular presentation of the world, fiction argues 
for that particular view” (80). He continues, “It is the power of fiction to argue for a 
way of seeing the world by constructing an imagined space where conflicting values 
are able to enter into a struggle with one another and, most importantly, a space 
where one of those values is portrayed as winning” (81). This is where Shelley’s 
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work differs, as she does not portray a particular set of values “winning”. The 
consternation this caused is clear when we consider, for example, the opinion 
expressed in The Quarterly Review: “it inculcates no lesson of conduct, manners, or 
morality; it cannot mend, and will not even amuse its readers, unless their taste have 
been deplorably violated” (“Rev. of Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus”).  
This void of moral clarity was quickly filled in the 1823 stage adaptation of 
the novel, Presumption. As Lillian Furst notes, “Literary works are especially 
valuable for disclosing the variegated human responses to the scientific advances of 
the period. These responses run the whole gamut from enthusiastic embrace of the 
new to doubts, falterings, scepticism, and downright rejection” (xii). John Robbins 
argues that the play’s more overtly moral message was more palatable to audiences 
precisely because it did portray particular “values as winning” (Chambers 81) and 
showed a rejection of the ambiguous morality of Shelley’s original work. Robbins 
cites The Morning Post’s July 1823 review of Presumption: “in the novel the rigid 
moralist may feel himself constantly offended, by the modes of reasoning, principles 
of action, &c. – But in the Drama this is all carefully kept in the background. 
Nothing but what can please, astonish, and delight, is there suffered to appear” 
(Robbins 194-195). One of the ways the play mitigates the moral questions of the 
novel is the removal of the Creature’s potential for procreation with the absence of 
the female creature (Robbins 195). Robbins notes it is not only Presumption 
performing this act of moral reinterpretation:  
 
Taken together, Frankenstein and Presumption provide a case study in how 
drama helped shape, and in many cases ameliorate, public perceptions of 
scientific knowledge during this transformational period: Peake’s play 
converted a narrative of unease into one of containment and an assertion of 
humanity’s dominance over its creations, one that allowed for a more 
comfortable engagement with scientific advancements that were occupying 
an ever-expanding place in the lives of common citizens. (195) 
 
This more conservative framing of the dangers of science, with a clear moral lesson 
and man triumphing over the mute Monster, coupled with the play’s success, 
demonstrate how Shelley’s ambiguous close allowed people to respond in their own 
way. The popularity of this more conservative, definitive outcome, with its clear 
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moral prerogative shows that the general feeling about the original Frankenstein was 
one of unease—people wanted a happy, clear cut, ending. In this way, we can see 
Presumption as a reaction to the ripples of discontent caused by Shelley’s ambiguous 
ending.  
In turn, Shelley’s own editorial efforts responded to the success of 
Presumption: the impact of the adaptation rebounded back to affect the original work 
in the much more overtly moral tone evident in the 1831 edition. As Robbins 
explains: 
 
Such a framing helps shed light on Shelley’s reworking of her own novel 
between the two editions of 1818 and 1831, during which she revised the text 
to make its moral condemnation of Frankenstein more apparent: by appearing 
before a mass spectatorship throughout the 1820s, Presumption had altered 
the public discourse on the new advances in the life sciences … 
Presumption and its many adaptations are the heirs of such works in their 
exploration of contemporary anxieties about scientific progress and 
industrialization, but they adopted a distinctly more optimistic take on the 
effects of such curiosity, rendering their source text more socially palatable in 
the process. (195) 
 
I argue that Robbins’s observation that “Presumption had altered the public 
discourse on the new advances in the life sciences” is not entirely accurate: Shelley’s 
novel established a new discursive space for people to think about the “life 
sciences”, and Presumption is one of the first responses to the work that operates in 
this same discursive space. Presumption does alter the discourse about the new 
sciences, as it shows the more conservative message people were comfortable 
hearing. 
This discussion clearly demonstrates that Shelley’s society was grappling 
with new moral questions, and her text was the first to explore science through 
fiction in a way that was taken up in popular culture, so creating a new space for the 
plays, films, and adaptations that followed to test the moral boundaries that Shelley 
has left undefined. As Robbins notes, many of these texts offered a more didactic 
and reassuring view than that of the original, but the space was nonetheless open and 
the conversations about the boundaries of science were being had. In this way, we 
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can see these early plays and texts as a response to Shelley’s work, an answer of 
what society would find acceptable.  
 
6.5 DISCOURSE TODAY 
 
Academic debate about the relationship between literature, reading and ethics is 
ongoing. Some see a direct casual relation between reading and action, while others 
counter this view. Martha Nussbaum’s argument that literature cultivates “powers of 
imagination that are essential to citizenship” (85) centres on literature as a vehicle 
for empathy and, in turn, social action. Yet Suzanne Keen suggests that “a society 
that insists on receiving immediate ethical and political yields from the recreational 
reading of its citizens puts too great a burden on both empathy and the novel” (168). 
While Nussbaum and Keen offer differing positions on the social role of literature, 
both focus on its ethical function, suggesting reading should affect readers’ sense of 
responsibility to others in society. As Geoffrey Galt Harpham describes, “Ethics is 
the arena in which the claims of otherness—the moral law, the human other, cultural 
norms, the Good-in-itself etc.—are articulated and negotiated” (394). For my part, I 
argue the work of fiction is of fundamental importance here, as the fictive element of 
a work provides a “safe” space for readers by limiting demands upon them in the real 
world. As Keen points out: 
 
readers’ perception of a text’s fictionality plays a role in subsequent 
empathetic response, by releasing readers from the obligations of self-
protection through skepticism and suspicion. David Miall has noticed a 
similar effect. The fiction reader who suspends disbelief, Miall argues, 
encounters devices that vouch for a novel’s fictionality and that are “capable 
of eliciting the decentering response of empathic projection. (88) 
 
A reader’s knowledge of the novel as fiction allows freedom to engage imaginatively 
in both emotive and ethical responses. Keen argues that popular fiction is even less 
likely to result in social change: 
 
When a novel becomes a popular bestseller, I have suggested, the 
psychological effect of diffusion of responsibility may deter readers from 
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acting upon their empathetic reading. The link between feeling with fictional 
characters and acting on behalf of real people, I have argued, is extremely 
tenuous and has yet to be substantiated either through empirical research into 
the effects of reading or through analysis of demonstrable causal 
relationships between novel reading as a cultural phenomenon and historical 
changes in societies in which novel reading flourishes. (146) 
 
While I do not think it is the necessary goal of fiction to achieve broad, 
tangible social reform as Nussbaum suggests, I do not agree with Keen’s assertion 
that popular fiction cannot have a social impact. As David White argues, “Science 
fiction as extrapolative thinking helps us to decide whether or not the catastrophic 
projection is realistic. Because of its moral consequences for the present, such 
speculation is anything but idle” (186). What some forms of fiction do is provide a 
safe space for readers to form individual, perhaps empathetic, but certainly ethical, 
responses. This is where I feel the power of science fiction truly lies—in giving the 
reader the imaginative space to explore possibilities without didactically proposing a 
solution or demanding an action. It is here that the value of readers and reading, both 
recreationally and critically, becomes evident. As Christopher Small argues, “it is not 
simply a question of literary descendants; Frankenstein belongs to the literature (and 
so of course does any work worth talking about in some degree) which has progeny 
not only in other writing but in ways of thought and consequently in acts: bringing 
not only other books but worlds into sight” (196).  
Yet as Keen points out, “empathy for a fictional character need not 
correspond with what the author appears to set up or invite … Self-reported readers’ 
empathy appears to be unpredictable and sporadic” (75). Shelley cannot have 
predicted if the reader would respond to Victor’s search for knowledge in a positive 
or negative way or if they in fact empathised with the Creature, or Walton, or any 
other figure in the novel. The reader may feel greater empathy for the Creature, and 
so view Victor as having failed his duty to his creation. As Colin McGinn notes, 
“one purpose of fiction is to present and reveal character in such a way as to invite 
moral appraisal” (2-3). These “evaluative attitudes” are both “affective as well as 
cognitive” (McGinn 3). A capacity for inviting differing responses is further enabled 
because Shelley provides no guidance from her privileged authorial position over the 
text—she does not condemn Victor or the Creature. McGinn describes the Creature 
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as a “rich source of human anxiety” (144), because his story is “complex, pregnant, 
and salutary—an emblematic tale of moral metamorphosis” (146). The uncertainty 
of the ending is reinforced as we do not see the Creature perish: as Walton sails 
away, he is “lost in darkness and distance”.  
The potential survival of the Creature and the lack of clear lesson in Victor’s 
story opens a space for the reader’s response to take primacy over any intended 
authorial meaning. As Wolfgang Iser established, “the convergence of text and 
reader brings the literary work into existence, and this convergence can never be 
precisely pinpointed, but must always remain virtual, as it is not to be identified with 
either the reality of the text or with the individual disposition of the reader” (277). 
Because the ending is not clear cut, there is greater scope for the disposition of the 
reader to play a larger role in meaning-making, as the reality of the text does not 
provide a definitive ending. This “essential ambiguity” (Hitchcock 226) is what 
establishes a space for moralising or ethical thinking. Unlike the didactic lessons 
given in other nineteenth century novels, such as the Bronte’s exhortations on good 
social conduct, which teach the reader what the world should be like, Shelley’s work 
shows the reader one potential view of what the world might be like, if we allow the 
“what if?” to become a “when I”. The lack of ethical guidance given by Shelley 
creates a vacuum that the readers must fill with their own conclusions. There are 
those readers that, as Shelley encourages in the more conservative 1831 edition of 
the novel, “deduce an apt moral from my tale” and condemn Victor, the Modern 
Prometheus, for attempting to usurp the creative powers of God. Others see it as a 
warning not against scientific experiment, but a lesson in the responsibility that must 
accompany this.  
The discursive space which Shelley founded with Frankenstein continues to 
provide readers today with texts which ask “what if?” and give readers room to 
create boundaries for themselves. Even in texts which present a more overt moral 
judgement of their characters, readers can still choose to take a resistant reading and 
so form their own position. While Frankenstein made his creature from many parts, 
science today allows for exact replication—cloning. Cloning technology has been 
explored in science fiction and Amit Marcus argues, “despite its transgressions of the 
boundaries of the actual world, science fiction can contribute to the bioethical 
discussion of cloning” (429). I argue it is not “despite” but because of fiction’s 
“transgressions” of reality that fiction contributes by providing a hypothetical space 
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to think through and explore the potential outcomes of new science. Marcus notes 
three ways in which fiction contributes to the cloning debate: “it can highlight 
potential problematic situations that cloning may bring about, which are ignored or 
marginalised in current bioethical debate”; also, while modern sciences are bound by 
strict codes of ethical conduct, science fiction offers a lens through which the 
broader social or relational impacts of science can play out, mirroring science’s “can 
we?” with a more reflective “should we?”; and science fiction can also serve as a 
“social barometer” in that it can “give voice to and amplify popular conceptions 
about science in general and clones in particular” (429).  
It has in fact become commonplace for scientists and their publics to look to 
science fiction for guidance on innovation. It is widely accepted, for example, that 
without Arthur C. Clarke’s vision of a global satellite network we would not have 
that particular technology that makes global telecommunications a reality. 
Conversely, the cause of robotics and AI innovations has no doubt been held back to 
some degree by decisions made by government agencies and funding bodies on the 
basis of fears of a world in which the vision of Isaac Asimov’s I, Robot or of 
the Terminator film franchise might be close to reality. Yet the impact of science 
fiction is not always so immediately obvious—as Laurie Johnson has explained, the 
uptake of virtual reality technologies should have been inspired by William Gibson’s 
wildly successful Neuromancer (1984), and as early as 1987 a viable VR kit was 
ready for domestic distribution with the VPL Reality Built for Two package released 
by Thomas Zimmerman and Jaron Lanier, but the personal computer had already 
cornered the domestic market, forcing VR technologies to have to be developed to 
interface with domestic computers (“Spectral Machinery,” 47-49). As Johnson 
explains further, the success of the personal computer was based in large part on it 
having been developed hand-in-glove with computer games, because the developers 
of the earliest personal computers were also science fiction fans who wanted to 
demonstrate the capabilities of this technology by replicating the space operas of 
Doc Smith in the program Spacewar! (49; see also Johnson, “Speculations”).  
Alexandra Aldrid suggests that “science fiction … is better understood and 
appraised as a register of newly emerging values. In that sense it often serves as a 
fictive seismograph of not altogether visible social change before that change 
becomes institutionalised” (16). Marcus argues that “bioethicists should take [these 
conceptions] into account, even if they deem these conceptions false and misleading” 
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(429). Science fiction offers scientists insight into how their work is perceived within 
the community. While this is done through a fictional medium, it nonetheless serves 
as a representation of the fears and hopes laypersons hold for emerging technologies 
and scientific advancements. Marcus’s concludes then that “science fiction … 
defamiliarises the perception, conventions and habitual thought of its readers, 
thereby making them aware of their often unstated presuppositions” (429). That is, 
by being offered a fictive experience, readers have the opportunity to reflect 
hypothetically upon how they position themselves on the topic, without the real 
world pressure of making a decision that will affect their life and their society. 
Aldrid recognises that science fiction as we understand it today operates in the same 
way as Frankenstein, noting that “both Shelley and LeGuin have produced 
exceptionally popular science fiction novels that … are teeming with ideas that 
reflect the romantic counterargument to the scientific rationalism of their respective 
times” (18).  
It is not only LeGuin’s fiction that offers this counterpoint—this is a key 
feature of the discursive space in which these texts operate. Anne Franciska Pusch 
explores the relationship between Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy and 
xenotransplantation, to reveals the ongoing discursive interactions between hard 
science and science fiction. Pusch argues that like Shelley, Atwood was well 
positioned to write science fiction: 
 
Being brought up among scientists, [Atwood] found inspiration in her 
family’s discussions of scientific experiments they conducted themselves, in 
addition to popular scientific magazines she read. This paper views the 
connection of fiction and science from two angles: first, how science fiction 
is inspired by science and second, how science fiction might inspire science. I 
argue there are mutual exchanges which can lead to reciprocal influence. (56) 
 
Pusch continues this argument about the interaction possible between science and 
science fiction: 
 
For bioethics, this means that with the help of imagined scenarios such as in 
science fiction, ethical concerns can be made visible and debated in a less 
constricted space. Liminal beings emerging from xenotransplantation do not 
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need to remain shadowy figures, they can be revived in the fictional context, 
which helps to make them more approachable and understandable. 
Repercussions of biomedical research can equally be made more 
comprehensible within the fictional realm. Both bioethics and literary studies 
can thus inform each other on critical topics that affect us all. (59-60) 
 
What Pusch observes here is also true of the Creature—he is a liminal being, not 
quite human and pushed out from the society in which he desperately seeks 
acceptance. Shelley’s representation of the Creature, the way he is humanised and 
also given a voice, makes him “more approachable and understandable”. Rather than 
the shambling, grunting figure of B-grade horror adaptations, Shelley’s original 
Creature offers an articulate plea for recognition as more alike than Other, as solid 
rather than liminal.  
This is something that Dolly the Sheep or the pigs growing human organs 
cannot (yet) do. As Pusch continues: 
 
Engaging with literary works that treat the problematic relationship between 
human and nonhuman beings in future capitalist consumer societies can help 
readers better understand their current society. The trends that Atwood 
extrapolates are dystopian, but they are also realistic and eerily possible. Her 
writing focuses on topics that are highly relevant for today’s world and it thus 
has the power to get the reader’s attention. (71) 
 
Here again Pusch articulates a key feature of the discourse in which both Atwood 
and Shelley write: that their writing is popular, it “has the power to get the reader’s 
attention” and in turn may allow the reader to “better understand their current 
society”. That is, “The utilization of fictional characters allows for a greater sphere 
in which moral questions can be reframed and applied to actual scientific 
developments” (55). Aldrid’s comments on LeGuin and Pusch’s observations of 
Atwood recognise the moralising space made available in science fiction, it a way 
that is not possible in standard scientific discourse. As Pusch notes, “fictional 
scenarios can help to shift the focus away from the anticipated positive outcome to 
that of the ethical and moral concerns not being examined in the context of the 
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experiments themselves and not being written down in the proposals for research 
grants” (63). 
 
6.6 IN CLOSING: THE FINAL SUTURE 
 
Speculative fiction asks “what if?” and I think great works in this genre leave it up to 
the reader to make their own decisions. In this way, fiction reading does shape 
culture, at an individual level, as each reader, in their response, draws a new 
boundary for themselves—Victor is to be condemned, celebrated for his endeavour, 
chastised for his lack of care for his creature, and so the reader may respond 
similarly when science does pose the same question in the real world. Frankenstein’s 
entry into the zeitgeist as a warning against playing God or irresponsible science 
suggests this is the dominant reading of the text. It also turns us back towards 
Nussbaum’s view that fiction can have a social outcome. The dominant view is that 
Frankenstein’s frequent invocation indicates that our culture has recognised the 
perilous nature of Victor’s lack of responsibility and so we have adopted a cautious 
approach to genetic and biological experimentation. Taking another example from 
the contemporary debate about cloning, Anne Lawton’s “The Frankenstein 
Controversy: The Constitutionality of a Federal Ban on Cloning” opens with a 
quotation from the novel and makes a bold claim for the lesson that the book 
continues to provide: 
 
[it] tapped into a societal uneasiness about the proper limits of scientific 
inquiry. Scientific discoveries do not unfold in a vacuum. They play out 
against a cultural backdrop in which both fantasy and reality are intertwined. 
Tampering with the process of creation, whether it be in the form of assisted 
reproductive technology, genetic testing, or, at its most extreme, cloning, 
plays on “profound concerns regarding the nature of humankind and its 
relationship to other aspects of the natural world”. (279) 
 
This highlights that the “what if?” of Shelley’s novel taps in to real world, and in this 
way reveals the operating of the discursive space that underpins the genre of science 
fiction. Readers can respond to the “what if?” with their own personal moral 
boundaries, safe in the knowledge that it is a fictional scenario. Yet at the same time, 
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as the premise has an air of reality, readers can also reflect upon their own real world 
experience, without necessarily having to be moved to action or a change in 
behaviour.  
Overall, I think Nussbaum’s argument that literature should serve as an 
ethical primer is potentially unachievable—literature’s ethical dimension cannot be 
ignored, and writers and readers must take responsibility for the texts they produce, 
but the role of the primer seems to be impossible for all literary texts to live up to. 
Reader’s responses will always vary based upon which character they feel the 
greatest empathy for and so no consistent lesson can be guaranteed to be learned. 
Keen acknowledges the complexity of the relationship between writing, reading and 
responding: 
 
That the novel should be singled out as a technology most adept at invoking 
empathy and shaping moral behaviour challenges what psychologists have 
been able to discover about empathy, but it endorses what many people believe 
about the transformative power of reading and of reading fiction in particular. 
(35) 
 
I would add to Keen’s point that speculative fiction is more likely to provoke ethical 
responses that come to bear in the real world. The reason for this, is that the “what 
if?” of the science fiction genre, coupled with ambiguity in the author’s ending, 
works to create a space for the readers to draw their own boundaries. In the case of 
Frankenstein, the narrative has transcended its readership, with the term becoming a 
cultural marker for the dangers of unfettered scientific experimentation. While 
speculative fiction broadly, and the science fiction genre particularly, are often seen 
a pulp or low brow, the popularity of the genre speaks to its appeal in our time of 
rapidly developing scientific change, just as was the case in Shelley’s time. Shelley 
helped establish a new way for fiction and reality to interact—an intersection where 
the reader is offered the security of fiction but the intellectual room to consider the 
potential realities of the author’s “what if?” premise. In this way we can see the act 
of reading as a rehearsal, rather than an enactment, of citizenry.  
The reading of fiction does not have to result in social action, but fiction does 
serve a social function—the safe space for readers to draw their own ethical 
boundaries within “what if?” scenarios provides a space for thinking about how we 
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would respond to similar changes in our real lives. McGinn’s observation about the 
experience of reading is perhaps most pertinent in this respect: 
 
In reading a novel we have ethical experiences, sometimes quite profound 
ones, and we reach ethical conclusion, condemning some characters and 
admiring others. We live a particular set of moral challenges (sitting there in 
our armchair) by entering into the lives of the characters introduced … A 
tremendous amount of moral thinking and feeling is done when reading 
novels … we can put an ethical idea through its paces, testing its ability to 
command our assent. We can also explore its alignments, limitations, 
repercussions. We can face moral reality with all its complexity and drama. 
(174-176) 
 
What this final chapter has revealed is that science fiction is not merely a series of 
generic tropes, such as the fantastic tales of mad scientists. Science fiction provides 
readers space for moralising, for explorations of ethical boundaries. In this way, 
science fiction is more than a genre, rather than genre is the manifestation of the 
moral discursive space Shelley established with Frankenstein. As Brooks Landon 
eloquently explains, in reading science fiction, readers have “the sense that you are a 
part of an enterprise with an agenda, a way of seeing the world as a problem to be 
solved or an opportunity to be taken, but most of all as an excuse for thinking, for 
endless speculation, fuelled by the simple words ‘what if?’” (Landon 36). It is thanks 
to Mary Shelley that we have this way of seeing the world through the lens of fiction 








Thanks to Mary Shelley, authors and their readers can look through the lens of a 
microscope or into the infinite vastness of space and wonder “what if…?” together. 
Opportunities for further exploration of the texts which occupy the discourse Shelley 
founded and their impact abound. Scholars of science fiction have already looked 
closely at the Golden Age of SF in the 1950s and the undeniable cultural impact of 
the Star Trek and Star Wars franchises, which have taught us to “live long and 
prosper” as we fight injustice and tyranny. With the research tools now available it 
becomes possible for scholars to trace and quantify the ongoing cultural impact of 
Spock and Skywalker, who, like the Creature, are readily recognisable even if the 
viewer has not seen the original series or films. Perhaps there is a case to be made 
that those authors who first turned their eyes to the stars as space travel loomed as a 
real possibility in the 1960s are the next wave of influence within Shelley’s 
discourse, reshaping it with a hope that man will do better and be kinder if given the 
chance amongst the stars – a moral hope rather than a moral ambiguity. 
 Alternately, the approach I have taken in my reading of Shelley and 
Frankenstein may be applied to another genre altogether, identifying other authors 
whose works have had a significant cultural impact; the ripples of which we can 
trace using new research tools. Stephen King springs to mind as an interesting study, 
as another famous creator of ‘monsters’. While Shelley has one hugely influential 
character, King’s works have permeated Western, particularly American, popular 
culture with a range of influences: a generation of parents who don’t let their 
children play near storm water drains (It) or those who dislike seeing twins in hotels 
(The Shining), for example. Just as Shelley’s work was rapidly annexed by theatrical 
productions, so too King’s characters have been adapted for the screen. Like 
Frankenstein’s Creature, King’s characters are also present in a wide array of 
intertextual references and borrowings and it is now possible to trace and measure 
the reach of his impact in our culture.  
Ultimately, this thesis has been a study of lives and afterlives, of the ripples 
that a single figure can cause. Building upon the rich biographical tradition in studies 
of Shelley and her works, I aimed in Chapters One and Two to explore the utility and 
better articulate the methodology of contextual biography as a way of seeing Shelley 
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positioned within the multidimensional time and place she occupied. While a study 
of the subject is still a key pillar in any form of biography, the defining feature of 
this methodology is a survey of the cultural landscape of which the subject was a 
part. This includes not only works and discourses that directly impinged upon the 
subject, but more broad forces of change and continuity in their society. This allows 
the biographer to better place their subject within this landscape, and begin to trace 
the intersections and interactions between the author’s life and works, and the world 
in which they lived. By adopting this contextual approach, we build a richer, 
multidimensional image of the biographical subject, and are able to see the author-
subject as an agent, both impacted by and impacting upon, their cultural landscape. 
There remains a great deal more work to be done in articulating a clear methodology 
of contextual biography, as many biographers do consider context, yet I think for a 
work to be considered a genuine contextual biography, there should be a detailed 
study of “contexts and cotexts” (McCourt, xv), while avoiding the pitfalls of 
psychobiography.  
 Foucault’s conception of discourse and those who can found a discourse 
proved helpful in ascribing Shelley more significance than she is given in most 
scholarship. By looking at culture as a metaphorical pool, we can see both the ideas 
that flowed into shaping Shelley’s work and in turn how her culture responded to her 
ideas. The most important feature of Frankenstein is its ambiguity, its lack of 
condemnation. This opens a space to readers that was rarely found in other novels of 
the time, and not in reference to new sciences. The impact of this space can be traced 
as we see the growth of the science fiction genre, where the morality of science is 
often thrown into question. Chapter Five gave consideration to what could be framed 
as a biography of authorship, tracing the influence and inspiration Shelley derived 
from those around her and other significant literary works. Here, I argue, we can see 
Shelley pick up the threads of the both her father’s and her husband’s thinking, and 
offer her own perspective, the innovative form and content that would be one of the 
earliest and certainly the most pervasive intersections between science and fiction. 
The debate about whether Frankenstein is genuine science fiction or not can be 
reframed—it is a fiction based on science, but more importantly it is a space for 
thinking about science.  
Contextual biography’s mapping of landscape not only allows the biographer 
to place their subject in context, but also chart the afterlife of the subject by 
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providing a way to trace and measure the impact of their works. Tools such as the 
Advanced Interface provide new opportunities for researchers to see both the size 
and scope of the ripples of impact caused by their author-subject, long after their 
physical death. The more traditional textual perspective, where we trace the ripples 
of influence radiating outward from the work can be complemented by adopting 
another position, where we place ourselves on the socio-cultural boundary and watch 
how it is effected, even though we may have lost sight of the origin-text itself.  
This is well-evidenced in the case of Frankenstein, where the name of the 
novel is often misascribed, yet the ideas of the novel continue to shape our culture 
today. Hitchcock outlines the pervasiveness of the imagery of Frankenstein within 
our culture: 
 
While in Mary Shelley’s novel, the monster disappears “lost in darkness and 
distance”, he is never far away from us today. Many adaptations call the 
monster immortal; that claim might just as likely apply to the myth itself. 
Frankenstein’s monster is on our bookstore, on our film and television 
screens, from morning cartoons to wee-hours rerun movies. He plays roles in 
advertising and political debate, he appears at public library story hours and 
on graduate-level reading lists. He is both a joke and a profound ethical 
dilemma. Known around the world by name and appearance, he is an 
emanation of the current human condition—a bundle of contradictions and 
universal meaning all in one. (Hitchcock 317) 
 
The range of ways “Frankenstein” is invoked in our culture is indeed a kind of 
immortality—the “idea” of Frankenstein has become so well known that it can be 
referred to without any direct reference to or knowledge of the original text. The 
ripples that continue to emanate from Shelley’s work provide “a bundle of 
contradictions and universal meaning all in one” (Hitchcock 317). These 
contradictions are the many differing responses to Shelley’s work, both critical and 
literary. These texts are a part of the discourse Shelley established, a space where we 
as a culture attempt to construct a “universal meaning” for how we respond to 
science. Yet, as the ambiguous ending of Frankenstein highlights, it is ultimately up 
to the reader to chart their own moral boundaries within our cultural landscape.  
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I argue that Frankenstein as a text has sunk into our culture to become a part 
of the bedrock of how we think about science through fictional literature. It opened 
new channels and the ripples caused by this new discourse are still felt today. 
Frankenstein was cast into Romantic English culture at a time where the cultural 
bedrock was shifting, and new discourses were emerging throughout culture. Being 
able to trace the impact of this work allows us to see Shelley as a founder of 
discourse, and so ascribe her greater significance and recognition than a mere 
pioneer of genre. Proposing that Shelley is a Foucauldian founder of discourse offers 
a new perspective on her significance not only as a Romantic author, but as a figure 
who has shaped the world in which we live today, as the ripples and afterlives of the 
ideas in her novel continue to inform conversations about modern debates like 
cloning. This opens new opportunities to revaluate the genre of science fiction, not 
as a literary form, but as a discursive space in which the genre plays out a social 
function, allowing for the testing of moral boundaries through its fictional “what if?” 
There also exists many more opportunities for a detailed study of particular 
discursive interactions, of moments when Shelley’s novel had a visible impact upon 
scientific thinking or cultural perceptions of science. 
These opportunities stem from the ambiguity of Shelley’s novel, and the lack 
of moral didacticism that was the norm at the time. This moral ambiguity, or moral 
curiosity as I have framed it at times throughout this thesis, is the key feature of the 
discursive space Shelley established. I have intentionally not given this space a 
formal name, as Scientific Moralism or Moralisation through Fiction, prioritises one 
discourse over another. Rather, it is the fluid and changing interplay between the 
discourses that I see as one of the key ways this space works. The space is constantly 
being reshaped as the ripples and their rebounds interact, so it is an active and 
dynamic space, whereas bounding it with the use of a proper noun would only limit 
its potentials. The closest I can come to a name is to identify that the moral curiosity 
or ambiguity that Shelley let her readers explore is most often manifest in the genre 
of Science Fiction (whose name balances the two key interactions of Shelley’s 
work—asking the ‘what if?’ of new science through fiction, as discussed earlier). It 
is less about identifying what is present and more about seeing in works that operate 
in this space a lack or a vacancy—the moral decisions are left to the reader rather 
than filled in by the author.  
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It took over one hundred years for scholarship to recognise the significance 
of Shelley as anything more than the young wife of Percy, who happened to write a 
contentious debut novel. While Frankenstein and his creature rapidly took on a life 
of their own, two hundred years on we can now see how important the life Shelley 
lived was in creating the conditions that made a novel like Frankenstein possible. 
The impact of the novel both in Shelley’s time and now shows that what has been 
left in Shelley’s wake is a space within our culture for readers to engage with and 
create boundaries for themselves around the sciences that continue to shape and 
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